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Summary 
Kant's metaphysics of space 
periods is explored via his 
in both the pre-critical and critical 
relation to Leibniz, the incongruent 
counterparts argument, and the distinctive arguments of the 
Transcendental Aesthetic. Sequentially, Heidegger's phenomenology of 
space from the period of Being and Time is explicated in terms of 
concepts like deseverance, directionality, region and equipmentality. 
The two analyses are found to overlap on several key points. These 
include: the priority of the whole over the parts, openness, and 
exteriority and thus non-discursivity. 
'spacing' . Through further analyses, 
The points of overlap we call 
it is discovered that the 
concepts of spacing are precisely the concepts required by these two 
philosophers even when they treat of subjects not normally considered 
essentially spacial. These subjects include the nature of temporal 
relations, of selfhood and self-constancy, and of the experience and 
significance of art. The importance of spacing for these subjects is 
individually discussed, as are possible reasons why the language of 
space should be required. 
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Programmatic Introduction 
I. The Motivating Question. 
At first, there is a mere empirical ob~ervation: spacial language is to 
be found everywhere. In common expressions like 'your answer is very 
close', 'we have grown apart', 'that was a long time ago', 'a distant 
memory', etc. These do not fall under a single metaphor, certainly, 
but as a family of metaphors they are perhaps more commonly used, more 
historically continuous, and more widespread throughout the world's 
languages than any other 'family.' More pertinent here 1.S the 
appearance of this family in philosophy. For example, in the roots of 
words like 'understand', ' conceive', 'obj ect' . Broadly, in Kant's 
descriptions of his own project: the metaphor of the storm-locked 
island, of the abyss and the bridge, the dove in a vacuum, etc. And 
less dramatically, in the constant metaphors of inner, outer, 
combination and connection which to a certain extent Kant borrowed from 
the English and German traditions. We find example of this family also 
in the heights of ontology in Heidegger: 'time stretches/spans', 
'Dasein is ahead of itself/outside of itself' and so forth. But, 
again less dramatically, Heidegger's treatment of primordial space uses 
the language of everyday space (near, far, direction, region, etc.) 
while the treatment of for example Dasein's ontological ownness avoids 
the everyday language of consciousness and personal identity. Why is 
space preserved in this way? 
At the very least, this series of observations (concerning philosophy 
if not more generally) cries out for an analysis of spacial language 
which would answer the question: why, to what extent, and with what 
consequences does space serve as our first resource in the description 
the transcendental elements of experience? This question motivates the 
following work. 
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II. The Motivated Questions. 
Such an analysis could be carried out in at least two ways. First, 
through the lengthy assembly of a historical and semantic map of 
spacial metaphors In philosophical language, and 
interpretation of the elements of that map such that 
a 
one 
subsequent 
could then 
judge whether a given metaphor was appropriate or inappropriate to its 
particular philosophical object. This would be the work of decades. 
Secondly, just the reverse: an inquiry into a metaphysics of space such 
that any given metaphor in a certain context might be interpreted into 
some determinate analogical content. The latter would be quicker for 
the following reason, which may not be at all valid but at least has a 
long tradition: a philosopher is normally said to have a more solid 
grasp over his or her thought than over his or her language. Thus, by 
analyzing what space ~s (for a certain metaphysics) we ought to be 
closer to what spacial language means (in that metaphysics) . 
Kant and Heidegger are the chosen targets. This choice was almost but 
not quite arbitrary at least it can be said that both contain 
elaborate and influential theories about space. In each case a series 
of four questions is asked. Of course these questions look entirely 
different when asked in different contexts, and indeed fail to appear 
relevant or even intelligible in some contexts. 1) What 
epistemologically is space? That is, where does knowledge or awareness 
of space corne from, and how primary is it in the order of our 
experiences? 2) What ontologically is space? That is, what kind of 
thing is space, how does it relate to other things? What do we mean In 
saying 'space lS x or y' or 'x or y is spacial'? 3) What 
epistemologically does space do? Or rather, in which elemental 
experiences does space play a role, what is that role, and how 
essential is it? 4) What ontologically is spacing? In other words, 
assuming that the spacial language that both Kant and Heidegger use to 
describe transcendental elements beyond ordinary epistemology has 
meaning - and thus there is some 'spacing' character appropriate to 
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entities not normally considered spacial - what is that meaning and how 
does it relate to the space of the first three questions? 
Question four 1S the most important, since these questions are all 
projected by the motivating question g,iven above. It suggests (for the 
moment without proof) that the concepts involved in an explication of 
space itself (the first three questions) might have philosophical value 
outside the investigation of space itself. That is, these concepts 
might prove useful in the explication of phenomena which are not 
spacial in an ordinary sense or at least not essentially so. We know 
these concepts are used outside their sphere - the question is whether 
this use has a value beyond an uncritical acceptance of traditional or 
contemporary language use. Provisionally, my name for this 'value 
outside' is 'spacing'. Spacing would be that which makes spacial 
language appropriate to non-spacial ontological and epistemological 
problems. Thus, properly interpreted, the fourth question is identical 
with the motivating question. 
There are two parts to the thesis, the first about Kant, the second 
Heidegger. In each part, an attempt is made to answer the first three 
questions about space in the name of each philosopher. 'In the name 
of' demands a certain fidelity, which is seconded by the assumption 
made above of a 'solid' grasp of thought. Of course this fidelity is 
ultimately only regulative to an interpretation - and vis a vis the 
history of Kant scholarship especially, our interpretation will at 
times appear to reach new depths of infidelity. Nevertheless, every 
effort has been made to think Kantian (or Heideggerian) problems 1n the 
first instance through Kantian (or Heideggerian) concepts and 
conceptual language. To translate too quickly out of that language 
would be to assume the self-identity, relevance and existence of a 
philosophical object ('spacing') which we have not even yet found good 
reason to posit. It is also worth noting that this 'in the name of' 
solves (though again regulatively) questions about the method of this 
investigation. 
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Hopefully, however, these three answers will prove suggestive about 
possible answers to the fourth question. The posing of this fourth 
question will take place throughout, but culminate in a kind of test 
case for concepts of spacing. In both parts, my chosen test case 
includes (but is not necessarily limited to) the philosophy of art. It 
should also be noted that, in each case, the so-called 'test-case' 
takes over a theoretical centre from that which is its supposed to 
test. 
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III. The Motivated Sketch. 
How then have these questions worked themselves out? 
The external unity of the thesis (the manner in which these two parts 
'hang together' from the first) thus arises from at least a) the 
sameness of the questions about space asked of each philosopher; b) the 
sameness in the target test case (aesthetics). However, there is an 
internal unity: one of the remarkable outcomes 1S a coincidence not 
just of the questions but of the answers, even and especially in the 
so-called test-cases. 
Thus there are elements of Kant's theory of space (and of time - and 
thus of 'spacing' more generally) which are very clearly taken up by 
Heidegger and expanded upon in the very heart of his own enterprise. 
In fact, there are several parallel 'gaps' in Kant and Heidegger. In 
Kant we find the propriety of the mere form of intuition before (or 
perhaps rather in some ideal isolation from) the understanding opposed 
to the measured and synthetic propriety of intuition-concepts (schemata 
or, viewed from another direction, the principles). The basic 
characteristics of this opposition will be sketched in terms of 
concepts like wholeness, representation, exteriority and openness 
(chapters 1.1 and 1.2), while at the same time we show this 
opposition's importance for Kant's transcendental thought in its 
entirety. In Heidegger we will find what we will call 'neighbourhood-
space' (the space for and the occupancy of world, which is described in 
Heidegger's provisional phenomenological analysis of Dasein in terms of 
such concepts as region, deseverance, sign, etc.) opposed to what can 
be called mathematical-space (chapter 2.2). Many of the basic 
characteristics of this opposition will be found to agree with Kant -
though always subj ect to the difficult task of ' translating I bet':Jeen 
Kant and Heidegger and their very different projects and methods. 
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But there is another gap as well. In Kant, it lies between the 
intuition-concepts (through which objects are presented and thought) 
and the pseudo-noumenal projections of pure reason (through which an 
'object' is 'posited' by rational desire). However illusory these 
lat ter are, however, they are necessary to drive the understanding 
forward to law. But in chapter 1.3 and 1.4 we will discover a 
surprise: certain of the essential observations about the form of 
intuition become relevant for this third space: for apperception and 
for the ideal. That is, we will find spacing at the furthest reaches 
of rational thought. In Heidegger, the three 'spaces' are arranged 
differently, but the same surprise awaits us. Immediately behind and 
opposed to neighbourhood-space (and thus only indirectly to 
mathematical space) and again as its condition of possibility, lies 
authentic Being-in-the-world (chapters 2.1 and 2.2) which takes it 
meaning from primordial temporality (chapter 2.2). But just as In 
Kant, essential observations about neighbourhood-space (and, equally 
striking, many of the same observations as in Kant) are at work in the 
description of this temporality. We will thus be able to arrive at a 
concept of spacing/nothing in the service of temporality as the highest 
point to which transcendental/ontological thought could be taken. 
It should be noted that these discoveries can only occur within the 
context of an interpretation of these 'highest point's. To not engage 
with these problems separately (at least initially) from any question 
of spacing or spaciality, and to engage them with some degree of 
rigour, would be to either a) violate the value of fidelity, or b) 
assume prematurely that 'spacing' has a certain universality. Only 
from out of an interpretation of Kant and Heidegger - and indeed of 
particular moments in their work - can the problem of spacing properly 
arise. It is for this reason that the following work walks a difficult 
and narrow line: between a thematic consideration of that which we have 
called 'spacing' and a historical interpretation of two philosophical 
systems. Only the former can give the latter coherence and concision; 
only the latter can give the former validity. 
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There is, finally, a third gap. This time between 'ordinary' 
intuitions of objects, and intuitions lending themselves to either 
aesthetic or teleological judgement (chapter 1.4) By this point it 
will no longer be surprising to find that the concepts articulating 
this gap are the same as those already found in the Transcendental 
Aesthetic. The equivalent moves in Heidegger involve distinguishing 
the work of art from the mere thing, and showing the modes and 
consequences of disclosedness proper to each (chapter 2.3). Again, 
this distinguishing will recall the description of neighbourhood space 
from the opening chapters of Being and Time, which already echo Kant. 
This triply redoubled parallel provides the framework of this thesis. 
About that framework, enough said for an introduction. Given the goals 
outlined above, it will be better to let Kant and Heidegger provide 
their own introductions and to insert a broader running commentary only 
when it is needed: i.e. at moments of philosophical exhaustion. 
Part One. 
Spacing and Transcendental Form in Kant 
1.1. 
Relational, Absolute and Transcendental Space 
1.1.0. Introduction. 
To come to a clear grasp of anything In Kant - even so (apparently) 
narrowly circumscribed a subj ect as space would require a long 
journey through the previous history of modern philosophy. For on few 
topics is Kant more obviously at an intersection of alternate 
traditions. As a first gesture of economy (and not the last) we will 
allow Leibniz to be spokesperson for a tour of this intersection. This 
lS fruitful since the Transcendental Aesthetic can be well understood 
as a series of arguments which extend and complete Kant's attack on his 
Leibnizian heritage. But also much of what is interesting in Kant's 
transcendental thought is not a break with but a carrying-over of 
Leibniz's thought in a greatly modified form. This curious 
relationship will indeed be one of our early themes. 
But what makes the transcendental an issue at all lS finiteness (a 
point that for both Kant and Leibniz was probably theological, but need 
not be) - or more precisely, in Kant, the impossibility of intellectual 
intuition. Thus, taking Kant's career-long discussion of space (as 
form of intuition) seriously helps restore Kant's work to its proper 
historical context. Further, Kant's engagement with these issues make 
problematic in interesting ways the kind of simple movement between 
intuition and concept that many commentators today read into Kant. 
That Kant distinguished between sensibility and understanding is 
heralded a great advancement, but it is less easy today to grasp just 
why Kant felt he had to articulate this general difference in terms of 
an essential and radical heterogeneity of form. Space helps to answer 
this question. Kant offers a treatment of several key concepts and a 
sort of critical illumination to the project of an inquiry into general 
spacing. 
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The current chapter investigates Kant's relationship to Leibniz, and 
several of the classic arguments made by Kant which modify Kant's 
Leibnizian heritage almost beyond recognition. We will also make a 
beginning at explaining why space and time were so important to Kant -
which is to say, how they function more broadly l.n Transcendental 
Philosophy. Subsequent chapters will take this task to sections of 
Kant's work which go beyond an explicit discussion of intuition. In 
general, and at the risk of saying too much too soon, as we move 
further from space and time as ordinarily conceived, and yet find the 
same concepts at work, we will discover spacing all the more 
prominently. 
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1.1.1. The Handedness of God. 
Leibniz's fullest account of space and time comes, oddly enough, late 
in his life in his correspondence with the Newtonian, Samuel Clarke. 
This was not because Leibniz had altered his views, or even extended 
them appreciably - but rather had found something so disturbing that an 
explicit elaboration of his philosophy of space and time became 
necessary. What was disturbing was not Newtonian physics as such, but 
as the correspondence makes clear again and again the implied 
theological implications of that physics. What Newton and his 
Vol"-" 
followers seemed to imply - at least to Leibniz - what that God used 
space and time as tools or organs to his purpose; in particular, that 
God perceived with space. Possibly Leibniz confused this point with 
Hobbes' materialism but, more naturally, Leibniz certainly considered 
this an imposition on God's radical transcendence. If space and time 
were organs of God, Leibniz thought, then they would not depend on him. 
The objection is akin to his rejection of Spinoza's monism. Physical 
objects in space and time depend originally and constantly on God's 
grace. God is above them (transcendent) and yet with them. How? 
Through the perfect pre-ordinance of all events which none-the-less 
requires God for subsistence. Things must depend twice upon God. 
Of things, metaphysics gives us two types: souls and bodies. The 
problem Leibniz inherited was their interaction, a problem which led 
Descartes to infamously absurd conclusions, and other philosophers to 
monisms of several varieties. Leibniz adapts his solution more or less 
from Malebranche but speaks of a pre-established harmony between soul 
and body, such that we call this harmony 'communication'. Time and 
space as separation and distinction have no meaning for God. Thus the 
second dependence of things upon God, their subsistence, is identical 
with the first; that is, space and time collapse or, rather, are 
eternalized. Leibniz writes, "God is not present in things by 
situation but by essence" (PW, 214). Similarly, no question about the 
location of the soul or the soul's affection in the body, its possible 
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extension, sources of movement, etc. need be asked. These are all 
spacial and temporal questions, and there lS no need for space and 
time. Thus, by Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason, space and 
time as such do not exist. 'Space' - for Leibniz does not develop his 
views with respect to time much further than a simple parallel - is, 
rather, our confused perception of the order and relations (and 
possible orders and relations) of co-existing things; as Leibniz puts 
it, space is the sum of all possible places. Which is not to say space 
is an order, and thus imply that order as such exists; that would be, 
as Leibniz rightly points out, an absurdity. 
wherein or as-which the mind thinks relations. 
Rather, space is that 
Since the nature of a monad is universal representation, however, all 
relations are reducible to the internal properties of monads. By 
'internal' Leibniz means a determination such that it contributes to an 
absolutely particular definition or concept of a monad. That we have 
no such concepts available to us in actuality is not at issue. Every 
absolutely particular concept of a monad is complete, which is defined 
as containing all possible information and the monad, in reduced 
space and time, is "big with the future". In particular, the complete 
concept includes all actual relations (actuality, being universal, 
includes all potential and past relations as well) to all other monads 
- what we normally represent as spacial and temporal relations. It is 
these attributes of substances considered in the plural that we 
confusedly represent to ourselves as separately existing as space and 
time. Things in general first open space and time by being plural and 
by being ordered. But this raises a problem: how are we to speak of 
quantity? Leibniz answers that relations (which word Leibniz continues 
to use as a sort of shorthand; we are close here to Berkeley's 'visual 
language' - Kant too has a problem with relations, but it is exactly 
the opposite problem: how to think of relations without things related) 
are more or less simple. Simplicity is nearness; complexit:r' lS 
distance. And because it pleases God for the universe to be infinite 
in complexity, so space is perceived to be infinite in extent.: 
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Leibniz has a number of arguments specifically against absolute space 
as conceived by the Newtonians, but of these one assumes an importance 
for Kant. Leibniz argues that if space were real in itself, then there 
would be no sufficient reason for God to have created the universe with 
the order A rather than in A's mirror image ("changing east and west" 
(PW , 212)), for the two universes are congruent in the mathematical 
sense in so far as their interior motions and positions are concerned. 
(By 'interior' I mean relations represented in space between the parts 
of a single determinate object - not to be confused with 'internal' 
which is equivalent to 'intelligible' or Kant's 'discursive' in this 
context. 
itself. ) 
Where the single obj ect is, in this case, the universe 
But if space consists only in the confused perception of 
internal representations - if it 1S "chimerical" as Leibniz puts it -
then this problem disappears, for it is only space as a confusion that 
makes the mirror rotate its images ttlough four-dimensional space. That 
is to say, it is space which first raises problems with space, problems 
which are not to be encountered in the intelligible properties of the 
object itself. The mathematical name for such objects taken 
individually is "enantiomorphism", and the commonest example is the 
human hand. But Leibniz speaks of all creation, not single objects, 
and within the former indeed no difference between left and right would 
pertain since all possible lefts and rights are interior. Accordingly, 
there are relevant differences between left and right hands taken 
singly (namely, their more 'exterior' relations to other bodies), but 
the human body as a whole, thought as perfectly symmetrical, could be 
mirrored and thus repeat Leibniz's paradox. 
It is surely no accident that Kant uses a very similar argument to 
prove the opposite conclusion. The first appearance of Kant's version 
is in "Concerning the Ultimate Foundation for the Differentiation of 
Regions in Space" of 1768. Kant argues that there is a di f ference 
between the position and the region of an object. The position is 
determined (opened) by the object's relations to other objects, but the 
region is the relation of these object-relations as a whole to absolute 
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space. This distinction is required because there are certain 
properties of objects that are regional and not merely positional, 
left- and right-handedness being an example. That an object should be 
known to be left-handed requires that the regional space of that object 
be known to be orientable (i. e. its handedness lS conserved in all 
possible spaces) and three-dimensional. Were the space four-
dimensional or non-orientable, then the hands would not be 
enantiomorphs. Kant's conclusion (in 1768) lS that space must 
therefore exist absolutely and independently. Kant's more extended 
aim, of course, is to demolish Leibniz' s principle of sufficient 
reason, especially as Wolff attempted to prove its inherence in the 
principle of non-contradiction. There is no reason why space should 
exhibit the orientability and three dimensionality it does rather than 
be, for example, non-orientable. The complexity of the universe is 
enhanced in neither case, since the Leibnizian internal properties of 
the objects are the same. God would be confronted with an undecidable 
dilemma. 
Let us conduct a curious thought experiment, suggested in part by 
Kant's comments at the end of the 1768 essay: if my hand were the only 
object in the universe, and if all the universe were precisely my hand, 
would it be a left hand or a right hand or both? This is precisely 
Leibniz's question to Clarke. Clearly, however, the question makes no 
sense for the problem would never arise, just as we do not ask such a 
question of the universe as a whole. We cannot say whether the 
universe is left or right, for this would only be possible if the 
universe were brought up against some other cosmic torso. 
However, we can say that it is potentially handed. Why? 
On the one hand (I beg forgiveness), the interior relations of left-
and right- handed objects are, mathematically speaking, indeed 
different. They are equivalent only with respect to angles and 
distances considered on various two-dimensional planes, and not with 
respect to the full three-dimensionality of the object. This Leibniz 
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did not consider, and it is the fallacy of his argument. Thus, it is 
not merely the confusion of our perception that creates handedness. As 
such, though, this presents no problem to the relational theory of 
space, as we shall see below, but it at least requires Leibniz to 
rethink his cherished principle of sufficient reason. 2 
On the other hand, of course, Kant would argue that the difference in 
interior relations lS only half the story, that the properties of the 
space within which the object rests (the region) are equally vital. 
For if the space were such that it permitted a rigid rotation through 
four dimensions, then no difference between hands would exist. Thus 
our universal 
properties of 
hand-space would decide 
the space it itself 
itself, and according to the 
was, whether handedness were 
possible. In this sense, the property of handedness is internal to the 
object because the object itself occupies space. The region need not 
be larger than the object, for it is not properly a place but a pure 
intuition. 
The fundamental question lS whether a relational theory of space can 
not only give the difference between hands as an interior relational 
property but also account for the observed properties of 'space' 
without covertly appealing to absolute space. If we take into account 
Leibniz's description of space as the set of all possible relations 
between objects, then indeed his theory will cope. For we must merely 
stipulate that one particular relation - namely, the relation between 
two objects of a certain type which permits rigid rotation of one into 
the other is impossible, and thus excluded from any possible 
appearance. Arguments of this type have indeed been made in recent 
years. Their terminal problem from Leibniz's - not Kant's - point of 
view is that there is no reason (much less a sufficient one) 'ilhy such 
an exclusion should be made. 
To the extent that a relational theory still has room to manoeuvre, 
Kant's argument is inconclusive. But 'incongruent counterparts', as he 
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called them, occupy him not merely in one isolated text of the late 
1760s, but for the next twenty years - that is, well into the critical 
period. The incongruent counterparts argument does not appear in the 
Critique of Pure Reason, but apparently not because Kant abandoned it. 
What is the later form of this argument, and what is its relation to 
the Critique? 
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1.1.2. Incongruence and Intuition. 
As should be obvious by now, much more 1S at stake in incongruent 
counterparts than the existence of space. For both Kant and Leibniz, 
space is linked directly to the broadest contentions of their 
metaphysical epistemology. Accordingly, from the Inaugural 
Dissertation of 1770 onwards, right up to the Metaphysical Foundations 
of Natural Science in 1786, the argument is still used but with a shift 
in emphasis. In particular, Kant uses incongruent counterparts to 
prove a modified theory of space: that space is a pure, transcendental 
intuition. How does this argument proceed? 
For Leibniz, all properties are ultimately intelligible properties. 
Above, we said that this meant that all relations (that is, aspects 
that are perceived as space or time 1n empirical intuition) are 
actually reducible to internal properties exterior no less than 
interior, but the interior with greater simplicity such that we, finite 
beings, perceive these as a (composite) body, and 1n the first 
instance, our body. To this extent, Kant agrees: we must think that 
simple related entities are prior to their relations, with the emphasis 
on 'simple'. Kant, however, will not admit that all relational 
(sensible) properties are reducible to non-relational (intelligible) 
properties. This residual non-reducibility is his main argument 
against the Leibnizian account of sensibility, which otherwise, Kant 
agrees (and Russell after him), would be inevitable. A property like 
colour, for instance, as a sensible property can only be perceived as 
relational (in space and time, specifically as a relation of alteration 
in my sensory organs), but within the determinate concept of an object 
it can be completely reduced to something like an inner determination. 
A colour is ostensive - in the sense that I cannot communicate a new 
colour without pointing it out - and yet I can certainly recognise it 
as a new colour on the basis of my concept of colour. What about 
figure and extension? 
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Now incongruent counterparts, Kant thinks, are identical so far as the 
interior relations (conceived of as spacial properties of the object) 
of their organs are thought. Such objects, in their exterior relations 
wi th each other, are determinately incongruent, but not considered 
(thought) in themselves. But since such objects are indeed incongruent 
in themselves, as is clear from our inability to map one onto the 
other, their incongruence is not purely intelligible; rather, it must 
be intuitive, but none-the-less real. Space cannot be thought. What 
does this mean, and how is handedness different from the colour, which 
is also only ostensive? Suppose someone who had never seen or imagined 
any colour. I show them a green card. From this point, although they 
almost certainly could not imagine other colours, they none-the-less 
already have a concept of colour in general. Showing them other 
colours would be something like showing a mathematician other integers. 
Handedness is different: if handed objects are possible, both left- and 
right- handed objects must be possible. Suppose again there to be a 
person who has never conceived the possibility of a handed object. Not 
only must I show them such an object to communicate the concept, but in 
order to get across my meaning I must also show them an oppositely 
handed object. For the translation from left to right is, according to 
Kant, not possible as a merely conceptual operation. 
Thus the nature of space, qua space that permits incongruent 
counterparts, contradicts the theory of relations. This would mean at 
least that Leibniz's theory of correspondence is wrong. Above we noted 
that for Leibniz, spacial relations were a confused perception of 
intelligible relations (themselves ultimately reducible to non-
relational properties). This implies a direct correspondence between 
what Kant will call the phenomenal and the noumenal realms. But if 
there are certain relations that are not reducible in this manner, then 
such relations are not related do not correspond to any 
intelligible, noumenal properties. 
peculiar relations come from? 
intuition. 
A gap opens up. :'ihere do these 
We all know Kant's answer: pure 
2.1 
Kant's argument, stated in this way, is flawed. First of all, ~ant 
rides on an amb1' gU1' ty l' n " th 1 h' h ln emse ves', w 1C means here both 
'interior' and 'internal'. Similarly, Kant makes the distinction 
between 'interior' and 'exterior' do more work than it is able, since 
both types of relations, qua spacial relations, are equally reducible 
to the internal from Leibniz' s point of view. Ultimately, though, 
handedness is potentially an intelligible property because it is simply 
not true that even the interior relations of incongruent counterparts 
are the same. 
Ignoring this last point for a moment, let us try to purge Kant's 
argument of its other failings: The handedness of an object A's 
interior is only ever intuited through its exterior (its relation to 
another enantiomorphic object, B); if we think or reduce the interiors 
of A and B to internal properties of those objects, these properties 
will be equivalent; but if we think the exterior A-B, A and B have non-
equivalent properties; we can only resolve this paradox by say1ng that 
the intuition of an exterior exhibits properties irreducible to 
discursive thought, and we call these properties 'spacial'; but, the 
same argument must apply to every part An or Bn taken individually of 
A or B; thus, Al (say, for example, my left index finger) is both 
equivalent and non-equivalent to Bl, or even possibly to some A2i if we 
allow ourselves to separate off an abstract An (as opposed to a 'real' 
part like a finger of a hand), then this partitioning can be continued 
ad infinitum; thu~ the intuition of the interior as such is emptied out 
in favour of the exterior. Far from confusing his distinctions, Kant 
1S on the contrary giving the ground of these otherwise quite arbitrary 
divisions. 
However, our separation of intuiting the object and determining its 
handedness is artificial. We can intuit right and leftness, which is 
what Kant means in saying that intuition gives counterparts as 
incongruent J in themselves'. All intuitions are exterior, and the 
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interior is possible only through an exterior. When we say 'intuition 
of an interior' we mean 'intuition gives the exterior as interior'. 
Even if we take into account the mathematical ability to describe 
interiors, Kant's position is not entirely lost. 3 The question lS 
complete reducibility. Yes, a purely geometrical description of 
incongruent counterparts can be given, but we do not know purely 
conceptually whether such a description applies to a given object. To 
return to Kant's earlier terminology: we require the region to 
determine whether the incongruence indicated by the positioning of the 
object is binding. And even were we to impose restrictions upon the 
possible manipulations of objects In a relational theory of space, such 
a restriction would not itself be reducible to intelligible, non-
relational properties. Why? If it were, we would have to know, from 
the pure concept of an object or indeed of a monad, and thus 
independently of any sense experience, if the restriction applied. But 
of course, this is not true, the restriction is only ever given in 
sensible experience. 
Furthermore, as we noted above, while any intuition of an object will 
determine whether or not it is potentially handed, such an intuition 
cannot determine whether the hand is left or right, until it is brought 
into a context; that is, into a further set of relations. The issue 
here is not possible but actual handedness 
province of exterior intuitions. 
and actuality is the 
A further argument is given alongside, and is a natural modification 
of, the incongruent counterparts argument. The relevant question is 
why does Kant reject Newton, after having argued for absolute space in 
1768? Is he moved by the same theological considerations that brought 
Leibniz so elegantly to his own position? Quite possibly. In Kant's 
own peculiar way absolute space asserts an absurdity of God - namely, 
that finite human understanding might have such knowledge of space as 
an object. 4 A less theological version of this argument is t:-r~s~nted 
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by Kant in the Prolegomena. Absolute space, first of all, would be the 
spaciality of things-in-themselvesi and indeed, if we wished to 
attribute some kind of independent reality to space, space would itself 
be a thing-in-itself. These two possibilities yield two different 
arguments. The two are not distinguished by Kant, for at this time he 
held, in a manner he was very shortly to question, that what 
transcendental principles held for space would necessarily hold for its 
contents as well. To avoid confusion, we separate the two arguments, 
one directed at the spaciality of things-in-themselves, and the other 
at absolute space as a thing-in-itself. 
1) With respect to what we have called interior properties of an object 
that can be intelligible, incongruent counterparts are identical (so 
Kant believed). Their only difference is exterior: the impossibility 
of substitution. Above, though, we discovered that all intuitions are 
essentially exterior. But this violates the very notion of a thing-in-
itself, which is, for Kant as for Leibniz, to be not merely interior 
(that is still spacial) but internal and not dependant upon relations 
at all. A thing-in-itself cannot be spacial. Again, Kant's argument 
is flawed, but perhaps not completely so, since if by exterior relation 
we mean relation to the region, to the properties of space as a whole 
(3-dimensionality, orientability) then indeed interior follows 
exterior. This reconstruction of a very incomplete argument would be 
one of Kant's implicit replies to that long tradition of critics who 
claim that he 1S making a metaphysical error in asserting that we know 
at least this of the thing-in-itself, that it is not spacial. 
2) Kant writes, "In absolute space the existence and nature of every 
part would be dependant upon the existence and nature of the whole"si 
or again, "the part is only possible through the whole (Ganze)" (Pro. 
40). What this means is quite simple for our present purposes: we can 
assert different properties of a portion of matter, and even its non-
existence, without saying anything about the rest of existent matter. 
The same is not true of space: posit any finite region, and one must 
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posit all space; change the properties of any finite region, and one 
must change the whole. The whole is logically prior to its parts. But 
this is incompatible with the first assumption that absolute space 
would be a thing-in-itself, for a thing-in-itself is an object of the 
pure understanding, determinable by mere concepts. 
mean? 
What does this 
For Kant, space and time are singular wholes, which is the same as to 
say they are intuitions and not concepts, for conceptuality is always 
the consequent unity of a plurality. Species which fall under a 
concept are differentiated by the addition of properties, meaning 
conceptuality is essentially abstractive, a closing down. As it is 
remarkably clear and concise, let us quote Louis White Beck's 
definition: concepts "are representations under an 
(abstractive) unity through which they are discursive 
analytical 
only as 
predicates of possible judgements do 'Vorstellungen' [in general] serve 
as concepts, and only as containing representations under themselves do 
concepts refer to objects" (Wolff 1968, 4). Regions of a conceptual 
space, then, would either have qualitatively different properties 
(which contradicts our thesis about whole preceding the parts, and in 
any case is empirically unlikely, though perhaps not for contemporary 
physics at its utmost frontiers) or quantitatively different 
properties, that is, different locations. But locations in what? Were 
space conceptual and a priori (that is, noumenal), it would demand some 
form of transcendental co-ordinate system, which 19th century physics 
would call the ether (and is again empirically unlikely). Conceptual 
space is 'God-space', so to speak. In this new argument of Kant's, we 
are brought straight back to the controversy between Leibniz and Clarke 
over the nature of God with respect to space. 
Kant's argument against the Newtonians comes down to this: for physical 
science to achieve anything, space must be a possible object of 
knowledge. Either it is so because grounded upon concepts (absolute 
space and relational space both) or upon intuitions (a priori or a 
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posteriori) . The former proves impossible to maintain ',·;ithout 
contradiction, therefore Kant concludes space is pure intuition - it 
will be in the Critique that Kant's tackles the empiricist, a 
posteriori possibility. 
29 
1.1.3 Towards the Propriety of Intuition. 
But these arguments only apply to a Leibnizian/Kantian thing-in-itself, 
and they remind one of a sophisticated reworking of Berkeley. If we 
I-.'~ 
redefine the t-in-itself as "the thing so-to-speak 'intuited' as it is 
when not intuited", do these arguments still work? Kant's response 1S 
very simple: if we are going to discuss the properties of a thing that 
is not intuited, we must discuss with concepts. Concepts determine 
their obj ects as interiors. If we are going to talk about some 
intuition of an un intuited thing, then - even if the paradox is not 
binding enough - Berkeley's argument applies. The difference between 
intuition and concept is not, for Kant, just a matter of degree, or of 
the exchange of a few 'subjective' properties, but is radical and 
absolute. 
In 1770 Kant introduces the important thesis that space 1S not 
operative in us via a concept, for no concept can express what 1S 
distinctive about space. This final point cannot be stressed enough, 
and Kant indeed did so consistently. Consider the following quotation 
from the Dissertation: 
"Which things in a given space lie towards one quarter and 
which things incline towards the opposite quarter are 
things that cannot be described discursively or reduced to 
intellectual marks by any mental acuteness. Thus between 
solids which are perfectly similar and equal but not 
congruent there is a diversity which makes it 
impossible for the boundaries of their extension to 
coincide, although they could be substituted for one 
another as far as concerns all the things which may be 
l' ntell1' gl' ble to the mind in speech" 6 expressed in marks 
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In other words, there is at least one property of space and of spacial 
objects that cannot be thought, expressed, made intelligible. Space ~3 
unthinkable. 
Now as we have said, no mention of the incongruent counterparts 
argument is made in the first Critique. There are several explanations 
for this, the least convincing of which is that Kant was simply 
confused about his positionj the most convincing is that Kant's passion 
for elegance in construction led him to eliminate an argument in the 
Transcendental Aesthetic that could not be repeated in parallel for 
time. Because time is one-dimensional for Kant, there is no question 
of any equivalent geometry of time except for its uni-directionality _ 
and in the Analogies Kant makes it clear that he wishes to bring In a 
categorical basis for that. 7 This may well be the reason why Kant 
briefly and perhaps tentatively notes for time that it is our 
representation for something noumenal, but not for space. 
But what is ultimately most interesting about the incongruent 
counterparts argument is that, vis a VlS Leibni z, Kant's argument 
signifies a breakdown in the representational field. As we said, a gap 
opens up between finite representation and the noumenal, and no 
necessary correspondence exists. Indeed, there is no explanation of 
space, save that it is our sole means of intuiting certain forms and 
orders. But this gap is immediately duplicated by the pure intuitions 
themselves: space is always the intuition of a relation between ... j 
time is always the interval between .... (We will discuss else~here 
Kant's views on 'empty space'.) Thus the only perceivable space is an 
occupied space, and the only perceivable object is an object in space. 
And yet we still said to much: for without the categories theLe is no 
object at all. Thus the relation between loses the poles of its 
betweenness, if we are going to describe intuition in itself. =~ is a 
relation without things related. This paradox indicates 'v'ery precisely 
the nature of the gap between sensibility and understanding. Tl~ere is 
no explanation of this 
legislates for one. 
gap, except 
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insofar as the understanding 
Let us perform another thought experiment of the Kantian type: suppose 
the universe consists of but one simple object. Certainly, Kant would 
admit such an entity could be a possible object thought; but sensible 
intuition? Yes, but only because there is never only one sensible 
object: by definition, outer sensibility is the perception of what is 
outside us, that is, in a spacial relation to us. Kant's analysis of 
space as pure intuition - as standing in for a gulf between phenomena 
and noumena lS completely equivalent to the erection of a 
subject/object space within which the possibility of representation is 
radically interrupted. Radically, indeed, and twice: once as 
phenomenon, once as sensibility isolated from the understanding. 
Indeed, as Kant says, not only is intuition a relation between subject 
and object, but it is nothing but such a relation: the content (space, 
time and sensation) of intuition is this relation. 
Kant would agree that an isolated entity could be the obj ect of a 
representation by the understanding, but clearly the word ' obj ect' 
functions differently here. The subject/object relation is the 'at 
least' relation for sensible intuition. Again, however, we are saying 
too much: subject and object are concepts schematised from out of pure 
logic, and thus do not belong to space and time. Rather, it is only 
because intuition gives relations that relational categories can come 
to be applied. And yet, what links the understanding to intuition is 
their shared representational nature. As representations, though, the 
synthesis of the understanding is spontaneity, whereas what Kant in the 
first edition's Transcendental Deduction calls synopsis (of intuition 
in appearance) is receptivity. This is Kant's way of asserting at 
least that neither faculty has precedence: for the understanding lS 
neither a secondary and distant receptivity as the empiricists thought, 
is sensibility a confused spontaneity as many rationalists held. nor 
It is important to realize both that the spontaneity of the 
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understanding is a spontaneity out of nowhere - and consequently we 
might say auto-receptivity - in other words, the categories are indeed 
numerable, but their derivation lS an act of hocus-pocus; and that the 
receptivity of sensible intuition is a kind of ecstatic-spontaneity, 
coming as it does from the unknown thing-in-itself. Knowledge lS 
indeed a kind of miracle, a meeting in the moonlight of unmarked paths. 
Let us, then, come away from this first discussion not only with 
certain details of Leibniz's and Kant's respective theories of space, 
but also with the following five observations: 1) what is proper to 
space can only be 'expressed' in an intuition; 2) space and time may be 
merely phenomenal or may not be, but in any case certainly are the very 
face of a breakdown in representational possibilities: they make 
possible the pure legislation of the understanding; 3) space and time, 
although a priori are formal (i. e. as a type of entirely exterior 
relation between ... ) and thus only ever granted as the form of 
intuitions; 4) space and time, Kant insists, are merely the form that 
the relation between sensibility and objects takes, and thus the first 
spacial relation is that of subject and object; 5) the separation of 
sensibility and the understanding makes of knowledge a wonder or 
miracle (and thus a worthy problem for philosophical study) that it was 
not for non-critical philosophers. 
We will need to explore further the strange gap between intuition and 
the understanding, and in particular the questions of spontaneity and 
receptivity. Let us however leave this first set of conclusions in 
favour of a more detailed discussion of the arguments in the 
Transcendental Aesthetic. 
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1.1.4. Matter, Form, and the Object. 
One thing that has b 'd' t d 1 een ln lca e c early is Kant's continuing 
adherence to Leibniz's theory of relations - not the thesis that space 
is nothing but internal representations perceived as interior and 
exterior relations, but rather that all that ever is perceived in space 
is relations. We can pick out this adherence even in the first few 
pages of the Aesthetic. Kant writes, 
"In the appearance I call that which corresponds to 
sensation the 'matter'; but that which makes it such 
[macht] that the manifold of appearance can become ordered 
in certain [gewissen] relations [verhaltnissen], I call the 
form of appearance. Since that in which alone the 
sensations can be ordered and placed in certain [Gewisse] 
forms cannot itself in its turn be sensation, so indeed is 
the matter of all appearance given only a posteriori, but 
the form itself must entirely lie ready a priori in the 
mind for sensations, and therefore can be isolated from all 
sensation and examined." (A20=B34). 
The key words in this long passage are 'Verhaltnis', 'form' and 
'gewiss'. The first means relation, and indeed Kant frequently changes 
indiscriminately between the germanic and latinate forms. The second 
word is latinate in German, as is its partner, 'matter'. We hardly 
need discuss the matter/form distinction or its tradition, except to 
the extent that our third word takes us directly to one heart of that 
tradition with Aristotle. The third word 'gewiss' means certain or 
sure; it appears twice, and functions in this context to indicate that 
the relations and the forms are particular. They are not just any 
relations or forms, but these, here, now, ln the present (even if, in 
fact, they are neither here nor now in the strict sense); space and 
time actualize matter. 
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Surely, though, sensations are not matter in any traditional sense, nor 
however are they without actuall'zatl'on. Wh at can Kant be meaning? It 
would seem that, for Kant, the primary/secondary qualities distinction 
breeds into a trio'. the " , a prlorl propertles of an object in general 
insofar as these are constitutive in any way (' l.e. extension, 
intension, substance, etc.); the formal properties (shape, duration, 
position, date, etc.); sensation properties (colour, taste, etc.). 
Sensation properties are always linked to formal properties. If I feel 
a warmth at my hand, it is a warmth that covers a certain number of 
square centimetres of skin, and has a certain number of seconds 
duration. Even if I hallucinate, the image is spacial and temporal: 
the pink elephant has a location in time and its tail is a certain 
number of degrees of arc from its ears In my vision, etc. Any 
actualization from out of sensation is also necessarily an 
actualization from out of space and time. Kant then accepts the 
empiricist's explanation of sensation-properties and their concepts: 
namely, we know what yellow is because the reproductive imagination 
(the empirical laws of association) groups my sensations into empirical 
concepts considered as sets, not in the first instance by the qualities 
of these qualities (which colour) but by the mode of spacio-temporal 
givenness which they accompany (colour as opposed to sound) This is 
Kant's way of saying that sensation-properties belong to empirical 
psychology and not transcendental philosophy, and he ignores them 
without further ado. 
In the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant's first argument is that space 
must be a priori and not empirical knowledge because no such knowledge 
would be able to form the preliminary insight of experience as outer -
a sensation would be indeterminate as to whether inner or outer, unless 
space made it possible for me to represent myself as in space, and in 
a spacial world. This is not simply a bland tautology - 'I could not 
have spacial representations without space' - but rather a statement 
that space is required first of all if my mental states are to be 
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possible 'representations of ... '. That is to say, the supposed 
tautology above should be reemphasized: 'I could not have spacial 
representations without space'. Similarly, space is required for 
objects to be represented as different and, indeed, in different places 
- for two sensations to be ascribed to different objects, and for these 
objects thus to be different, requires a preliminary spacing or gap of 
difference, which 'spacing' may be either spacial or, as we shall 
temporal. This point 1S alternately clear and obscure in 
see, 
thi2 
literature on Kant: space does not serve to represent differences in 
obj ects, but 1S the first condition of the representation of any 
difference. Rather: space is not an obj ect, but is the form of 
intuitions, thus we must say that space is difference. (This is the 
foundation for Kant's most direct confrontation with the Identity of 
Indiscernibles.) 
Kant continues with the following famous argument: "One can never form 
a representation that space is not, though one can quite easily think 
that no objects will be encountered in that space" (A24=B38-9). One 
cannot have a representation of empty space (as Kemp Smith translates 
it), for space is always the form to sensation's matter Kant's 
language is remarkably careful. Similarly, one cannot represent the 
matter without form. Space, then, is prior to all sensation - it "lies 
ready" in the mind; but equally importantly, this passage indicates 
that space is first and only ever granted along with objects. This 
thesis is fundamental to the Kantian theory of form, whether, as we 
shall explore later, that 1S a form of intuition, consciousness or 
understanding. The concept of space could never be a form. We may put 
the same point in this way: space is always irreducibly particular. It 
is this mode of phrasing (and the conceptual/intuitional difference 
that it describes) which will generate Kant's problem in the 
Schematism. 
Kant continues by arguing that space is not a discursive concept of 
relations between objects (although again we only ever perceive space 
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as a relation between objects) There is only one space - not a space 
for each object-cluster. (The singularity of the representation is one 
characteristic property of an intuition, although that singularity is 
really only a consequence of immediacy while the reverse relation would 
not be true.) The parts of that space precede the whole, for our 
intuitions indicate that the parts of space co-exist infinitely. Thus 
the parts of space are an infinity (as Kant puts it) within and not 
under, as with the possible representations of a concept. Of course 
there is a concept of space, but first of all it is derived (the 
intuition, Kant says, is "original" (ursprQnglich)); and second, its 
pure spaciality is always at odds with its conceptuality. 
In speaking of the 'parts of space', of course, we are again 
space as an object. It is very tempting to speak of space 
treating 
Cl> 0e an 
object. But space cannot be anything like an object, because objects 
are synthetically constructed, while the form of space is certainly 
not. Indeed, Kant insists that the forms of intuition are 'nothing' 
(A291=B347).8 Thus when Kant says space is not a thing, but is a form 
of intuitions, he means that outer intuitions are not in space, nor are 
they parts of space, but are spacial. Rather than space we should say 
, spacial i ty' . Spaciality is the being of outer intuitions. For 
example, the essential characteristic of space's limitlessness is given 
in every intuition in the way that intuition must be conceived as a 
limitation of a prior whole. That is, the understanding recognises 
that the intuition which would represent the end of space lS not 
possible. Limitlessness (and other 'properties') is then an inference 
and yet it has to be seen that, in an important sense, this 
limitlessness lS also just given in the intuition, In the way the 
intuition is 'open'. 
This does not mean, however, that space as the form of intuition also 
itself presents a pure manifold: rather, the propriety of spaciality 
(the properties of represented space) are given within each and every 
always particular outer intuition precisely as the form (or manner of 
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givenness) of the particular form (or spacial figure of the represented 
obj ect) of that intuition. The conclusion of Kant's argument would 
then read: the spaciality of intuitions is such that we must represent 
any intuition as a limitation of a prior unlimited whole, which whole 
can then be called space. We are not making an crucial mistake in 
talking of space as an object, provided we continually reemphasise 
those properties of space which are paradoxical when attributed to 
ei ther an obj ect or a concept, and which thus show that ' it' is 
originally a form of intuition. Indeed, treating space as an object is 
probably unavoidable. 
To return to the above argument, the relevant distinction which Kant 
tells us to draw is between community as 'communio' and community as 
, commercium' . The former belongs to the pure understanding 
apperception, the 'conceptus communis' and even the 'sensus communis' -
the latter is linked with the peculiar property of reciprocity 
associated with co-existence in space, and Kant identifies the 
'commercial' whole as an "aggregate" [Aggregat] (Bl12) or, later, a 
"composite" [Zusammengesetztes or compositum] (B262=A215) , Communio' , 
for Kant, signifies that synthesis precedes analysis in all cases and 
that all experiences are in one experience. However, Kant argues that 
once we refer to objects, 'communio' is no longer appropriate, but that 
time determination must translate into reciprocal influence, or 
, commercium' . 
Now, to think this thoroughly would require that we discussed the 
category of community in relation to the disjunctive judgement 
something we will postpone for some time. For the moment, let us say 
that neither 'communio' nor 'commercium' are quite to be equated with 
space and time as wholes, but are rather an indications of precisely 
the difficulty the understanding has with the forms of intuition as 
forms. For the elements in commerce, although mutually determining, 
yet stand "outside each other" as existent objects (B261-2=A215), and 
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thus are not thought from the whole but "constitute" [ausmachen] that 
whole. The paradox in this definition is revealing. 
A look at the Concepts of Reflection at the end of the Analytic will 
give us a clue. The concepts of reflection are, briefly, pairs of 
opposed concepts whose opposition consists entirely of whether they are 
employed in the pure understanding or with respect to appearances. 
Thus, for example, the inner and the outer (internal and exterior in 
our terminology, but there are complexities, some of which we have 
already discussed): concepts have inner determinations, but objects in 
space have only outer relations as determinations. The concept of an 
object internalizes these relations, which makes empirical concepts 
possible, but does not allow us to assume that, in the thing in itself, 
all determinations are inner. Kant writes: 
if we begin with mere concepts, we cannot think the 
relations of things 'in abstracto' in any other manner than 
by regarding one thing as the cause of determinations in 
another, for that is how the understanding conceives of 
relations. But since we are in that case disregarding all 
intuition, we have ruled ourselves out from any kind of 
recognition of the special mode in which the different 
elements of the manifold determine each other's positions, 
that is, of the form of sensibility (space), which yet is 
presupposed in all empirical causality" (A 285-6=B341-2l . 
Kant's point seems clear. Namely, and I quote again, a wholly 
relational object "bannot be thought through pure categories" 
(A285=B341) Intuition clearly must be altered if it is to be thought. 
This alteration is called: the synthesis of the manifold. 
We might say that, for Kant, the wholeness of space for intuition must 
needs be reconstituted as a synthetic unity for thought, as a 
composite. But the form of this reconst i tut ion lS not, no'.V, the 
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wholeness of space and time, but the original unity of apperception, 
and there is a difference between wholeness and unity. In space, pure 
coexistence is reciprocal determination of position of appearance in 
space and similarly for pure succession in time. Formal 
determination of this type is, as Kant states, unthinkable, for it is 
determination only as outer and not inner - thought must have an inner 
determination, and therefore determines the manifold universally 
according to cause and effect relations. Thought converts properties 
that in intuition were outer into formal properties belonging to the 
object itself. Commerce is the attempt by thought to think the outer 
as inner, the intuitive as discursive, wholeness as unity. The fact 
that the concept of commerce is difficult to grasp and even paradoxical 
- Kant writes that things in commerce "stand outside one another and 
yet in connection" (A215=B261-2) - is a sure marker of the violence 
inherent in this attempt. 
Kant's argument continues: there is a given finite region of space only 
through limitation. We know the infinity of space not because we can 
intuit the infinite as such, because we cannot - and this latter not 
for the reason that no synthesis of an infinite manifold could ever 
take place because we do not intuit space as a manifold of spaces that 
need to be synthesized. Rather, limitations which define a finite 
space are always represented as placed upon prior space - that is, 
space is given as itself limitless. 
A brief digression might help us to understand Kant's arguments and how 
space could both be a form and singular and infinite. A classic 
question: could there be more than one space? If some dreamworld (the 
universe of which did not overlap with the wakingworld) were to become 
so persistent and coherent as to warrant the title 'real', then in one 
sense there would be two spaces. Obviously, if by reality I mean 'what 
exists in dreamworld' then all of wakingworld is not real, and the 
reverse. For the argument to work, my criterion of reality must be 
, obj ects the experience of which I cannot believe is imaginary or 
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illusory'. The notion of experience is the key: that is, my inside 1S 
in some conscious relation to an outside, and the former alone supplies 
the continuity. But this continuity is compatible with other states of 
affairs, and thus empties the 'two spaces' of any radical content. For 
I could just as easily say that dreamworld is in the same space as 
wakingworld, but 1S indefinitely far away, or of indefinitely small 
dimensions - that is, such that I cannot experience the positioning of 
one in the other. Indeed, certain common expressions have just this 
meaning: I might say, for example, and be perfectly understood, , she 
lives so far away from me that I might as well not exist'. 
In the above dreamworld argument, space is functioning as a concept, 
namely the concept of location. What Kant is actually asserting is 
that for one intuition there will be one intuited spaciality. The 
proof of this is directly analogous to that proof (given by those who 
propose the above argument) that for time there can only be one: any 
other time will either be experienced before or after the first time, 
and thus already in the same time. For space, in anyone intuition, 
spacel will either be to the left or the right, in front or behind, 
above or below space2, but in any case will already be in and from out 
of the same space. This 'same space' is not a super container space, 
which must itself either be an actual infinity, or be already 1n some 
even greater space i rather, it is just the already-being-in itself. 
'Same space' is then a cognitive inference, and ultimately a 
dialectical illusion. But ' already being in' is not a concept of 
location, nor itself a thing, but rather the intuitive condition for 
the possibility of objects (like spacel and space2) being located. The 
'from out of' is the limitation which gives actualization as 
particularisation. The form of space 1S spaciality which is 'already 
in and from out of'. Later, we will call examples of this type of form 
'open'. No doubt this language would seem very strange to Kant. This 
is because he always spoke of space as always being either an object or 
a concept - which, as we pointed out above, is not harmful, so long as 
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one recognises that these are derived phenomena and does not let them 
get in the way. 
In the interest of clarity, let us add to the list of five observations 
made above. 6) Space is the condition for the possibility of 
representations of outer objects, and of the identification of 
difference in such objects. 7) The manifold of space in intuition must 
be considered as another aspect of 
thing and understanding. Space 
space as a relationship between 
is encountered cognitively as 
containing a manifold. 8) Space and time actualise, but are only ever 
given along with that actualization. More precisely, what is given is 
spaciality and temporality as the 'already in and from out of' of every 
particular. 
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1.1.5. Encountering Intuition. 
As we mentioned above, Kant later seems to retract the prior wholeness 
of intuition in the second edition Deduction (B160n), but in so doing 
creates other problems that could have been avoided. Virtually alone 
in the Kantian tradition, Melnick argues that the positions are not 
incompatible . ."\1 '$ (cf. Meln1ck~ pp 7-14) He gives us a most plausible 
corrective to Kant's contradiction. Melnick re-marks a distinction, 
which is normally clear enough in Kant, between the subsequent levels 
of a priori intuition and empirical experience. My intuition of space 
1S of an unlimited magnitude i but I only ever experience limited, 
enclosed, demarcated spaces - and this for the precise reason that my 
experience is only ever categorical. Melnick then makes the revealing 
observation that empirical perceptions do not "duplicate" pure 
intuitions, but "conform" to them. Melnick thus points out very 
clearly the manner in which Kant's own withdrawal of space's given 
infinitude is untenable on Kant's own terms. The concept of space is 
always an empirical concept, we might conclude, while the intuition is 
pure and only occasioned by receptivity. In the footnote at B160 if 
"represented as object" is read as a restrictive clause, and we pay 
attention to a series of distinctions (space/space as object, 
intuition/concept, form of intuition/formed intuition) then the 
resulting interpretation does not contradict in any way the 
Transcendental Aesthetic as Kant seems to think it does, but rather 
alludes to the complexities of taking intuitions up into the 
understanding. 
There 1S a similarly troubling passage at B136n. Kemp Smith's 
translation is an excellent attempt at making readable a difficult 
sentence. What is notable is that the whole latter part of the 
sentence, including the last phrases, is under the one verb 
'angetroffen' which I will translate as 'encountered'. A modification 
of Kemp smith is called for such that this is more apparent. 
Space and time, with all their parts, are intuitions, 
therefore are with their manifolds singular representations 
(see the Transcendental Aesthetic) and thus are not mere 
concepts. For through concepts one and the same 
consciousness J.s encountered as contained in many 
representations, but in space and time, many 
representations are encountered as contained in one 
representation and in the consciousness of that one, and 
space and time are consequently composite. It follows that 
the unity of consciousness is encountered as synthetic and 
yet original. 
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This translation makes it more clear just how decisively Kant draws the 
distinction between sensibility and the understanding. The meaning of 
the last sentence is also more clear: the unity of consciousness is 
encountered as synthetic because of the way concepts come to 
consciousness, and yet as original because of the way intuitions do so. 
Let us explain this. The one in many is a synthetic operation (this 
being the basic thesis of the Deduction); that is, the many are 
combined into one and thus the one can be found therein. But the many 
in one is simply a restatement of the argument in the Aesthetic about 
the whole of space and time being prior to its parts, which parts are 
brought out of the whole by subsequent limitation. That is, the one 
comes originally, before the many. And this accords with section 16 
(B132) where what Kant means by 'original' is that apperception 
generates the (possible) I think before all other representations -
that is before the representation becomes a determinate 'I think this' 
or 'I think that'. Thus apperception is the form of consciousness. 
It now becomes apparent why Kant felt the need to write the footnote, 
given that much of it only repeats the content of the Aesthetic. There 
J.S a real problem in calling something both synthetic and original. 
This is answered by the word 'encountered'. We only become conscJ.ous 
in our synthetic acts, but looking back, so to speak, (on I':ant's 
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analogy, viewing reality as if it were a dream) we recognize that each 
element in the manifold must have been ours 'from the beginning' or 
originally, before any empirical synthesis. We might say that there 
are three ways of considering spacial and temporal intuitions: 1) as 
synthesized representations of objects; 2) as given manifolds looked 
back upon; 3) as pure intuitions. 
This footnote, however, l.S not merely a defense against a possible 
attack, but implicitly contains a positive argument. Kant is saying 
that only on the basis of the gap in the faculties is any encountering 
of consciousness as both synthetic and original possible. Space and 
time as distinctive forms do not, certainly, make apperception 
possible, but rather make possible an encountering of consciousness as 
original, insofar as we recognise our intuitive grasp of space and 
time, and indeed as wholes, as being prior to any determining content 
which requires a synthesis, and yet as still 'ours'. 
Returning once again to the Aesthetic, we find that the arguments with 
respect to time are similar, but not exactly so. First of all, time is 
shown to be prior to an empirical knowledge not only of all succession 
but also of co-existence. Time infringes, as it were, on space's 
territory because co-existent objects are always successively 
apprehended, for Kant. 9 Kant continues, "One can not, in the 
abolish consideration [Anschauung] of Appearances in general, 
[aufheben] time itself, though certainly one can remove [wegnehrnen] the 
appearances from time. Therefore, time is given a priori" (A31=B46). 
This formulation is slightly different from the parallel argument in 
the chapter on space. Why? The first part l.S easy enough to 
understand: if there are to be appearances at all, they must be in 
time; thus there l.S no need to specify a representation of either 
existence or non-existence. For a similar reason, Kant writes 'remove 
appearances' not 'remove obj ects' . Further, of course, any 
representation of time, as Kant will note later, l.S spacial. Notice, 
though, that Kant does not write 'the absence of appearances in time' 
45 
or 'empty time' but 'remove the appearances from time'. That is to 
say, once again, that time is always originally granted with 
appearances and as their formal relations. Thus there is no empty 
.time, except in the intellectual process of ab-straction. Trivial now, 
but important later, will be the observation that this parallel in the 
arguments between space and time begins from space - and time borrows 
the metaphors of 'remove' or 'empty'. 
We should also notice that, in the second edition, Kant removes the 
argument concerning geometry and space to the Transcendental 
Exposition; however, with time, no such alteration takes place. Why? 
Not merely for the sake of brevity, as Kant implies. Rather, Kant knew 
that there were problems with the a priori knowledge of geometry - he 
had mathematician friends, such as Lambert, who were concerned with the 
difficulties that surrounded the parallel postulate (cf. Symth). 
Further, Kant came from a tradition, which included Berkeley and 
Leibniz, which questioned space's relevance to knowledge. The nature 
of space as a pure a priori intuition, then, could explain our 
intuitions concerning geometry, but the reverse would not be a strong 
argument - even at this point, well before the advent of any formally 
non-Euclidean geometry. There would just be too many objections. 
However, with time Kant felt on safer ground, and thus presented an 
argument for the a priori nature of time based on the apodeictic 
certainty of several propositions concerning time. 
Through our discussion of sensation and J.n Kant's arguments in the 
Aesthetic, it is clear that, for Kant, mere appearances in pure space 
are not necessarily causally related, but co-exist; appearances in time 
are in sequence but not necessarily a causal sequence. Thus, the 
peculiar contributions of space and time are relations that are not 
thinkable as such and in their purity - which is why Kant feels we can 
be certain of geometry without ever being able to prove, and thus found 
conceptually, that certainty. In other, more Kantian words, synthetic 
a priori knowledge is made possible. Let us define (provisionally, it 
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must be said) knowledge in this famous phrase as 'true thinking of an 
object', synthetic as 'requires the experience of objects' and a priori 
as 'proceeding without or before all experience.' Kant's question 
translates as 'How is a true thinking of an object which requires the 
experience of that object possible without or before any experience?' 
This paradox can only be resolved if 1) certain forms of thought (i.e. 
concepts) are available before experience and 2) 'experience' 
bifurcates into two meanings: a) thinking sensible intuitions and b) 
thinking a priori intuitions and 3) sensible intuition depends for its 
exhibition of pertinent properties upon the same forms as a priori 
intuition. Thus it is clear that the importance of the Transcendental 
Aesthetic for Kant's enterprise cannot be overestimated. 
To our list of five plus three observations, then, let us add the 
following: 9) Though interrupting some absolute representation (which 
Kant labels 'intellectual intuition' and cannot strictly speaking be 
called 'representation' at all) space and time are the very conditions 
for the possibility of finite, human representation. It is thus not 
enough to characterize the forms of intuition as forcing a truncated 
infinite knowledge - finite knowledge has its own form. 10) Even at 
this early stage we can see that any characterization of intuition qua 
intuition as merely not-yet-determined thought - as 'raw material' - is 
inadequate and must fail to accomplish what Kant requires of intuition. 
This inadequacy is indicated by the paradoxes and failures of a concept 
like 'commercium.' 
Now in the Principles, Kant analyses the necessary impos it ion of 
categories of judgement upon the undetermined manifold. The result 1S 
the concept of space and the concepts (or modes) of time. But this is 
only to reinscribe the gap in different terms, such that knowledge 1n 
general is possible. In the next chapter, then, we must explore this 
imposition and analyze the problems Kant encounters in terms of it. 
The gap, we might well say, is broached, provided we allow that ~ord to 
resonate in its possible (and here incompatible) meanings. 
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Chapter Notes 
1. But activity and passivity are also related to simplicity, a theme 
which has something of Spinoza in it. Those actions are called active, 
we can guess, which bear a peculiarly simple and direct relation to 
certain states of the will. For God, then, everything is simple. 
2. Kant resurrects the principle of sufficient reason in the Critique 
as an a priori condition for the possibility of experience. But as 
such, it only applies to experience, and noumena are not of course 
objects of experience. 
3. Perhaps a strict Kantian would not have to accept this step-back: 
giving a three-dimensional description of an enantiomorph is 
essentially to give another enantiomorph. It is perhaps not clear that 
such a language could be purged of all intuitive references. 
4. Further, of course, there is Kant's infamous argument concerning 
the apodeictic certainty of geometry. As we shall see, in the second 
edition of the Critique, Kant seems to be recognizing this infamy. 
5. Quoted in Broad, p41. 
6. Quoted in Buroker. 
7 . Later we will find reason to question the lack of a parallel 
argument for time, or at least take the problem very much further. 
8. It is helpful to remember this when reading such passages as the 
'represented as object' at B160n. 
9. In the next chapter, we will discuss more carefully successive 
apprehension. 
1.2 
Models and Closure 
1.2.0. Introduction: Minding the Gap. 
Analysis and Synthesis are brother-operations in the understanding, but 
have no meaning for intuition in itself. Thus, for Kant, the 
understanding is first responsible for the dis-communion of the 
'object' as well as its synthetic reconstruction. Such an 
interpretation clearly throws into doubt many traditional 
interpretations of Kant's philosophy. It will be the job of this and 
the next chapter to show how our interpretation of the form of 
intuition leads to interesting interpretations of other key features of 
transcendental thought. What is more, and as we have already hinted, 
this does not mean that the concepts at work in the metaphysics of 
space and time will operate on the Critique from afar. Rather, these 
same concepts will prove essential in describing other transcendental 
objects of inquiry. 
For these reasons it is no longer possible to treat the Transcendental 
Aesthetic as a isolated chapter - as if Kant just had a philosophical 
bone to pick and get out of the way - or as if Kant had a philosophical 
darling which was also a blind spot. Certainly it is the case that the 
whole notion of synthetic a priori knowledge cannot be understood 
without the doctrine of a priori intuition. But we must go further: 
what Kant means by 'synthetic' (and indeed by 'a priori' and 
'knowledge' 1) can only be explicated with reference to the Aesthetic. 
It is precisely this point that our work on Kant lS meant to 
illustrate. 
First, we need to take a look at topics derived from the Anal~·t ic of 
Principles, especially the Analogies of Experience, for it is here that 
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Kant is concerned with the details of what we have called the 
imposition of the forms of understanding upon intuition. Our exemplary 
analysis here will be the Second Analogy. We will find that several of 
the problems Kant's arguments encounter, problems that commentators 
have hashed and rehashed for two centuries, can be traced to precisely 
to the peculiar character of the postulated division of faculties. 
There is, we might say, an 'other' war of the faculties and one perhaps 
more fundamental than that against the metaphysical rhapsodies of pure 
reason. 
The second half of this chapter will be devoted to the same set of 
issues in their highest generality: schematism. Here we will try to 
understand in general the becoming-sensible of pure intellect. In 
order to make our reasoning clear, a brief foray into the theory of 
models will be required. Seen in the light of our interpretation of 
the forms of intuition, the Schematism chapter appears as Kant intended 
it too: as absolutely central to transcendental philosophy, and equally 
difficult to grasp. 
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1.2.1. Second Analogy: Circles within Circles. 
In contrast to the third analogy, which has been neglected - indeed, 
often entirely ignored in the secondary literature, the second 
analogy has received more commentary than perhaps any other portion of 
the Critique. Why this surplus should be is not difficult to 
understand: here it is that Kant engages most clearly and devastatingly 
with Hume (and thereby the entire empiricist tradition) The second 
analogy, as Kant recognized, was the test of transcendental philosophy 
- much as Hume's general discussion of how mechanistic science was to 
be thought was the te~t of empiricism. At the same time, but for 
entirely different reasons, it has become apparent that the Analogies 
in general are of vi tal interest for our proj ect here. This non-
coincidence of motives, however, means that much of the secondary 
literature is quite beside the point for our purposes, and thus any 
reconstruction or analysis of the second analogy in traditional (and 
thus familiar) terms would only be of preliminary usefulness. 
Consequently, our interpretation here will at times seem unfamiliar and 
indeed digressive. 
Kant's response to Hume is, however, easy enough to grasp on Kantian 
grounds. Kant says that Hume's argument concerning causality is 
circular, and the concise proof added in the second edition makes this 
relatively clear (B233-4) Let us paraphrase it, and fill in a few 
hidden assumptions. 1 Kant takes up the problem of what connections are 
possible - and on what conditions - between two perceptions. Hume 
requires, Kant says, the apprehension of order in the subject, 
independently of any objective references for my perceptions, so that 
we may then observe regularities and form habits. Let us for clarity 
make a few strict definitions: 1) objective succession or order is 
order in the object, the order of events in time that we can attribute 
to the object of perception itself; 2) objective-in-the-subject 
succession or order (forgive the name) is the actual order in which our 
faculty of receptivity was affected because the reception of a 
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sensory signal is itself an objective event, this order must be called 
objective, but in the subject. Of course, this order mayor may not be 
identical with objective succession, for I may see the bullet breaking 
the window before I hear it being fired or, more ordinarily, I may see 
the dog limping before I not ice the sore on its paw i 3) arbitrary 
sUbjective order is an imaginative giving of order out of the manifold 
which mayor may not correspond to the above two orders. In this new 
terminology, the order Hume requires is objective-in-the-subject order. 
Kant then argues that any consciousness of order outside objective 
reference requires that there be something only against the background 
of which can I make any connection whatsoever. This something cannot 
be time itself, for time is not itself perceptible. In the first 
instance, the something can only be (though Kant never says it) the 
transcendental unity of apperception, which is given in the '1 think'. 
This background is the condition for the possibility of any connection 
at all (whether temporal or not) being posited by the understanding. 2 
But the latter is, unlike objective time itself would be if there were 
such a thing, bidirectional. It consists merely of the possibility of 
the accompaniment of the 'I think' - two perceptions are equally mine 
whatever order they fall in, and yet to have any mutual relation in 
time they must already be mlne. Thus Kant can say that, although the 
imagination does indeed link perceptions together in a certain order, 
this order has no significance whatsoever. In the absence of objective 
reference, what I construe as objective-in-the-subject order is 
actually arbitrary subjective order. It is only by reconstructing the 
situation in objective terms, which always involves the use of causal 
laws (it is, of course, precisely this important auxiliary step that 
occupies the majority of the pages of the second analogy), that I can 
become conscious of anything except an arbitrary directionality in my 
perceptions. (We should note that this problem is parallel to, but not 
identical with, the problem of distinguishing objective succession from 
co-existence.) But Hume's analysis of the habit of causal connections 
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could not but depend Upon objective sequence, and thus upon the prior 
assumption of causal laws, and is thus circular. 3 
Now, as we have already indicated, the weak-appearing step lS that 
objective construction requires causal connection. The famous passage 
about the perception of the house versus the perception of the moving 
boat is pertinent here. Although above it became clear that Kant's 
first distinction was between two alternate subjective orders of 
perception, the distinction now is between two objective modes of time: 
succession and co-existence, and Kant argues that only causal rules can 
distinguish between these two cases. Briefly, the proof proceeds as 
follows (I am roughly following Arthur Melnick pp. 87ff; and again many 
of the steps are only implicit in Kant's text): All events take place 
in one time, and thus all events can be placed in a single series. 
This single series indeed allows the datability of an event (in terms 
of mutual temporal relations between events) only under one assumption, 
that ultimately all events are datable. Complete datability, of 
course, is not an empirical possibility, and thus time determination lS 
strictly regulative. (Kant says as much about the Analogies and, in 
the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, spacial determination 
is said to be regulative in a much stricter sense.) Such a conclusion 
implies, however, that there is a real difficulty in moving from the 
objective qualities of things in discrete perceptions (which, in the 
absence of the perceptibility of empty time, are the only available 
data which might lead to temporal ordering) to their objective temporal 
order. The only way of surpassing this difficulty is to somehow 
introduce what are, in effect, global (or complete) determinations at 
a local level namely, to apply universal causal laws to those 
objective qualities. This proof constitutes the important auxiliary 
step in Kant's broader proof. 
Now all this would be fine if only things were that simple. It is safe 
to say that the above is an apt summary of Kant's thinking, or at least 
of a Kant at certain moments, but it is only necessary to suggest a few 
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difficulties that are suggested by Kant's work itself - that is, which 
are internal to the system - in order to show the presence of a subtext 
to the second analogy more in line with our interpretation of the 
third. 
A first problem, which indeed many commentators have made much of, 1S 
that Kant's proof depends upon the doctrine of successive apprehension 
- that is, that perceptions are always at least temporally discrete. 
The aforementioned commentators have pointed out that not only is such 
a thesis untenable on the basis of more recent research into perception 
(ie. Gestalt Psychology and its various after-images), but that on the 
basis of Kant's own analysis of (for example) imaginative construction 
in space, it is dubious. 
There is yet another, equally disturbing problem with Kant's double 
proof as we have presented it. Our reconstruction of the auxiliary 
line of proof depends upon a distinction between objective properties 
and objective temporal datability. But on Kant's own terms this is 
impossible to maintain, for all that intuitions give us are external 
relations. An objective property, as its name implies, would be an 
internalized (that is to say, conceptualized) property. But surely 
such a becoming-objective must itself depend upon - or at least be 
developed alongside temporal determination. All properties of 
objects are certainly also temporal properties of the object. Thus 
Kant's argument is itself circular. The difficulty can be extended, of 
course, in the direction of space. For example, an objective property 
p of X might be its orientation. But empirical knowledge of p is not 
possible - nor any significance p might have for X - without the 
intuition of X being first and foremost an intuition of context - that 
is, the relations that constitute X as such and, indeed, as a object 
wi th property p. (There is no special type of intuition called an 
'intuition of context'. If it is a sensible intuition, then it is an 
outer or exterior intuition, that is the main point.) This context is 
at bottom obviously spacial and temporal: at what time does X have p, 
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and with respect to what other spacial objects 1S the orientation p 
determined? 
We should further recognize that, in the auxiliary proof outlined 
above, the distinction is not between properties of objects but of 
perceptions. The only relevant difference this makes, on Kantian 
grounds, is that the perception could be of an event - that is, an 
alteration in a substance. (Every perception must be, treated 
objectively, either a perception of a substance which exists as object 
X, or of a substance altering from X to Y. Thus the distinction 
between obj ect and event is identical to the distinction between 
objective succession and co-existence.) However, considering the 
perception of an event only makes our position clearer, for the content 
of an event (the alteration itself) is obviously only temporal and 
spacial relations. Given this dependence of p upon time and space, it 
is clear that only through a prior determination of the timing and 
spacing of X is any determination of p possible. Thus we cannot 
express the step in the auxiliary proof as the problem of moving from 
objective properties to objective temporal order. 
Now, in the last chapter we noted that, for Kant, sensation - by which 
Kant means colour, taste, smell, etc. can be taken up without 
difficulty into the intelligence. Subsequent developments allow us to 
interpret this as meaning that, for Kant, sensations are not 
relations. 4 However, given that there is some property p of an event 
or object X that, in intuition, is entirely relational, how is it 
possible to arrive at an objective representation of p such that, on 
the basis of p, a causal rule could be applied? This question 
expresses the circularity of Kant's argument very concisely: the causal 
law must be applied before the causal law can be applied. 
Having stated the second analogy and its problems with some r1gour, it 
is now necessary to begin the salvage operation. 
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1.2.2. The Span of Intuition 
Let us take stock: 1n summarizing Kant's proof of the second analogy of 
experience, we identified a main and an auxiliary proof. The main 
proof is concerned to show that objective-in-the-subject order requires 
the determination of order in the object. The auxiliary proof wants to 
demonstrate that the causal principle is needed to determine order in 
the obj ect. We then found two basic problems with the central 
assumptions of these. The first revolves around successive 
apprehension; the second involved a circularity in Kant's argument 
about the moment of application of the causal law. 
The story of successive apprehension seems to be told fully in the 
opening few pages of the first Transcendental Deduction. In discussing 
the synthesis of apprehension and the synthesis of reproduction Kant 
apparently asserts that all representations are unities and that any 
two representations are necessarily successive in time. But there is 
an ambiguity here: when Kant says representation, does he mean any 
representation or only an intellectual representation? In our previous 
chapter, when we discussed the similar problem of the pure manifolds of 
space and time, the problem was solved by the observation (based on 
Melnick's) that space and time only have manifolds for the intellect. 
As intuitions as such, they do not present manifolds. Let us expand on 
this argument here. 
Kant writes that "every intuition in itself contains a manifold which 
can be represented as a manifold only in so far as the mind 
distinguishes the time in the sequence of one impression upon another; 
for each representation, in so far as it is contained in a single 
moment, can never be anything but absolute unity" (A99). What the 
first part of this sentence means is extremely obscure, and the second 
1S little better. In the following attempt at paraphrasing for 
simplicity we treat only of outer intuitions: Every intuition of an 
object must be considered by the understanding as a manifold of 
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impressions; an intuition which contains nothing but relations cannot 
for this reason be a intellectual unity and thus cannot be in a single 
moment; the understanding represents this manifold by distinguishing a 
sequence of impressions in time; thus if some representations are 
contained in a single moment and are absolute unities, they must be 
intellectual representations; intellectual representations are unities 
through synthesis. 
Thus the successive apprehension and synthesis 'in' intuition is not a 
description of intuition itself (it cannot be), but a description of 
the 'first' operation of the understanding (broadly defined so as to 
include the imagination) upon intuition. The understanding synthesizes 
by first taking apart, interpreting space and time as locations. This 
is not equivalent to analysis, because intuition is not a synthetic 
unity. The unity of intuition Kant discusses in the transcendental 
deduction is, then, not the same as the wholeness introduced in the 
aesthetic - and this is precisely where so many commentators have gone 
wrong. 
If indeed intuition as such contained any kind of a manifold, then - as 
I believe Kant himself knew, since it was a common enough problem in 
the literature (both philosophical and mathematical) before and since -
we would be faced with the absurdity of atoms (absolute units) of 
spacial and temporal magnitude if it is to be possible to construct 
magnitudes, and the forms of space and time would have no work to do. 
Not of course absurd for Hume - but certainly so for Kant. Indeed, 
such a theory contradicts itself by opening the possibility of a non-
manifold intuition, i.e. the intuition of one such atom. In addition, 
it would be possible for such atoms to be identical (not in the 
understanding, but in intuition) which is impossible for spacially or 
temporally formed intuitions. See, for example, Kant's discussion of 
Leibniz's Identity of Indiscernibles at A264=B320. Only for the 
understanding's encountering of manifolds as manifolds of located 
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sensible atoms is the identity of elements possible, and Kant discusses 
this possibility at B131n. 
Now there are other problems with successive apprehension as well. But 
the mere fact that there must be a level prior to such apprehension 
where, for example, an intuition of co-existence might be possible 
without material interaction, means that there is a Kantian way of, 
very properly, having one's cake and eating it too. The necessity of 
the categories as supplement to intuition is brought about not because 
of successive apprehension but because of the absolute difference 
between intuition and all thought. 
In the broader, first proof, we said that there necessarily was a 
difficulty in moving from a sUbjective attribution of order to an 
objective determination of the order of apprehension. But as our 
consideration of the problem of succession makes clear, this may well 
be a problem generated by the understanding. An intuition never lasts 
merely a moment (whatever that would mean) - if it did it very clearly 
could not encompass the spacial and temporal relations that it does. 
But this does not therefore mean that an intuition is composed of a 
succession of micro-intuitions. On the contrary, the intuition has a 
certain wholeness or 'stretch' without discrete parts. Its 
apprehension of an event which 1S thought as XY need not be the 
apprehension of X followed by an already distinct apprehension of Y. 
Further, not having parts, it 1S difficult to see how the intuition 
could be reversible or capable of being scrambled in the same sense as 
a sequence of isolated and instantaneous representations; that is to 
say, being dependant upon the whole, it is always already oriented. 
Therefore, in at least some cases namely those cases where the 
intuition/duration/span encompasses the event itself - the order of 
apprehension of the event must be implicit in the intuition. s Thus the 
third type of order, arbitrary sUbjective order, would be a non-
category, if we could prove that the 'order' implicit in intuition were 
somehow available to the understanding. Certainly, we never actually 
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experience an order as arbitrary, even if not at all objective - though 
in itself this is no proof. Thinking this 'order' as objective-in-the-
subject order (that is, as belonging to embodied receptivity) requires, 
of course, the categories. The mere representation has to first of all 
be linked to the embodied organ of receptivity in a strict relation of 
cause and effect such that the order in the latter is delivered over 
into the former intact. Embodied receptivity is useless to the 
understanding unless the body is thought as such and as object. We can 
conclude swiftly that the subject/object distinction as the mind/body 
distinction is required by the understanding for experience (in Kant's 
sense) to be possible. Let us leave this here, for the moment. 
What, though, are we to make now of Kant's famous argument about the 
non-perceivability of empty time? Kant must claim that time itself 
cannot be perceived or he leaves himself open to the spectre of 
idealism. The solution is as simple as it is revealing: the operative 
word here (and everywhere else Kant raises the issue) is perception, 
which does not simply mean intuition. Kant makes this clear in section 
26 of the second Transcendental Deduction. Perception is equivalent to 
empirical consciousness and follows upon combination of the manifold. 
Naturally, time cannot itself be perceived, for in perception the 
intuition has already undergone its sea-change and is now thought "as 
appearance" (CPR B160), which is to say, the SUbject-object distinction 
is already in operation. Thus, in collaps ing arbitrary subj ect i ve 
order into objective-in-the-subject order we are merely describing 
another of the aspects of how the understanding thinks the forms of 
intuition. This is not to say, however, that in any straight-forward 
sense empty time or time-in-itself is intuited - because time is not an 
object. Time is a form for intuition, there is no better way of 
expressing it. 
The fact of an implicit 'order' given in intuition will cause gl-ave but 
perhaps not insurmountable problems for Kant's argument against Hume, 
as we shall see shortly. First, though, let us develop one fascinating 
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implication. We are now in a position to develop, on purely Kantian 
grounds, a situation directly parallel to incongruent counterparts in 
space. We saw above that, for Kant, the incongruent counterparts were 
those that could only be thought of as distinguished by exterior but 
none-the-less intelligible relations, but which intuition gave as 
distinguished in their interiors because intuitions 
'construct' 
interiors through exteriors. So long as we spoke of two events (or 
states of a substance separated by an event) X and Y, and introduced 
the notion of a causal law to determine their order, it was impossible 
to speak of the two orders XY and YX as being incongruent counterparts. 
This was because given the complete determination of one (which would 
include the causal law) the other was just another internal and 
intelligible manifestation (cf. Leibniz's complete concept). That is 
to say, there was no dependence upon the dimensionality (or any other 
property) of time as such. 
However, recently we discussed the idea that the introduction of the 
causal law by the understanding was equivalent to the importation of 
complete determinability in time, and thus of intuitable dates. Now we 
have taken a further step and noted how a non-momentary intuition would 
necessarily though implicitly contain what we have called the 
objective-in-the-subject order, but only by virtue of the nature of the 
form of time as a whole. Therefore, the incongruent counterparts 
argument might proceed roughly like this: Orders XY and YX are 
indistinguishable in their interiors so far as the pure understanding 
is concerned, because it has no reason or means to demand uniqueness in 
temporal order; for the empirical understanding applying a particular 
causal law, the two are distinguishable, but only ever as exterior, 
first because the law is derived neither from X or Y but from a 
constructed induction from all other experiences, second because the 
criteria for the application of this rule are only determined in X and 
Y from their exteriors; it follows that for any mode of understanding, 
the two orders are equally possible in their interiors, and are 
indistinguishable - this just means that although the understanding 
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ultimately attributes order to the interior of objects or situations, 
it none-the-less defines order by way of a some set of rules that are 
not 'within' the manifold itself; however, this difference is given as 
interior in intuition; this proves that time, and the properties of 
time, are intuitions and not concepts with all that distinction implies 
in Kantian philosophy. (What it does not prove, as was the case with 
space, is that time is also an a priori and pure intuition.) Such a 
proof is important for our purposes since it shows the clear affinity 
of the givenness of order in intuition and the determination of order 
in the causal rule. 
According to our analysis of the Kantian understanding thus far, it is 
clear that such an order is unthinkable as such. To think time, the 
intuition must be dissected and then reconstituted in synthesis, and 
order in intuition may be lost thereby precisely because the intuition 
of the whole time is to be replaced by regulative dating. 
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1.2.3. Aspects of Necessity and Objectivity. 
The auxiliary proof needs to be recast. Melnick's assumption in his 
reconstruction of the l'l' f aux lary proo was based on the following 
definitl' on·. A caus 1 1 1 h a aw lS a ru e t at allows us to infer from 
objective properties of perceptions of events the order of those 
events. Although at first it seemed plausible, we can now recognize 
(on the basis of the second problem we identified with Kant's proof) 
this definition as circular. What we overlooked is the fact that the 
event is already constituted by the empirical imagination with a 
provisional order of relation - our experience of the sUbjective order 
of apprehension is not as arbitrary as Kant sometimes tells us it is. 
We do indeed seem to have a limited ability to recall objective-in-the-
subject order without any reference to causal sequence - and it is 
indeed the introduction of an artificial causal sequence (such as a 
mnemonic) that allows the trained memory to exceed this limited 
ability. Kant does vacillate between attributing to us knowledge of 
actual subjective order and mere arbitrary sUbjective order (compare 
B233, 238, 239-40, 243, etc.). 
The whole intuition contains the actual subjective order (though not, 
of course, as an order) and it seems that this information cannot be 
always or completely lost. Thus, this provisional order is that order 
already inscribed in intuition. What this implies is that certain 
temporal relations are given, although when applied to the objective 
events themselves (order in the object) these admit of being reversible 
or (in the becoming-objective) reduced to simultaneity. This half-
solves our second problem: there lS something like time (and in 
parallel, space) determinations prior to objective determination, but 
they are given only as provisional or hypothetical. Let us call P the 
provisional determination of that set p of the objective properties of 
the object under consideration. We shall assume for the moment that a 
property set can be transformed into a unique order, and the reverse. 
If the provisional order is XY; the problem then becomes whether the 
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objective order is indeed XY or rather YX or whether on the other hand 
X and Y were in fact simultaneous. Of course in more complex events, 
which the intellect has divided into more than two terms, the number of 
possible provisional orders increases exponentially.6 
The only criteria for the solution of this problem are 1) the 
provisional determination P of properties such as p, and 2) knowledge 
of empirical causal laws. Let us now define a causal law as one that 
generates hypothetically possible property-sets (call them (pI, p2, 
p3 ... }) on the basis of the P-set. Notice that our definition has 
restored (against all odds, critics of Kant's architectonic would have 
told us) to the proof of the Second Analogy Kant's original concern 
with the hypothetical judgement form. Now, that p-set which is the 
actual objective set following from the objective order, will have as 
a necessary condition that it agrees with one of (pI, p2, p3 ... } - that 
is to say, it will have (at least) internal coherence with respect to 
a rule. The understanding is assisted by the fact that, by and large, 
the possible permutations that make up (pI, p2, p3 ... } are limited, and 
that there must be causal reasons for why the given order is the 
particular order it is - for example, it is useful to know the relative 
velocities of light and sound when one is estimating the distance away 
of a lightning storm. P is provisional, not arbitrary, and its order 
must be capable of being mapped onto p, according to rules. Note also 
that, again, the introduction of the causal law is equivalent to 
introducing complete determinations into local situations because it is 
directly equivalent to intuitable datability. We do not directly infer 
order from observation but test hypotheses with observation. 
It is thus unimportant to the auxiliary proof whether the provisional 
order has anything objective about it at all, and this must be Kant's 
point. The understanding takes intuition apart, gives its manifold a 
provisional order and unity in the empirical synthesis, and tests that 
unity and other possible unities against the rule which functions 
hypothetically. It 1S simply that the causal rule must first be 
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present or any notion of succession in the object is lost. Fair 
enough. Presumably, though, if Kant were interested in giving a 
Lockean account of the genealogy of empirical laws (but he is not), he 
would recognize the priority of objective-in-the-subject order. It is 
only later at a high level of development of experience in terms of 
hypotheticals that thought can discard the body, and the understanding 
can leap, as it were, entirely over receptivity as an event (though not 
intuition itself) from perception to object. 
Now the premise we have been discussing in the last few paragraphs has 
wider significance. Kant's argument against Hume is already in trouble 
enough, but if objective-in-the-subject succession is allowed without 
interference from the a priori principle of causation (in the form of 
a particular causal law that partakes of its necessity), then Hume's 
point about the habit of causal connections once again has footing on 
which to stand, and Kant's whole effort is wasted. Not that Hume would 
accept much of the above, that is not the point: rather, as we shall 
see, Kant's connection between a priori necessity and the objectivity 
of the obj ect breaks down. We may speculate that Kant (however 
unconsciously) held onto the notion of arbitrary sUbjective order as an 
artifice to make his anti-Humean job easier. 
Before we ask how Kant might answer this new objection, we require an 
important detour. We speak of the categories, the causal law, the 
forms of intuition as 'necessary' and 'universal'. What do these words 
mean here? Kant's own definition of necessity is not of much use, for 
it itself 1S a category, and there are points in the Critique of 
Teleological Judgement' where one suspects the concept of 'necessity' is 
on the verge of being drained and abandoned entirely. What one can say 
is that necessity is always the necessity either of a concept or a 
relation, never of an empirical object, for Kant. Given, for example, 
the actuality of a sensation, it is necessarily posited that sensation 
will have an intensive magnitude; given an event, the necessity of its 
connect ion to another event in a time sequence is also ;ll",ren. 
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Universality is something like the necessity of necessity - that is, 
this particular necessity has a necessary application to all x of this 
type. These definitions are becoming circular - let us narrow down. 
One concept related to necessity is that of objectivity. Now, 
objectivity has two meanings for Kant, which are equivalent but in a 
complex manner: 1) objectivity as the objectness of the object, that 
which exist separate from us and is not subject to our whims or fancies 
or, immediately at least, to our will; 2) objectivity as the necessity 
and universality of certain rules, concepts or judgements. Now, the 
traditional interpretation of Kant has (1) following from (2). For 
example, in Robert Paul Wolff's elaborate and exceedingly careful 
reconstruction of the Deduction. The argument can be paraphrased so: 
the observed unity is possible and is made necessary only through 
reproduction in imagination according to a rule; the categories are 
these rules; objective reality means necessary connection, therefore 
the contents of consciousness have objective reality (Wolff 1968, 
89ff) . For the moment, let us take the complicity between the two 
meanings of 'objectivity' as read - observing only that, for Kant, the 
negatives of these are also linked: lack of necessity means lack of 
object, and thus Hume's scepticism cannot stop short of absolute. 
Next, we have to ask ourselves what does 'necessary' mean here with 
respect to the law of causation, and what exactly is it that is 
'necessary' . Let us list the possibilities: 1) the categories have 
necessity by virtue of being the unique modes of the unity of 
apperception under which all encountered manifolds of intuition are 
synthesized, and thus (for example) the law of causation will always be 
applied; 2a) some causal law is necessary to determine objective order 
with respect to every perception in time; 2b) that objective order 
should be experienced necessarily implies the 'prior' existence of some 
causal law; 3) the understanding cannot think the possibility of 
objective order without assuming the existence of a causal law. There 
must certainly be other variations. These are not exactly mutually 
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incompatible, but rather have their different moments. The first would 
be something like Kant's argument in the Transcendental Deduction. The 
main thrust of Kant's arguments in the second analogy seems to be 2a, 
and this 'main thrust' has led to all the familiar difficulties raised 
by post-Kantian empiricists, who claim that experience would still be 
possible within a world that did not always - but only for the most 
part - obeyed causal laws. Possibility 2b would be typical of the type 
of analytic argument that Kant uses in the Prolegomena, and operates in 
the same manner as 2a though it is slightly weaker. The third 
possibility borders on the psychologistic thesis that, as a matter of 
fact, humans do tend to resist disorder or absolute contingency (and 
would consequently belong to anthropology) - but only borders, for it 
is fully capable of being a proposition in transcendental philosophy. 
The necessity in 1 is axiomatic: the principles are simply content-
variations (modes) to be derived under the a priori conditions of the 
forms of intuition from an a priori form. The necessity in 2a and 2b 
is functional: causal rules are thought of as conditions for the 
possibility of experience as we know it or could imagine it, although 
of course it is the categories which define what we know and imagine. 
Note that in general a concept or judgement which is axiomatically or 
functionally necessary lS also material i that is, has determining 
content with respect to empirical objects or events. The necessity in 
3 we can call regulative and has no content. Several moments in the 
analogies tend towards this third view of their necessity - certainly 
Kant states that the analogies are regulative, but what he means is 
that since being is not a real predicate, any principle that puts 
existence under a priori rules cannot be said to determine real 
properties a priori. This is different from the meaning of 
'regulative' in the Dialectic where a relation is given to something 
that cannot be said to exist at all because it is not a possible object 
of experience. The precise meaning of 'regulative' is different for 
reason and the understanding, but its understanding of necessity is in 
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both cases the same: without the positing of some x as ground of y, y 
is unthinkable as such. 
Above we said that the possibility of objective-in-the-subject order 
available to the understanding without the objectification by a priori 
rules upset the Kantian relation between necessity and the object. We 
can now pin this down more clearly. According to traditional 
interpretations of Kant, functional and axiomatic necessities are 
simply mirror images of each other. Now T.K. Swing breaks open this 
connection by showing how the Kantian system might function best 
grounded only in functional necessity - and indeed, at least for Swing, 
wi thout a priori forms of intuition. In either case, objectivity 
consists in that which is necessary according to a priori rules. The 
type of necessity which we have called regulative is quite different: 
at issue here is the thinkability of those ingredients of objectivity 
mentioned above. Causation is the only available mode of thinking 
time-sequence, and thus it is necessary that causation be brought into 
playas a thought-construction, but there is no guarantee that all 
time-sequences will be available to thought. The only necessary 
connections are between mental states of the perceiving subject, and 
therefore the subj ect lS the only obj ect. The radical separation 
between thought and intuition comes into play here as soon as we ask, 
how might an unthinkable 'time-sequence' present itself to us? It is, 
of course, precisely this possibility that Kant speculates on 
throughout the third Critique. 
The wholeness of intuition is precisely its dependence upon the a 
priori form of time and space as such. These forms the understanding 
cannot depend upon (which is the problem of the second analogy) because 
time and space are not available to it as objects of intuition. Thus 
it is the form a priori of wholeness which assures that the orientation 
of intuition in time is in itself necessary. Space, strictly speaking, 
only forms outer intuition and time only inner, but since time can only 
be thought in terms of space, and space only synthesized across time, 
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the two must be considered at least equi-primordial for all intuition. 
Thus, they must necessarily apply to all intuition, although what 
exactly they represent (noumenally speaking) is for Kant an insolvable 
problem. The character of wholeness of an intuition is not empirical, 
it is a priori, and thus the necessity of the order (and, in space, 
orientation) given in intuition is also a priori, although it is not an 
axiomatic necessity nor, strictly speaking, a functional one. The 
necessity In question let us call formal. This indicates that a 
certain order will be given in the very application of a unique a 
priori form, and thus the givenness of order is necessary. But not the 
order itself, which remains radically contingent; in other words, 
formal necessity is contentless, having to do with the mode of 
givenness of the contingent. 
with the regulative. 
It has this contentlessness in common 
We can then describe intuition as such as entirely syntactical (though 
this is not quite proper since when, in the qUotation we were referring 
to, Kant speaks of representations he is presumably referring to images 
in a manifold, but let it pass). Synthesis is not a purely syntactical 
operation, but is always synthesis under (the transcendental unity of 
apperception and the categories). The formation of the phenomenal 
categories can be rigorously described as alien to pure intuition in as 
much as the categories are discursive or class concepts and thus are 
not purely syntactic entities. We of course already knew this under 
different conceptual tags, for Kant makes it perfectly clear from the 
first pages of the Aesthetic (cf. B40). 
Order implicit in intuition is given, then, and it is necessary a 
priori that it always be given, but by itself such 'order' (we enclose 
it in inverted commas because, as we now know, the implicitness of this 
order is something other than a mere hiddenness) is of no use to the 
understanding, for it is not yet an order of something. Being I the 
order of' would place it within an alien representation field 
(discursivity) involving sUbsumption. There exists a classic problem 
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laboured over by numerous commentators concerning whether Kant's term 
'intuition' means 'that which is intuited' or 'the intuition of that 
which is intuited' and at what points in the text it might mean which. 
It means both and neither, because intuition as such is unable to 
formulate that distinction. Thus, the implicit order being purely 
formal has no material content; that is to say, it is not an order the 
necessity of which has any generality; it is singular within the 
wholeness of the one space and time. Put in still other words the 
order is not an order of something, it is not part of a series or 
orders thought through as regular, nor determined by any laws of the 
understanding. As we have mentioned already, the necessity of 
orderliness in question is not axiomatic or even, strictly speaking, 
functional, but only formal. 
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1.2.4. A Priori Elements in the Second Analogy. 
Kant could answer the empiricist's resurgence about the availability of 
order in several ways: 1) such retentions of order are insignificant 
because clearly brief and undependable - however, this is merely an 
empirical and not a transcendental argument; 2) retained order is only 
objective-in-the-subject order, and not succession in the object - in 
other words, only the auxiliary proof is kept, but this begs the 
question of how the two meanings of objectivity differ; 3) the forms of 
intuition are a priori, and thus it remains true that the necessity of 
order is granted a priori (not a move for purists, but interesting 
none-the-Iess); 4) however it may be given, objective-in-the-subject 
order requires a causal law to be understood as such. 
fourth possibility would be Kant's. 
Surely this 
We can only further frustrate Kant if it could be shown that the order 
given in intuition were somehow necessary for the determination of 
order in the object by the understanding; that is, if arbitrary order 
alone did not supply enough information to the understanding for its 
laws to get a grip on experience. Now it may well be the case - were 
we to study the psychology of perception, etc. - that the understanding 
consistently makes use of what we called above the provisional order. 
But we can suspect that this will in fact be a matter of convenience 
(oversampling), and that the provisional order thus has no 
transcendental role to play in the possibility of experience. 
Hume's point is stubborn: surely, the mere fact that order is given 
would be enough to set our empirical law-seeking instincts in motion. 
Above we said that the (for the understanding) regulative nature of 
time determination was overcome by the introduction of what were in 
effect global and complete determinations in the form of rules. Kant's 
most explicit description of this 'introducing' 1S quoted below. Kant 
1S noting that objectivity cannot consist in a relation to a 
representation, 
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for then the problem would arise concerning the 
objectivity of the latter: 
"How, then, does it come about that to these 
representations we posit an object or, beyond their 
sUbjective reality and as a modification, attribute we know 
not what kind of objective reality? Objective meaning 
cannot consist in the relation to another representation 
(of that which one wishes to name object), for then the 
question renews itself: how in turn does this 
representation go out beyond itself and acquire objective 
meaning when we enquire, then, what new character 
relation to an object would give to our representations, 
and what dignity would be thereby awarded, we find that it 
would do nothing other than to make necessary a particular 
manner [Art] in the connection of the representations, and 
to subject [unterwerfen] them to a rule; and conversely, 
only if a particular order in the time-relations of our 
representations is necessary, will their objective meaning 
be granted." (A197=B242). 
(Let us note very quickly that we find here (as against Kemp Smith's 
translation) the confirmation of our characterization of the causal 
rule as hypothetically setting up and matching possible p-sets.) As we 
discussed above, objectivity ln the dominant Kantian sense is 
essentially equivalent to the necessity of a certain p-set. The 
necessity, Kant obviously feels, is only granted in the causal law or 
rule, which itself derives its necessity axiomatically from the a 
priori understanding. The verb 'unterwerfen' (to conquer, subjugate, 
make submit to) is here very telling. Note also that in dismissing the 
possibility that objectivity might be found in a representation 
relation, Kant is here referring to what we might call 'experiential 
syntax': that is, the relation of one same-level represent at ion to 
another. 
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With this in mind, we are now in a position to formulate at least the 
outline of an argument. Kant could admit that we are given an order in 
our intuitions which would be adequate for us to, over the course of 
long and regular experience, generalize or abstract to empirical 
'laws'. But, Kant would ask How (ie, against the background of what) 
could we judge not order this time but regularity? This question can 
be seen in the syntax argument in the quotation above. Here we can 
insert the Refutation of Idealism which, since Kant saw Hume's argument 
against causation as an argument against objectness and thus reality, 
was also directed at Empiricism. Thus it is that the very same 
argument about the non-perceivability of time is repeated there. 
Kant's argument proceeds like this: 
Existence in time means possible determination in time. Determination 
in time means that some event has a fixed location (which can be a 
predicate in the concept of that event) in time relative to other 
events, and ultimately all other events. To decide objective order of 
events, we would need to compare relatively representation R(A,Ta) of 
event A at time Ta and representation R(B,Tb) of event B at time Tb. 
But this would mean that R(A,Ta) would have to in some way continue to 
exist until Tb (or the reverse, depending upon the objective order). 
That is, the comparison would mean comparing R(A,Tb) with R(B,Tb). If 
the existence of this third representation were itself an event, we 
would then have to prove that the representation was a representation 
of R(A,Ta), by comparing R(A,Ta) and R(A,Tb)i but this would be only 
possible through another representation either of A or of R(A,Ta), and 
so on. 
event. 
or way 
The existence of this representation would not itself be an 
Therefore, if only events 'existed', there would be no reason 
to ask about the relation of one event to another, and no 
content to any assertion about events carrying causal indexes to other 
events. The very possibility of 'fixed location relative to ... ' 
thus requires that something be presupposed as not being eventful, 1.e. 
being permanent or at least enduring across events. Furthermore, this 
72 
something must endure without question - it must be of its essence to 
endure, and not something which endures only accidentally. Otherwise, 
the question can be asked about whether the enduring thing in fact 
endures or merely appears to endure. 
Because there are no other types of things, the enduring thing must be 
either a thing existing in time alone, a thing existing in space alone, 
a representation of a thing in space or time, or time or space itself. 
This thing which endures cannot be a thing that exists only in time, 
because things in time are in flux; certainly Kant can not disregard 
the possibility of a permanent non-extended substance, a soul, but his 
point is rather that such a thing cannot here serve: that is, a thing 
apprehended merely through time, for the reasons given above, cannot 
ground determination in time. Nor can the enduring thing be time or 
space itself (because time or space themselves, as objects, are 
something we construct). The enduring thing cannot be a representation 
of something in time (a memory) because (among other objections) such 
a representation as a representation in and of time can only be 
construed as contingently enduring. That is, a question about the 
validity of any or all memory as such can arise. This thing which 
endures also cannot be a representation of something which endures 
(i. e. a representation of something in space) because the concept 
'representation of ... ' already presupposes a determinate time and space 
relation to something outside the representation. This thing which 
endures must ultimately be a thing existing in space. I have knowledge 
of my existence in time, therefore I have knowledge of things existing 
in space (and not merely representations of things in space). Indeed, 
)6'Y knowledge of my existence in time 
depends upon such existing things. 
(i.e. my consciousness itself) 
Regularity is such by being referred to something which persists, that 
is, an object (matter as substance); in the absence of a concept of an 
object in general, the notion of regularity is also empty. In other 
words, order in intuition would give us the information for experience, 
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but only if we were also given, and in advance, the mode in which that 
information was to be gathered. 
This mode consists in, of course, the forms of judgement as (re-) 
formed (by space and time) into phenomenal notions like substance, 
alteration, cause and effect, co-existence, magnitude and reality. 
Order is always 'order of' something, but what? events or objects? 
This is the significance of the house versus boat example: the question 
is not merely temporal succession contrasted with simultaneity but of 
what an object or an event is, where does it start and stop, and ~n 
what way does it relate to the next or previous object or event or 
history of events. In discussing hypothetical orders above, we assumed 
out of the blue that a given order corresponded uniquely to a property 
set, and that the transformation itself was always available. It is 
becoming clear that this assumption is only possible on the coat tails 
of judgements about phenomenal modes. The Humean bundle of 
representations needs form - notions of bundling in general - before it 
can think itself as 'mere bundle'. 
Our first reconstruction of Kant's auxiliary argument was recast in 
terms of a provisional or hypothetical order that could then be tested 
against ongoing experience, using known causal laws as interpreters. 
Subsequently, however, we decided that this provisional order - which, 
because of the nature of intuition, was not arbitrary, but object-in-
the-subj ect - was a mere convenience, not a necessity. Its formal 
necessity does not give an 'order of ... ' and thus its relationship to 
the 9bjective situation is indeterminate. Finally, we noted that this 
syntactical formal necessity is so content less as to be insufficient 
for any empirical account even of regularity. We require a priori and 
synthetic judgements as to the possible modes of an object or event 
(and these are the Analogies) before any construction of regularity is 
possible. Kant's argument in the second Analogy is explicitly designed 
to prove a strong thesis about the relationship between causation and 
objectivity. What it actually does prove, according to the above 
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reconstruction, is the weaker but still Kantian thesis about regularity 
and objectivity. This would be Kant's answer to Hurne, then, an answer 
that has retreated several paces from the terrain of the Second 
Analogy, but that has kept its central bastion secure. 
It seems clear now that this letting-become-an-object can also be seen 
in terms of the projection of objectivity into intuitive terms: a 
causal law could describe events separated enough in time that clearly 
no single intuition could encompass them, but it would be describing 
them as if the whole process were singly intuited. Indeed, if the 
causal law were converted into an imagined intuition, such an 'as if' 
would be precisely the content of that intuition. We will return to 
these issues in discussing schematism and models. For the moment it is 
enough to observe that the formal necessity of the givenness of order 
in intuition is the display in intuitive terms of the axiomatic or 
functional necessity of judgements about the phenomenal modes of 
objects (i.e. in discursive terms). And this is the case even though 
the given order is not required for determination in empirical thought. 
But intuition lS not merely left behind, for that too would be 
unkantian. Above, in presenting a temporal version of incongruent 
counterparts, we said that the understanding defines order by way of 
rules. But order is a temporal concept - no conceptual rules on their 
own could be a schema of order. Specifically, what is required is the 
one-dimensionality and the unity of time if we are to derive the notion 
of order from the notion of rule. Now, an empiricist could reply that 
these two are concepts derived from experience and subsequently applied 
in our causal judgements. However, we have already accepted the 
possibility of objective-in-the-subject order, or the order given by 
the imagination in the intuited manifold. The givenness of order, we 
said, was formally necessary. But if it were not the case that time, 
as an intuition, were one-dimensional and unified (or rather: whole) 
then order could not be given interior to the manifold. In fact, the 
formally necessary givenness of order just means: the givenness of a 
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presentation 'already in and from out of' a one-dimensional and whole 
network of betweenness. Which is to imply that, time itself incapable 
of being perceived and the form of time not an object for inspection, 
the givenness of order is just that wherein the a priori structure of 
time is encountered. The source of this essential information about 
the nature of time, without which no concept of order would be 
possible, must be the form of time itself. Thus intuition too must be 
a priori for Kant's argument in the Second Analogy to succeed. 
A priori here means that, given (essentially contingently) some 
representation in space-time, the form of that representation will be 
encountered by the understanding with particular synthesising 
judgements such that the latter are instances of general rules for all 
representations in space-time. Of course, a priori also means that, 
when the understanding attempts to understand the above process, it 
will necessarily encounter certain paradoxes which hint at the 
propriety of this a priori form of intuition as such. There are a 
priori discursive elements in the analogy, and also a priori intuitive 
elements, and both are required - but more: this double requirement is 
precisely due to their heterogeneity of form. 
That the given, provis ional order should be neither suff icient nor 
necessary is something we could have guessed long ago: the 
understanding even as functionally necessary delivers its own 
definition of functionality over to itself. Thus it should have been 
clear that possible experience in the Kantian sense of the various 
principles of objectivity, since these principles were derived from the 
understanding, could only be possible on the basis of the 
understanding. This circularity, because it is the understanding 
itself, can never be sufficiently understood, though it characterizes 
'd I' and after that, phenomenological hermeneutics. 1 ea lsm , Still, 
although such questions always answer themselves with themselves, there 
remains for Kant an exterior barely thinkable that is called intuition 
- and thus once again and with undeniable tedium, the same question 
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returns, this time in the form: how does (or would) intuition relate to 
that which is intuited, and what is the significance of this relation 
for experience in the Kantian sense. 
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1.2.5. The Space of the Subject. 
Above we quoted a long passage from the Second Analogy about the 
relating of one representation to another without ever finding 
objectivity (A197=B242). This we called syntax, and we used this 
notion to reinforce certain characterizations of the understanding 
which we had already developed. But what is new in the passage is the 
metaphor of 'going out beyond itself [aus sich selbst heraus gehenJ'; 
the representation cannot of itself go beyond and form the 'relation to 
the object'. This spacial language is not accidental, certainly. The 
beyond is the projected field of objects. Space and time are in the 
subject and what is out of the subject - the noumenon - is also out of 
experience. Intuition is not of itself distinct from the intuited - a 
fact which has caused commentators no end of headaches and certainly no 
end of complaints about Kant's careless use of terminology. We have 
already explored a number of problems arising from this fact. It is as 
if the syntactical play of representations is a mere surface, and it is 
the task of the understanding to wrench an entirely new dimension out 
of it. This dimension is suspended between subject and object, inside 
and outside, mind and body, and is the first and minimum requirement of 
all thought. 
What do we mean by subject and object? Do we mean the elements of a 
grammatical proposition, or the 'human subject' and the (possible) 
objects of its awareness? But for Kant, in an important sense, these 
two are the same. Any analysis of a proposition like 'the bulb is 
burnt out' will eventually resolve itself, according to Kant, into a 
proposition like 'My experience is of the burnt-out bulb'. Further, 
'My experience' predicates nothing of anything except that this 
experience is mine. The 'is of' (and thus the 'the burnt-out bulb' as 
such) is made possible by certain rules. At the same time and in the 
same way as these rules turn my experience into a representation of 
something outside me, they constitute that something as an object which 
itself is expressed according to the language of substance. Thus the 
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two meanings of subject and object are directly linked in 
transcendental philosophy. 
Yet space or a certain space lS a condition for any 'going outside'. 
The new dimension of the becoming-objective of a representation is not 
a distancing of the understanding from space, but is rather and exactly 
the placing of the subject into space as one of its occupants, as an 
object/ but an object which/ at its /centre/ is also a judging subject. 
Further / the mere fact of obj ecti ve-in-the-subj ect order and the 
problem it presents for Kant indicates that for the understanding our 
faculty of receptivity itself (our body) must be the first object/ and 
that the understanding posits its own bare and empty spontaneity as 
subject. This is the true meaning of the Refutation of Idealism: 
everything we have of ourselves is in space and time and we depend upon 
their /reality/ for our own. 
When/ in the Transcendental Aesthetic/ Kant tells us that without space 
as a form of intuition within the subject, we could never have 
conceived insideness and outsideness/ he is not thereby asserting that 
space as a form is sufficient (another of those crucial moments where, 
as we have seen/ a whole tradition of commentary goes awry). Rather/ 
Kant is saying that without space as a presupposition/ the sUbject-
predicate judgement form would never have been schematized as 
substance/ and thus as the relation between the judging subject and its 
judged affectation-objects. And/ similarly, without the spacial and 
temporal schematization of the hypothetical judgement form, the causal 
law would not be able to think the difference between inner and outer 
intuition. 
Still/ it would seem that the now of time (the present) and the here of 
space (the point of view) would inevitably be given (in order to anchor 
and orient the relational space and time) and thus be able to 
constitute/ within intuition alone, a first objective time and place. 
The time and place of the thinking, judging subject. 
what is the 'subject' in mere intuition? 
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In other words, 
Space's first thought relation is the relation between self and not-
self - or what amounts to the same thing, between judging subject and 
object of judgement. But in the Aesthetic, space is also the 
preliminary laying out of outside and inside, which is to say that even 
as an intuition, space lS oriented or constituted from out of a 
particular relational position, which the understanding will think as 
the 'here'. Obviously a connection exists between this thinking of 
subject and object and this preliminary laying out. We say 'outside' 
and 'inside', but of course in space itself there is only ever outside, 
both because all appearances consist solely of relations to the whole, 
and because time and time alone is the form of our relation to 
oursel ves (inner sense). The 'inner' of space is mere position, 
viewpoint, but is not, of course, thematised as position: there are no 
keeps on a flat surface. Consequently, and strictly speaking, this 
'point' is not a point-of-view, for who would be viewing what, under 
which causal story of sensibility? And strictly speaking, not even a 
'point', as if the point existed of its own prior to the field in which 
it lies. As Kant himself says (significantly, in The Anticipations of 
Perception), the point lS simply a limit to, and therefore dependent 
upon, prior intuitions of space and time. 
In intuition, then, what is given as the subject (the point-of-view 
which is as yet neither point nor view) lS entirely exterior, ec-
static. Space and time always exhibit a here and a now, but always in 
an exterior manner and thus always implicitly. (This is the same 
implicitness as, for example, the temporal order in intuition.) The 
outerness of space as intuition is not reducible to or directly 
constitutive of subject/object space. Subject/object space is already 
a thought space, and space therein a concept. Only thought can think 
the point-of -view. We might put this otherwise: in intuition, the 
primordial relation is object to object (this is shorthand: naturally, 
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the notion of an object is properly alien here) while in thought, the 
primordial relation is subject to object. Thus Kant's whole problem of 
object-formation is misleadingly labelled as a progression from the 
sUbjective to the objective, and can now be seen as the becoming-
thought of intuitive space and time. 
Wha t about time? In an important and remarkably rich passage Kant 
writes: 
there is an order among our representations in which 
the present (in so far as it has corne to be) gives us a 
referral [Anweisung gibt (auf)] to some preceding state as 
a indeterminate correlate of the event which is given; but 
nevertheless, the correlate is determinantly [not 
'determinately'] referred to the event as its consequence, 
connecting it necessarily with itself in the time-series 
(B244=A198-9) . 
What is being expressed here is both the regulative nature of the 
second Analogy and its necessity. But it is important to observe the 
two phrases 'in so far as it has corne to be' and 'gives us a referral' 
as opposed to 'is ... referred'. It is the present itself, and not the 
representations given in the present, that gives the referral, and this 
because it has corne to be. The present is always already constituted 
out of relations to and among the past (also to the future, of course, 
but this is not Kant's concern at the moment): it comes to be. As a 
corning to be, it refers outside of itself for its possibility as 
present. But this constitution, like the point-of-view above, has to 
be thought by way of order (order of course being the dominant concern 
in the second Analogy) for it to be brought out as 'the present' which 
'giyes a referral'. The present thus becomes the consequence of the 
determining correlate. The present as part of a predicable trio 
(present, past, future) is in the order, but the order would not of 
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course have been possible as such without the coming to be, from out of 
the whole structure of time, of the present. 
This is the significance of 'gives us a referral'. If Kant had said 
that 'the present refers', he would have been open to the charge of 
self-contradiction with respect to the non-perceivability of time In 
itself. And yet, if he had said the present event referred, we would 
have lost the regulative nature of the analogy and with it the whole 
point about the construction of temporality by the understanding. 
But also and at the same time the presentness of the present (here: as 
a time that has come to be, a point or a pointer) is considered 
independently from its formal and sensible 
longer being considered as constituting 
'contents' . Time 
and actualizing 
is no 
form 
inseparable from temporal events, but as container ('time-series'). 
This too is a consequence of the construction of time via the 
determination of order recall Kant's discussion of 'removing 
appearances from time' in the Transcendental Aesthetic (A31=B46). Only 
schematized with respect to time can the hypothetical judgement form 
become causation; only as realized by causation does time in itself 
(that is, as a thing) have a past, present and future all necessarily 
laid out in the time series. 
The conclusion we come to is this: the objectness of the object indeed 
consists solely in the necessary connection of the 'flat' manifold of 
intuition. And it is only because there are objects that there is a 
subject which judges them, carries knowledge of them, wills them or 
takes pleasure in them. No subject without object, for substance is a 
category of relation and the relation comes first. And finally, 
because an intuition is not yet in itself a representation, it is 
impossible on Kantian terms to make the leap which must have seemed 
obvious for at least a chapter now: the development of an alternate, 
nondiscursive ontology wherein the forms of intuition are constitutive 
of 'objects'. Heidegger warns us against this often enough: the very 
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form of the question 'What is ... I already projects a metaphysical 
determination of objectness. Care that seems at times excessive must 
be taken. 
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l.2. 6. The Paradoxes of Schematism. 
In the Schematism, Kant seems to default. He writes, 'this schematism 
of our understanding in its view of appearances and their mere form, is 
a concealed art in the depths of the human soul, the nature of whose 
true labour we will scarcely ever guess and have laid open before our 
eyes' (A141=B180-1). But this is only a default if we cannot show 
exactly why - that is, transcendentally - the schematism, as such, is 
concealed; that is, why it is either unthinkable or not a possible 
object of experience. 
Many interesting points are introduced in the opening paragraph. Kant 
writes, 
'In all subsumpt ions of an obj ect under a concept the 
representation of the former must be homogeneous with the 
latter; that is, the concept must contain something which 
is represented (vorgestellt) in the object to be subsumed 
under it - which lS precisely what the expression 'an 
obj ect is contained under a concept' means. Thus the 
empirical concept of a plate is homogeneous with the pure 
geometrical concept of a circle, since the roundness to be 
thought in the former can be intuited in the latter' 
(A137=B176) 
It has become traditional to reverse the 'former' and 'latter' ln the 
last sentence. But in the empirical concept of a plate, roundness is 
brought to thought; in the geometrical concept of a circle, the clue to 
a schema of roundness is to be found such that 'roundness' itself, and 
not a determinate empirical object like a plate (which has a particular 
roundness as a property), is intuited or brought to a schema - since it 
is a geometrical concept, we may properly say 'constructed'. Thus 
there is no need to alter the order of Kant's words as later 
commentators have supposed. 
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What does Kant mean by 'homogeneous'? At issue is not an essential 
link between concept and object, but with the 'representation' of an 
object; namely, intuition. But Kant tells us in the second paragraph 
that empirical schematism is not the real issue, and that empirical 
concepts and intuitions are homogeneous without further interference. 
Then, of course, as every commentator has pointed out, Kant proceeds to 
give examples of empirical schematism and even, in the paragraph just 
quoted, speaks of homogeneity between two concepts. Provisionally, let 
us define homogeneity as that form- (but not content) agreement which 
makes possible the operation of thinking one representation in terms of 
another. Partly, of course, the discussion of empirical schematism was 
meant merely as an illustration or analogy for the concept of 
schematism in general. But the illustration was never clear enough for 
it to be functional in this way; let us interrogate it. 
Kant writes, a representation that, from a general procedure of 
the imagination, supplies a concept its image, I call the schema to 
this concept' (A140=B179-80). Elsewhere, the schema is called a 'rule' 
or 'procedure'. The schema is a product of the imagination and is a 
representation, but is not singUlar, like an image. With respect to 
the pure concepts of the understanding, the schema is a determination 
of time; but apparently the schema of empirical concepts is not limited 
merely to time. 7 The schema, however, by being indeterminate and 
plural is still like a concept. We might term it a figurative concept. 
Now it is certainly very queer, and I do not know if it has been noted 
adequately before, lS that Kant does not widely use the not ion of 
'rule' or 'law' in the second transcendental deduction until its end, 
where he is essentially giving an out of place commentary on or 
introduction to the Principles. Why? We suspect this comes about for 
the same reason as Kant chose to eliminate the transcendental object. 
In the second deduction, the categories are 'forms of thought' merely 
(B150) and are simply the mode in which the unity of apperception is 
generated or exhibited within judgement. Rules are out of place here. 
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The notion of rules, Kant implies negatively, applies only to concepts 
considered with respect to the schematism. 
Thus, we might say, it is the task of the faculty of schematism - which 
is the a priori imagination - to generate rules for intuition. Now, a 
pure category is certainly not a class concept for Kant, when he is 
thinking most clearly. Rather, we must assert with T. K. Swing that, 
prior to schematism, the categories are only the forms of judgement 
considered as forms for the organization of concepts or the materials 
of concepts. The relation judgement forms/phenomenal categories is not 
the relation genre/species. Whatever this may imply for transcendental 
schematism, it gives us a clue for the empirical schematism. 
What is the meaning of Kant's statement that empirical concepts are not 
heterogeneous from intuitions? Empirical concepts already exist as 
rules; that is to say, empirical concepts are their schemata, provided 
we recognize that empirical concepts can never be only logical class 
concepts, but must also be synthesizing rules (see Kemp Smith 336ff). 
The doubleness arrives out of the necessary double operation of 
'concepts' for Kant: concepts must unify manifolds of concepts 
(possible subjects for and predicates of) as well as sensible manifolds 
(concepts as rules for the connection of sensible particulars) . 
schemata are supposed to solve the problem of how concepts 
So if 
meet 
intuitions, in the ordinary empirical case the schema is already there, 
and is not some 'third thing.' We can think of concepts in all these 
ways (as class, as rule, as schema) - it is thinking them in all of 
these ways together that is difficult and is the immediate object of 
our discussion. 
There are thus two problems in the Schematism chapter. One 1S how 
categories become rules (i.e. acquire schemata) for the synthesis of a 
manifold. The other is how something like either an a priori or 
empirical rule can be both sensible and intellectual. 
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The very notion of a figurative concept seems to bring out what is 
decisive in this problem, since above we said that the significance of 
space and time was their ability to actualize the matter of a 
sensation. That is to say, what is distinctive about intuition is its 
immediate and singular relation to - its granting of the possibility of 
any immediate relat ion to the presence of an obj ect . It 1S 
impossible for a concept, which is discursive and thus caught up in 
notions of representation and subsumption, to be in an immediate 
relation to an object. This would be tantamount to the intellectual 
intuition. 8 What is a schema if not either a mere concept nor an 
empirical intuition? What is distinctive about the schema is not only 
that it allows concepts access to the pure forms of intuition, but that 
it allows these forms to be generalized and abstracted - made concept-
like. The schema thus represents the possibility of knowledge; and in 
particular this is the importance of Kant's example of the plate and 
its relation to the pure geometrical concept of a circle - the schema 
represents the possibility of a priori knowledge of geometry. 
Now the conceptual determination of an object is also its loss; the 
detour of discursiveness is the loss of the actualizing effect of space 
and time. Space and time are the very face of finitude. But from the 
very first sentences of the Cl"iti~, we understand our being as 
essentially involved in means of access. The word 'Mittel', alone or 
as the root of compounds, occurs five times in that first paragraph. 
The etymological relation of Mittel to 'Mitte' or middle (also in 
English, of course: 'means' and 'mean'), and thus to spaciality, is 
probably a pun Kant would have chosen to disregard. The question of 
means, then, is essentially a transcendental question but transcendence 
is also a means; that is to say, establishing that distance, which is 
pure conceptuality itself, between mind and immediate intuition is the 
means by which intuition supplements its finitude, and knowledge of an 
object, if not the object, becomes possible. But if the supplement is 
to do its work, that distance must both remain and be abolished. This 
paradoxical tension is the schematism itself and, more generalll', the 
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whole Analytic of Principles. We can see this tension operating in 
that tradition of Kant-commentators who not only dismiss Kant's 
solution here but also his problem - that is, those who do not accept 
radical finitude as a problem. 
Kant says that the representation of an object in intuition can never 
attain ('erreichen', related to reichen, to reach or extend) to the 
generality of a concept. But why not, if the particular by definition 
contains more ' information' than the concept? Perhaps because the 
concept is a concept by virtue of its unity, produced by the synthesis 
of imagination as regulated by the original unity of apperception. The 
concept, that is, is overlaid by a unity arriving from 'above'. If the 
schema, then, is to produce an image of a concept (is to be a 
figurative concept), it must be a representation that imports to space 
and time the unified generality of the concept. 9 Clearly all we have 
succeeded in accomplishing so far is polishing the glaring surface of 
the paradox; is it possible to do more? 
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1.2.7. The Monogram of the I. 
What distinguishes the schema-concept from the concept as logical class 
such that it might be sensible? The difference between an ordinary 
image and the schema apparently lies in this: the empirical image, Kant 
writes, 'is a product of the empirical faculty of the [probably: re-] 
productive imagination; the schema ... is a product and, as it were, a 
monogram, of pure a priori imagination through which and in accordance 
with which, images themselves first become possible. These images, 
however, always must be connected with concepts by means of the schema, 
which they describe (bezeichnen), and are themselves never fully 
congruent with the concept' (A141-2=B181). 
The metaphor of the monogram is interesting. In the first instance, 
this product is the mark, trace, or calling card of the a priori 
imagination; we recognize the existence and operation of the pure 
productive imagination via the schemata it produces. But a monogram is 
also a principle of unity and organization itself. A monogrammed 'I', 
for example, delimits a determinate range of names (Immanuel, Imogen, 
Issac, Isabella ... ) and gives the principle of their identity as 1-
--... 
ness, while yet being of their order, that is, being a letter, a 
figurative character in space. The unity of that manifold which the 
monogram unifies is given internally to the manifold, such that it is 
improper to speak of a manifold - it is always already an imminently 
determinate set. Kant's example of the schemata for numbers functions 
in precisely the same way as the monogram, for the unification of sets 
of fives (five dogs, five plates, triangles, turnips, etc.) is immanent 
in precisely the same 'way as the I, not needing to pass through the 
concepts 'dog', 'plate', etc. 
The metaphor of the monogram is repeated in an interesting and 
suggestive context in, no less, the 'Ideal of Pure Reason', AS70=BS98). 
Here, Kant speaks of the so-called 'ideals of sensibility' carried by 
painters and physiognomists. Kant explains that such an :deal a 
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product of the imagination, incommunicable and unintelligible, 
furnishing no rules, and rather like a 'blurred sketch' [schwebende 
Zeichnung] or monogram acquired by mUltiple experience, and not even 
amounting to a determinate image. 1o The difference seems to be this: 
that the schema arises out of the concept, the sensible ideal from 
empirical images, and thus has not been through the clarifying trial by 
fire of discursiveness - thus Kant says, it is incommunicable although 
it may well be the basis of (some kind of) estimation [Beurteilung]. 
It may well be that Kant draws attention to this distinction by using 
the word 'Beurteilung' rather than 'Urteilung'. 
Similarly, 
identified 
'monogram' in 
with schema, 
Latin 
in the 
lS translated by 
'Architectonic of 
'Umriss', and 
Pure Reason' 
[A833=B86l]. There it stands for the sketch of a basic science, based 
on the rational idea of that science. Its construction is explicitly 
identified as not 'technical' in Kant's sense of that word: its parts 
have an affinity [Verwandtshaft], not just a similarity [Ahnlichkeit]. 
Each of these uses of 'monogram' draws attention to an inner form of 
unity not strictly identifiable with that designated by the category of 
unity. 
Returning to the quotation cited above, what could Kant mean in saying 
that images 'bezeichnen' a schema? Kemp Smith expresses his bafflement 
in translating this verb as 'to belong to'. Bezeichnen means to mark 
or indicate; to describe; to call or describe as. The word also had an 
etymological partner appear a few lines above: the schema of a dog 
makes possible the 'general delineation [verzeichnen] of the form of a 
fourfooted animal ... ' (A141=B180). If we attribute to this connection 
the general meaning of 'drawing' or 'describing', then we must say that 
the various empirical (and particularized) images somehow mark out the 
schema as a schema through their figuration as images. The schema only 
realises itself in making possible images of things, so it is only 
through these images that we come to know the schema. And thus the 
schema is both indicated by the existence of and described by the form 
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of the images, for the images certainly contain all that the schema 
contains, but not as a rule. 
Using the notion of the monogram as a clue, and reconsidering what we 
have called the wholeness of space and time, we can speculate that the 
schema is just the concept considered as a rule for the synthesising of 
manifolds - it thus represents the unity of the concept by a wholeness 
but within a closed space and time. An empirical intuition is not 
closed - that is, it depends upon (its relations extend necessarily to) 
the never simply present wholeness of space and time. Closure here has 
an essential link to the understanding's need to think determination 
internally. Now closure is, even for the understanding, predicated on 
a certain exterior, which is one reason why synthesis always precedes 
analysis for Kant. Kant argues, for example at B133n, that a concept 
is nothing (not one concept) if it does not exist in possible 
combination with other and diverse subjects, and thus synthesis 
precedes analysis. Every concept is thus a 'conceptus communis.' But 
closure here is not regulative (meaning a concept (like a proper name) 
with a unique extension of one is already a concept) and is always 
already accomplished (meaning the exterior is already a constellation 
of interiors, of synthetic unities and commonness), even if, as Kant 
argues in the Jasche Logic, empirical concepts are condemned to an 
incompleteness; thus such incomplete vagueness and openness must be 
accounted as utterly different. In other words, closure in the 
understanding actually makes analysis possible - that is, constructs a 
determinate inside, which can then find its place in a hierarchy of 
class concepts. Such a determinate inside is something intuition, of 
itself, could never form. If an intuition were closed or bounded it 
would not "be particular or actualized - singular - but would already be 
generalized. Synthesis, as the fundamental operation of the 
understanding but alien to intuition, effects, as it were, a sea-
change. 
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The notion of closure gives content to what we have already called a 
'figurative concept.' When Kant discusses the problem of geometrical 
construction again in 'The Discipline of Pure Reason' (even using the 
same example of a triangle) this vital point receives its confirmation: 
the schema is the singular construction (the triangle on the 
chalkboard) but considered as a universal, that is to say, closed off 
from the particularities of its singularity and context (A713-4=B741-
2) . Now, what is distinctive about a wholeness is that it is non-
categorically relational. For example, the relation that 1S an 
object's determinate position is indeed an absolute particular, and we 
are only ever given these particulars in intuition. The wholeness 
(which is space itself) of such a set of relations lies in their pure 
side-by-sideness - in other words, the 'relations' between relations 
are themselves just relations, there is no conceptual or categorical 
meta-level that unifies them. (We have already discussed similar 
concepts in speaking of the 'span' and 'duration' of intuited 
'betweens' . ) If in the schema, however, the plurality of possible 
empirical images (which are themselves, for Kant, always mere relations 
of mutual limitation) stand together not as unified-under but as a 
whole-within (like the monogram), this is because their 'determination' 
as a particular representation but in a closed space and time agrees 
with their 'determination' by a concept. The schema's unity does not 
subsume, strictly speaking. The schema is nowhere and nowhen while any 
image, even if ideal and without a actual object, is always particular 
and somewhere. 
Take Kant's example of a dog. With respect to the concept, the various 
images of dogs (which are thereby real, whether imagined or actual) are 
unified 'from above' by a common set of properties which collectively 
we call the intension of the concept 'dog'; but with respect to the 
schema, the wholeness of the collection of possible figures and torms 
is immanent to their plurality. Heidegger expresses this by 
considering the gegenstehenlassen (roughly, 'allowing objectification') 
as neither prior nor subsequent to subsumption, but identical " .. :it:h it, 
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and develops the point with his own example: 'this house which we 
perceive indicates how a house appears in general, and consequently 
that which we represent in the concept 'house' in order to be a 
house, it need not necessarily appear as, in fact, it does appear. It 
indicates to us 'only' the 'how' of the possible appearance of a house' 
(Kant-Buch, 99). The implicit distinction between representation 
(vorstellen) and indication (zeigen) is Heidegger's version of our own 
distinction between the unified-under and the whole-within, although 
Heidegger's exposition takes him in other directions. Thus, just like 
the monogram, the schema is not a principle of synthesis or subsumption 
so much as the same-order mark (figuration in space and time) of their 
belonging-together. 
The figurative concept is like a stencil [Umriss, Kant says] which the 
understanding can place over 'raw' 
synthesis. As a character it has, 
intuitions during 
despite and indeed 
or rather as 
as its closed 
materiality, a certain set of rules for its orientation and application 
and consequently has generality while as a mere 'thing' (in 
intuition) it would have neither. That is to say, its internal 
universality (whole-within) is only possible on the prior condition of 
its being as figuration in closed space and time, which in turn is only 
possible on the basis of a concept, a unified-under. 
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1.2.8. Models and Closure. 
It may be possible to further clarify and extend this picture of 
schematism by a brief digression on the theory of models.ll 
A model consists of a hypothetical or real system whose relations are 
unambiguous and precise. By this I mean they are explicitly thematised 
above the objects related, and not that they are necessarily 
quantitative (although in mathematical models they tend to be so). Let 
us call this a model's structuredness. The relations are rule-governed 
in well-known ways. If a model has elements within it that do not 
belong completely to this structuredness, then either these elements 
can be abstracted from or else the model ceases to be a model. 
Further, through a set of application rules and boundary conditions the 
limi ts of which must not be passed (let us call these mapping-
conditions), the model can be and is intended to be associated to a 
primary system which it thus 'models' (this is its mapping-
directedness) . 
directedness, 
Without mapping-conditions, there can be no mapping-
or perhaps the latter 1S a directedness towards 
everything and nothing. Both the primary system and the model system 
are presumed to be closed; that is, its structuredness and the rules of 
that structuredness are finite. If this were not the case, the 
relations would not be 'unambiguous and precise', nor would any useful 
mapping-conditions be available. This is to say that of course the 
model need not be a perfect model, but closure indicates that we must 
know when (have boundary-conditions, etc.) it is going to fail and to 
what degree. This closure may, of course, only be ideal for an actual, 
material model, but must be quite real for the model qua model. 
In addition to its uses for prediction and explanation, a model may be 
exploratory. An exploratory model is one wherein certain associated 
but not yet mapped relations will hopefully provide clues to certain 
relations and effects within the primary system. In general, a model 
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can only be exploratory if its boundary conditions are either 
approximate or incomplete - although it is important to recognize that 
no model, as we defined a model above, can be infinitely exploratory _ 
this follows simply from closure. The exploratory model itself has two 
modes: the generative and the hypothetical. The difference being that 
in the latter the not-yet-mapped relation was not in fact discovered 
afterwards, and may have been the reason why the model system was 
chosen in the first place. In a generative exploratory model, a new 
exploratory relation is discovered after mapping-directedness as a kind 
of added extra; however, this new relation first has to be determined 
within the model system. Thus, a generative exploratory model becomes 
in effect a primary system for a time; and the original primary, if it 
remains relevant at all, becomes temporarily a model. 
In addition to the relation between the parts of the systems, there are 
also the relations between the systems themselves. The relation 
between parts in two systems we call representation, but representation 
is itself a model - between a part 'in the model' and a part 'in the 
primary system' there exists a relation which we then have a model for; 
therefore, the concept of representation can be called an application 
model. The relations between the relations can be called description -
we say this because we like to think there is something not 
arbitrarily representative about the way a primary system is modeled. 
The concept of description is also an application model. Both of these 
are another way of thinking about mapping-conditions, though the very 
concept of mapping-conditions presupposes prior application models of 
representation and description .12 
Now representation and description are firmly directed: there is a 
signifier and there is a signified. But they need not be, and the 
notion of an example makes this clear. Consider a child learning new 
words. An adult holds up an apple and says 'apple'. It would be 
normal for us to think of the word apple as a representation, perhaps 
via a concept or idea, of the apple or of the set of all apples or 
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appleness, or whatever. But from the child's point of view, the 
physical apple is targeting or representing the word. Of course, there 
are all sorts of paradoxes here which eventually evacuate the purity of 
the concept representation - I am not interested in them at the moment. 
What is important is that directedness is reversible: the primary 
system also models the model. 
If in some essential way the model is not closed, then it cannot be 
said to have structuredness as we defined it above. A system that has 
no structuredness clearly cannot have mapping-conditions as such. 
Now, we might want to call such an open model a generative exploratory 
model. But there are two problems: 1) the generative exploratory model 
was, in an important sense, an accidental outcome of misestimating the 
precise closure and structuredness of a model; in our present case, 
however, closure is considered as abandoned from the beginning. 2) 
Even were such an identification possible, we would be forced to 
recognize that its status as a model of a primary system would be put 
in jeopardy - because, as we observed above, even in closed exploratory 
models mapping-directedness can be reversed and is at least suspended. 
Thus, if what we are trying to consider as a model is in fact an open 
system, and is not even ideally closed, then it cannot have mapping-
directedness. Something strange now ensues. We could just call this 
a primary system without a model, except that we took the initial view 
(for whatever reason) that it was, in fact, a model. 
Translating all this back into Kant, intuition can also be described as 
open in this more precise sense. Because ultimately we are trying to 
understand intuition, and we have no way of so understanding this 
except in terms of object-directedness (which Kant calls 
representation), which I am here modelling with the concept of a model, 
therefore our initial assumption of the state as model cannot simply be 
dropped, whatever paradoxes it may lead to. Intuition is always 
assumed (by the understanding) to have mapping-directedness or in other 
words, to be a representation: intuition is intuition of. If this is 
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the case, then the understanding of intuition by the faculty of 
cognition is made to disagree with intuition qua intuition. For in the 
latter, as we have been arguing all along, the discursive and thus 
self-closing rules of structuredness required for mapping-directedness 
are missing. This can be expressed another way: the intuition has a 
'structure' only by virtue of a the forms of intuition which reveal 
themselves for cognition as always external and non-finite in nature, 
and thus they cannot be considered immanent, nor can the intuition be 
considered as an instance of the forms as concepts. Such a'structure 
is not, therefore, structuredness as we defined it above. And thus the 
intuition both is and is not a representation. This is perhaps the 
very centre of all the paradoxes and violences we have observed between 
the two Kantian faculties. 13 
If we make the additional assumption, which Kant makes, that the object 
of intuition (the primary system) is unknowable in itself, then the 
problems only deepen, for in that case we can say that, ln a sense, 
what we are actually intuiting are mere representations and 
descriptions (phenomena, in Kant's words). But from the point of view 
of the mere relations of representation and description, there is no 
way of telling the parts of an open model from the relations between 
those parts, precisely because there is no determinate order or 
structuredness in the model. The open model, then, has no objectivity 
criteria. Similarly, open intuitions can not have mapping-directedness 
and cannot intuit objects for there are no directedness nor 
objectivity criteria within intuition itself. As we metaphorically 
described it above, such intuitions are necessarily 'flat'. The 
becoming-representational of the intuition is accomplished by an 
internal reorganisation or transformation of the intuition (now 
considered as material and manifold) such that its form is glven 
entirely internally or according to a finite set of rules. This is a 
more general description of precisely what we saw happening ln our 
discussion above of the second Analogy of Experience. 
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We have already shown that the concept of representation presupposes 
both the intuition of outerness held in the pure intuition of space, 
and the objectification of appearances made possible by the a priori 
understanding. What is made additionally clear by the discussion of 
models is the relationship between representation and closure. Kant 
writes that images are possible only through a schema, but that 
nonetheless they also describe or mark out the schema. We were only 
partially successful in interpreting this above. Kant's assertion 
seems paradoxical until we realize that when Kant says 'image' he does 
not mean the mere mental state which we have been calling 'intuition' 
(whether real or imagined). An image is always an image of ... , a 
representation, and this is only possible through the closure of the 
schema. And yet, while the schematism is a concealed art, images can 
be looked at and communicated, and insofar as they are looked at as 
images of ... , they make possible the schema. 
But at the same time, in empirical judgement, this ideality is 
necessarily applied within an open field it cannot control; in the last 
chapter, we called this open field the syntactical. In the schema 
conceived as figurative concept, the closure is at least thought as 
possible - as soon, however, as the understanding is placed in the 
service of intuition, the closure is burst open, and becomes 
regulative, and even this only from the point of view of the 
understanding. We saw this happening ln Kant's miscellaneous 
descriptions (ie., in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science) 
of the never-complete determination of position in space and time. It 
is precisely because of syntax - which for the understanding means the 
always present possibility of non-agreement - that reason is required 
to regulate the understanding towards universality in all judgements. 
Only in this way can we understand rigorously in what way the 
schematism can be said to be a 'concealed art': it is precisely that 
which cannot either be fully thought or fully intuited. Thus we have 
preserved intact that gap in the faculties that is finitude, while 
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accounting for the possibility of knowledge. But it is also on the 
basis of the wrenching open of closure by syntax that we understand the 
possibility of experience in its richness - substance as the source of 
inexhaustible aspects (the sublime), unthinkable forms (beauty), 
undecidable causes (teleology). The discursive understanding's failure 
to fully hold its own at the 'lowest' level of intuition must be 
necessary a priori or else Kant's critique of 18th century rationalist 
thought may as well have never taken place. Our interpretation of the 
schematism has indeed gone beyond the letter of Kant's text, but it 
remains 'strictly' Kantian. 
It remains to note that, in our discussion of empirical schematism we 
have stumbled upon its relation to transcendental schematism and thus 
also treated of the latter. The schemata of the categories still 
belongs to the imagination, but in its most transcendental operation. 
No image can be found for a category, even an inadequate one; this just 
means that the schema will indeed be pure. Instead, the categories' 
relation to sensibility will be through certain transcendental 
determinations of time. But surely (many commentators have argued) a 
category like causation already stands in a relation to time, is it 
then already schematized? According to the letter of Kant's text, 
clearly not; yet such a line of thought is productive and leads to T.K. 
Swing's interpretation of the formation of categories from an encounter 
of the judgement-forms with intuition. 
Now Kant argues that time is homogeneous with the category in so far as 
it is universal and 'rests [beruht] a priori upon a rule' (A139=B178-
9). This, of course, is where Kant's analysis even on its own terms, 
goes awry: he does not indicate that the resting upon a rule is, 
strictly speaking, always one of two views of time. Time in itself is 
not axiomatic but formal - thus mere rulefulness is not adequate for 
homogeneity if the rules are of different orders. However, Kant seems 
to have given a glance in this direction in the last paragraph of the 
Schematism: 
although the schemata of sensibility first realize the 
categories, they at the same time also restrict them; that 
lS, constrain them to conditions which lie outside the 
understanding (namely, in sensibility)' (A146=B185-6). 
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This indicates that the categories themselves in their application to 
experience irredeemably take on the aspect of sensibility and thus 
undergo a change which distinguishes them from pure thought - they 
become the analogy of thought. 14 That this should be expressed 
paradoxically is no surprise. If the 'rule' of time were just another 
rule, then this language would be ludicrous. 
Rather, then, time lS in itself ruled only after it has been 
encountered and has passed through the activity of the understanding. 
Closed time is rule-governed in the way Kant requires: it displays 
axiomatically what was only formal, that time is whole, one-dimensional 
and, by this point, sequential and infinitely divisible. Only closed 
time can accept determination according to the pure understanding, and 
thus serve as a model. Clearly, we are back to the same concepts we 
used in treating of empirical schematism. But we are speaking as if 
time is closed by something other than the sovereign act of 
determination. On the contrary, schematism just is the production, as 
a transcendental judgement, of time-determination which in turn just is 
the realisation of the category as phenomenal. 
But we are still telling narratives. As if, at some time tI, there was 
pure intuition. Then, at time t2, the intuition is 'run through' by 
the understanding. Finally, later still, a transcendental judgement is 
made and a phenomenal category is born. There are many stupidities ln 
such a description. The following points need to be made: 
1) As we recognised before, the distinction between intui t ion and 
concept, as separate types of mental state, is a distinction the only 
reality of which lies in intuition and concept being the t~o 
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necessarily possible directions of abstraction from actual experience. 
All experience demands this transcendental analysis, but obviously 
there is no parallel claim that at any time there exists a mental state 
called pure intuition or pure concept. The demand for such an analysis 
is just what Kant means by 'transcendental conditions of possibility' . 
The same holds for Kant's 'third thing', the figurative concept or the 
pure closed intuition. We should not be surprised if the 
transcendental schematism falls into line with the empirical - for it 
is the latter which demands the former. 
2) Very simply and concisely, Kant's claim is this: of any empirical 
judgement it can necessarily always be claimed that this judgement 
arose from the encountering by concepts of intuition, which encounter 
was already in-formed by a transcendental judgement. 
3) It follows that there is no harm in telling transcendental stories, 
provided of course no vivisectionist goes hunting for the lobe of pure 
space. It also follows that, although they are stories, they have 
consequence, precisely by virtue of the fact that they are 
transcendental and thus universal. 
4) In many ways, transcendental schematism is the ultimate story, 
practically an epic. It brings together all the main plots: the 
propriety of pure intuition and pure thought, the encountering of 
intuition, the projection of objectivity, and so forth. (Only 
apperception and rational illusion are missing.) Because of this 
ultimacy, the story became too long for Kant to hide its fictionality, 
and he had to claim that it was self-hiding. 
The missing elements of the story remain to be considered. We should 
hardly be surprised at this point if these elements too demand for 
their analysis the same formal structures which we have found at work 
from the Transcendental Aesthetic and which, in the Introduction to 
this work, we have called 'spacing'. 
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Chapter Notes 
1. The reader shou~d note that ,this brief reconstruction is my own, 
although no doubt It has been lnfluenced in countless ways by the 
enormous body of literature alluded to above. 
2. A much more thorough treatment of apperception will be given in the 
next chapter. 
3. Thus T.K. S~ing's ?bj~ction that "contrary to Kant's arguments, we 
uS":lal~y ~~term,lne obJectlve succession without invoking the causal 
prlnclple (Swlng, 151) unknowingly but completely aligns itself with 
Hume and misses the point (indeed, misses the order) of Kant's 
demonstration. At this point I refer the reader to H.W. Cassirer's 
text, in particular the discussion of what has been labelled Kant's 
third argument, on pp. 195ff. 
4. This is further thematised by Kant in his distinction between 
intensive and extensive magnitudes. It might well be that Kant's view 
of sensation (which is essentially a bizarre twist of the distinction 
between primary and secondary qualities) is wholly without foundation -
or, in other words, no rigorous distinction can be upheld in this case 
between form and content. We will ignore this issue here, although we 
recognize that this ignorance may be a mistake. 
5. Of course, speaking in terms of width, depth, span or duration is 
improper with respect to intuition because such language assumes space 
and time are object-like. What would be a proper language, however, is 
difficult to imagine. Perhaps one might begin by characterising 
intuition as a 'network of qualitied betweens' - i.e. a 'red spacial 
between' or a 'loud temporal between'. However enjoyable, however, 
this naming is just theatre. 
6. Which means probably we have a completely wrong model of synthetic 
experience. However, in epistemology our model does not matter, so 
long as the required output is logically possible on the basis of the 
given input. 
7. Kant evidently had later reservations about only using time for the 
pure schemata - and rightly so. Cf. also the marginal comment to first 
analogy by Kant noted in Kemp Smith's 'Commentary', p360. 
8. Now and again, Kant calls intuitions 'singular concepts'. 
a traditional designation Kant has inherited. Immediacy 
singularity, and not the reverse. 
This is 
implies 
9. Although in the schematism Kant speaks of mathematical examples 
side by side with dogs, yet because mathematics can construct its 
objects a priori and thus only mathematical concepts can have complete 
definitions (in the Leibnizian sense), the meaning of schema as a rule 
must be different for the two types of example (cf. Louis White Beck in 
Wolff 1968, 31). If this is so, then it is impossible in the sensible 
ideal passage to be sure which type of rule - rules for estimating 
empirical objects or rules for synthesizing mathematical c~nstructions 
_ is in question. Possibly, Kant was just confused on th~ lssue of how 
the rules differed that made possible different types of Judgement. In 
as much, however as at the very beginning of the Schematism Kant 
posits as possibl~ a basic homogeneity bet~een th~ empirical ~oncept of 
a plate and the geometrical concept of a clrc,le, It seems unllkeli" that 
we should consider the two rule-types whlch govern the sj'nthetic 
activity of each (empirical concepts/mathematical concepts) as 
essentially different. 
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10. In paragraph 17 of the Critique of Judgement, Kant discusses a 
similar phenomenon, here called a 'normal idea' and describes it in 
words like 'mean' or 'average', 'contour' [Umriss] and 'figure' 
[Gestalt]. The examples are very similar indeed. Here, though, 
although the normal idea is not based upon rules obtained from actual 
measurement, it is yet the condition for the possibility of any rules 
of estimating the perfection of a form, and is presentable. Separated 
by nine years, it is no wonder Kant's account of this phenomenon has 
altered. 
11. The conceptual vocabulary is my own, but there is certainly a 
great indebtedness to Max Black and others. 
12. Application models, being models, 
application models. Either there is 
empirically is not the case, or something 
of models. These considerations will be 
2. 
themselves require further 
an infinite regress, which 
is missing in our description 
more fully discussed in part 
13. The Paradox is enhanced when we realise that not-being-a-
representation does not also exclude what phenomenologists understand 
by 'intentionality'. As we shall see, intentionality would be 
completely misunderstood if we took it to describe a mental state the 
immanent structure of which necessarily posited an X to which the state 
referred. This is one reason why Heidegger decisively drops the 
noesis/noema distinction. 
14. Actually, for Kant, it is only the dynamic principles that could 
be called analogies, because they are regulative and not constitutive, 
but at the end of the introduction to the Analogies of Experience 
(A181=B223-4) Kant seems to apply the notion of analogy more widely to 
all categories inasmuch as it is the schema and not the category that 
applies to experience in all cases. 
1.3. 
Spacing at the Limits of Transcendental Thought 
1. 3.0. 
Asking why we move now to a discussion of transcendental apperception 
is straight-forward: Kant calls apperception the form of consciousness'. 
It is imperative to understand what this means. We will eventually 
arrive at an interesting analogy between the form of intuition and the 
form of consciousness. This analogy Kant already and explicitly posits 
in terms of the presentation function of the forms. But the analogy 
has to be seen also in the mode of presentation. It will then be clear 
in what ways there lies a certain spacing in apperception, which in 
turn requires a slight modification to an otherwise traditional reading 
of the Deduction. 
The second part of this chapter will discuss the Ideal of Pure Reason. 
It is equally easy to answer why one might want to take the question of 
spacing to the Dialectic. For it is implied in the Dialectic and 
asserted explicitly in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science 
that absolute space is an idea of reason. On one level this is clear 
enough and of only secondary interest, since absolute space is only a 
conceptual issue. But ideas of reason, it would seem, behave rather 
like intuitions in some respects (i.e. in their essential form), and 
thus Kant's reasons for this move are more complex and suggestive than 
it would seem. 
Though it is not our subject here, a few and too-brief speCUlations can 
be made which will place all this work into a historical context. The 
rationalist tradition had always taken its ideas of reason as 
constitutive. Ideas were either true or false representations of 
states of affairs. For Kant the ideas are regulative, the very act of 
the 'as if'. This 'as if' is the ultimate outcome of the critique of 
reason. 
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This regulative nature marks the place of a certain gap or 
delay between the idea and its 'completion'. Of course, for Kant there 
is no question of the actuality of completion, and yet given Kantian 
premises, Idealism had no where else to turn. Thus representation of 
the absolute (if representation is an appropriate word) gets thought in 
terms of telos, project, Bildung, history. If this gap is figured, as 
it inevitably is, in terms of the subject/object difference and the 
constitution of that difference, then there arise all the questions of 
representation, mimesis, models, etc. Moreover, since the self both 
posits the idea and accomplishes or constructs its actuality, this 
proj ect of the self is a journey of the self, its auto-formation. 
Finally, following the outer limit of what Kant's work suggests to us, 
we see, as the Romantic Ironists seem to have seen, that the 
impossibility of the completion of the project cannot be thought simply 
in terms of infinite regress, nor in terms of a necessary empirical 
insufficiency of resources at hand; rather, one must consider how the 
project posits itself as synthetic unity already within the duplicity 
of a representational space made possible by the annihilation of an 
intuited absolute. That is to say, reunion is not of the nature of the 
absolute. Or, to put it differently, the two ontologies refuse to 
coalesce in synthesis. 
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1.3.1. The Argument of the Deduction. 
If we may be so audacious, let us attempt to present at least a vague 
paraphrase of the argument in the second edition Deduction. We 
restrict ourselves to the second edition in the interests of economy; 
this necessarily means that our account must be incomplete, but then 
one suspects that, given the subj ect, it would be so in any case. 
Further, whatever we give below will tread on countless philosophical 
toes. This cannot be avoided, and one must begin somewhere - in this 
case, Kant's text itself is perhaps the worst possible place to begin! 
The following is an attempt to outline, very approximately and briefly, 
the argument that Kant actually gives - and not yet the argument he 
should, might or could have given. 
1. It must be possible for the representation 'I think' to accompany 
all my representations, otherwise I would be thinking representations 
which could not be thought, and owning representations which do not 
belong to me, both of which are contradictions. Let us call whatever 
generates this 'I think' the OSUA (Original Synthetic Unity of 
Apperception) . This 'I think' is always possible, but not always 
actual. Indeed, precisely because of OSUA I am aware that certain 
representations are within me without having the tag 'I think' 
explicitly attached to them. 
2. Since this 'I think' is only possible, the OSUA must justify that 
representation with respect to all representations but without actually 
justifying it in conjunction with all actual representations. That is, 
all the representations in the manifold of intuition bear a relation 
before all thought to the 'I think'. The OSUA generates its 
possibility transcendentally and a priori. 
3. But, for the 'I think' to be what distinctively it is (the tag of 
self-consciousness), it is not enough for it to be linked to each 
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member of a manifold of representations. For though the 'I think' is 
in every instance the same, there would be no guarantee within it as a 
mere representation that in each case it referred to the identical 
self. Rather, I must grasp the whole manifold as a unity and give it 
the 'I think'. That is, I must synthesize the manifold under one (and 
not many) 'I think' in order to have self-consciousness across the 
whole manifold. 
4. But the reverse is also true: in order to synthesize a manifold 
under a rule, the elements of the manifold must all be my 
representations, or capable of so being. This we call the Analytic 
Identity of Apperception (AIA).l This means that it is analytic that 
whatever is mine must 'conform' to the conditions under which it can be 
mine; or more concisely, that whatever has the 'I think' must already 
(in some manner) 'belong' to the I that thinks. 
5. Thus, though the 'I think' only becomes what it is properly with 
such an actual synthesis, it must already have been possible. 
Therefore the OSUA, which makes possible AlA, is transcendentally prior 
to any given and particular synthetic act. 
6. Experience is a determinate relation of a manifold of 
representations to an object, but an object is simply that in which or 
because of which the manifold of representations is united according to 
rules. 
7. But uniting of any manifold (as was shown above) requires the unity 
of consciousness in the synthesis; thus, OSUA is the ultimate condition 
of the possibility of a representation of an object, and thus of 
experience. 
8. Synthesis of a manifold means judgement about that manifold. Since 
judgement is the manner in which representations are synthetically 
brought under OSUA and thus become representations of obj ects, a.n~· act 
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of synthesis is determined in respect of one of the forms of judgement; 
and since the categories are just the forms of judgement considered as 
applying to intuition, intuition in general is necessarily subject to 
(and exclusively) the categories. 
9. Finally, since space and time (as the actual forms of intuition) are 
both unique and themselves present manifolds requiring synthesis, no 
non-synthetic form of unity can be presented, and the categories 
therefore apply to all possible objects of experience. 
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1.3.2. Discussion. 
Let us immediately say that we do not think this argument is 
acceptable. There may be dozens of problems, each resulting in a 
finesse (or complete overhaul) of the argument presented above. 
Indeed, one could easily discuss this celebrated argument for hundreds 
of pages. But one particular objection (and consequent finesse) is our 
target. To help us get there, it will be useful however to discuss a 
quite different problem. 
consider an argument similar to Korner's argument against 
transcendental arguments in general. Such a counter-argument might 
claim that such arguments have no way of proving the uniqueness of the 
set of conditions as conditions of differentiation and identification. 
The transcendental argument, at best, could only prove that some one 
set of conditions were sufficient. However, this set is assigned the 
task of differentiating and identifying, which is a conceptual task. 
Thus, the pure set of conditions must be just the empirical field of 
concepts 'purified' of the super-added content of experience - that is, 
both levels have to be considered as concepts. One could indeed never 
prove from within experience that this purification must proceed in a 
certain direction, because we are guided only by the scheme we are 
attempting to prove is unique. 
But if Kant's thesis concerning the gap between the faculties is 
properly understood, then it becomes clear that the transcendental 
elements are not 'similar' to empirical concepts simply purified, 
precisely because they are divided into two heterogeneous groups: the 
forms of intuition and the forms of judgement. The problem about 
uniqueness, at the very least, is modified. The issue can no longer be 
whether a different set of concepts to Kant's could perform the same 
work, because Kant simply defines a concept and the work it performs in 
terms of the forms of judgement and intuition both of which are 
contentless. Rather, we have to recognise that any question about the 
109 
uniqueness l completeness l difference or multiplicity of a scheme is 
already a judgement. K6rner 1 s problem about getting outside one/s 
scheme becomes much more radical l but loses its force as an argument 
against transcendental deductions. Rather l one criteria for the 
evaluation of Kant/s transcendental deductions or arguments must be 
their ability to prove how the problem of the uniqueness of the object 
is set aside. Granting this l then l any questioning about uniqueness 
must assume one of the following: a) there is no consciousness; b) all 
the judgement forms I and thus general logic itself I must be overturned; 
c) we do not experience in space and time. It seems obvious Kant can 
make a good case against any of these three! 
Indeed l it is only by understanding Kant correctly here that we can see 
how transcendental philosophy can both demonstrate and justify a priori 
categories - i.e. answer the quid juris. IJustification l refers us 
back to K6rner 1 s argument discussed above. For Kant I to be justified 
means to prove that any application of the categories does not distort 
or ignore possible objects of experience. Since l however I space and 
time bear no necessary relation to things-in-themselves l the categories 
are constitutive for what Ipossible objectsl are. ConsequentlYI any 
proof which could show that a category was necessary for experience 
would also be proving both that the application of that category was 
justified and that its application was justified only within the limits 
of experience. Thus demonstration l justification and indeed critique 
itself are part of the same transcendental movement. 
Returning to our main problem: the I think is the minimum aspect of 
consciousness I thus in saying that it must be possible for the I think 
to accompany all my representations I what I am saying is that in order 
for a representation to be actually conscious it must conform to the 
condition of possible consciousness. The emphasis on possibility is 
very explicit in the following passage: 
'The thought 'these representations given in intuition 
belong one and all to me' consequently says the same as 'I 
unite them in one self-consciousness or can at least unite 
them therein'; and though this thought is not yet itself 
the consciousness of the synthesis of the representations, 
it does however presuppose the possibility of the latter; 
that is, only because I can grasp (begreifen) the manifold 
representations in one consciousness do I name them one and 
all mine; else I would have as many-coloured and various a 
self as I have representations of which I am conscious to 
myself ... ' (B134). 
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But the outcome here is one of naming or calling the representations as 
mine: that is, of explicitly and consciously recognising them as mine. 
The combination of the emphasis on possibility and on naming or 
recognising greatly complicate the issues of the Deduction. If we 
ignore the 'possibility aspect', however, we encounter enormous and 
classic problems, as follows. 
modes of belonging together. 
The elements of a manifold have several 
First, they belong together as 
spacial/temporal - i.e. are a manifold of sensible intuition. Second, 
they belong together as representing an obj ect i. e. they behave 
according to discursive rules. These first two are relatively 
unproblematic. But third, they belong together as all being my 
representations. But this third belonging-together is paradoxical, 
since if 'being mine' means 'being conscious of', then I must have been 
conscious of something before I was conscious of it. Obviously, then, 
the transcendental mineness and the empirical mineness cannot be at all 
alike. This will prove to have important consequences. 
So wherein lies the legitimacy of the 'transcendental synthesis ... in 
general' which assures the can? We might like to argue that, because 
space and time are forms of intuition which proscribe the form of all 
intuition (and because they are themselves manifolds, as Kant argues in 
the Deduction, against the Aesthetic), this transcendental synthesis 
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(as the giving of mineness to intuition in general) is possible prior 
to empirical intuition and synthesis. But Kant distinguishes between 
figurative synthesis and intellectual synthesis (B150ff.). In his 
discussion of this distinction, he implies that the OSUA is prior to 
any recognition of the OSUA with respect to a priori manifolds. In 
addition, he writes, 
This synthesis of the manifold of sensible intuition, which 
is possible and necessary a priori, may be entitled 
figurative synthesis (synthesis speciosa) , to distinguish 
it from the synthesis which is thought in the mere category 
in respect of the manifold of an intuition in general, and 
which is entitled combination through the understanding 
(synthesis intellectualis). (B15l) 
But how are we to distinguish between 'the manifold of [a priori] 
sensible intuition' and 'the manifold of an intuition in general'? 
Kant allows for the logical possibility of other forms of intuition 
than our own space and time. Kant asserts that the figurative 
synthesis, though a priori, is in some way subsequent to the mere 
intellectual synthesis in the mere category. The categories are the 
rules which bring apperception to intuition, no matter what or how that 
intuition is. The categories are the way that any intuition is mine. 
The actual forms of intuition, space and time, are rather the 
contingent modes in which categories actually function. Since the 
former are unique and present manifolds which themselves require 
synthesis, the application of the categories to all possible objects of 
experience is assured,' and so Kant considers his Deduction complete. 
But possible consciousness is not consciousness - actual consciousness 
requires an actual manifold, which is already transcendentally mine but 
cannot be recognised as such (i.e. the mineness cannot become 
actualised) without a fairly ordinary act of synthesis. 
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Of course, it remains a question of what this 'transcendental' 
synthesis means? We have to understand 'transcendental' as meaning: 
descriptive of the unique and necessary conditions of possibility of 
the empirical in any analysis of the empirical, or better: descriptive 
of that which, in the analysis of the empirical, provides but also 
legitimates the necessary form of the empirical. The transcendental 
synthesis does not take place (solely) transcendentally (as if the 
transcendental were a location or a time). Rather, Kant claims that 
within every empirical synthesis, as its very essence, and indeed as 
that which provides and legitimates the form of not just that synthesis 
but the 'every' as well, must (somehow) lie an act of transcendental 
synthesis. 
Is all this coherent? It might well be, except for one niggling 
problem. 
Kant seems to be going against both the content and spirit of the 
Transcendental Aesthetic in demanding that space and time themselves be 
intuitions presenting manifolds. How can something be both a form of 
intuition, and an intuition? That is, how can spaciality, space and 
something-in-space all be construed as the same? We might ask where 
then is this perception of space itself, or of time itself? Kant 
apparently says 'in geometry' (B160n). But what kind of a space is 
this? In geometry we either talk about the properties of space (i.e. 
talk about a concept, as for example when a physicist talks about 13-
dimensional space) or we project a region of space within which, for 
example, we imagine the intersection of two objects (i.e. imagine a 
more or less indefinite volume, itself a kind of object, as a way of 
located other objects - but not space itself). We only ever have 
perceptions of things or forms in space, real or imagined. 2 Space and 
time themselves are either intuition-forms (the form of the form 
presented in intuition), or conceptual abstractions. If this is so, 
then how is what Kant calls the figurative synthesis (which guarantees 
a priori the application everywhere and always of the categories) 
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possible? Clearly it is not 'in general'. But if the figurative 
synthesis is not available, then there is no sense in saying, In 
advance, 'I can combine under the categories this or any manifold of 
intuition'. How does this change things? 
In the intellectual synthesis, by an essential directive of the 
understanding, and under the auspices of pure apperception, the 
categories relate to intuition in general. Kant then tries to claim 
that space and time, as the forms of our intuition, provide contentless 
manifolds a priori by which it becomes possible for the categorical 
OSUA to be thought across space and time. But, as we have just shown, 
Kant's own arguments show this to be impossible. 
So how, in the intellectual synthesis, does the mere category (as a 
form of thought in the understanding) synthesize the manifold in them 
(B150)? To put this problem in other words, what transcendental 
relation does understanding bear to sensibility, always within but 
without depending upon the content of an empirical relation? The 
obvious answer is that the understanding, transcendentally defined, is 
that faculty which brings rules to manifolds - this is the essence of 
the understanding. The understanding, as some kind of mental potency, 
never just stumbles across manifolds of intuition, then combining them. 
Rather, the understanding is from the first directed in the way of law 
towards them. The understanding just is this directedness-as-law-
towards-manifoldness. 
What Kant has to worry about, however, is the possibility that 
something other than manifolds might present itself that lS, a 
something with a unity other than that categorically prescribed. For 
in itself, intellectual 'synthesis' is hypothetical: if there were 
always to be sensible manifolds, then the OSUA would always be brought 
to them by way of categorical rules. Thus the cautious phrase, 
' ... provided only it be sensible' at B150. But there is no guarantee 
from this alone that all presentations will be intuited manifolds. 
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Then not all presentations would be subject to categorical unity, or 
even to the unity of apperception - and the possibility of the 'I 
think' accompanying all 'my' representations would not exist. Of 
course, this results in a contradiction, expressed by our 'my' - Kant 
himself says that the identity of apperception is analytic. What would 
a representation in me be like if it was not 'mine,?J But the 
contradiction is just the problem: AlA might be analytic, but it still 
has to be transcendentally analyzed. Thus Kant forces himself to 
contradict the Transcendental Aesthetic and speak of space and time as 
themselves intuitions with manifolds (in section 26). If, however, we 
bypass Kant's contradiction, can the Deduction still work and what will 
it look like? 
In brief, what has to be added to Kant's account here is an addition to 
the transcendental definition of the understanding made above: the 
understanding is that which is essentially directed in the way of law 
towards sensible manifolds, and always as manifolds. We can be brief, 
because we have in fact been arguing this point for two chapters now. 
The encountering of intuition by the understanding and by apperception 
demands not that intuitions 'in themselves and always' be atomistic 
manifolds, but rather that the understanding necessarily and by its 
nature always so construe them. This is the only way of saving Kant's 
deduction, at least from this particular fault. The result is to 
. inscribe on the stone at the heart of the critique the absolute formal 
gap between sensibility and understanding. Kant's own most central 
argument can thus be brought powerfully into line with our 
interpretation of intuition. 
Now let us reconstruct Kant's argument accordingly. The only step in 
the above outline which needs altering (to take account of our problem, 
and not of course to take account of other problems) is the last. It 
should now read: 
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9. If there were some mental state X which had a non-categorical form 
of unitYr it would not be a manifold. Of courser such a mental state 
could not come to consciousness and thus be experienced as such an X. 
But there is no guarantee that X could not still raffect r (or 'infect') 
the understanding and thus experience thus compromising the 
exclusivity and constancy of the categorical application to intuition 
in general. No guarantee, that iS r unless we assume that the 
understanding is that which is directed essentially towards manifolds 
and always as manifolds. At least for the purposes of Kant's 
theoretical philosophy4 r this assumption becomes necessary if the 
transcendental account-books of experience are to balance necessarily.s 
It follows that the categories necessarily apply (and exclusively) to 
all presentations r making of them objects of categorical experience. 
But whatr on this interpretation, is the mysterious OSUA exactly? 
That synthesis which gives the 'I think' its 'can accompany' is the so-
called transcendental intellectual synthesis. But this is not, in 
fact, a synthesis at all, if by synthesis we mean combination of the 
manifold under a rule. The 'manifold of an intuition in general', 
before the presentation of space and time, is not a manifold, but 
merely the thought of manifoldness. The intellectual synthesis is 
simply the recognition that the understanding is that the whole essence 
of which lies in synthesizing manifolds. But it is in this 'synthesis' 
that Kant places the synthetic unity of apperception itself (B157) 
or, put in another way, it is what he means in writing ,that 'I exist as 
an intelligence which is conscious solely of its power of combination' 
(BI58) . 
Thus, the transcendental synthesis of the a priori manifold - which 
ensures the possibility of actual consciousness in every actual 
synthesis - does not actually happen as a synthesis, either separately 
or together with empirical synthesis. The understanding itself, from 
out of its essence, projects itself as that which, everywhere and 
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always, synthesizes, and this projection just is original apperception. 
Thus Kant also writes, 'this faculty of apperception lS the 
understanding itself' (B134n). 
'Encountered as synthetic' does not 
necessarily mean, in all cases, 'product of an act of synthesis'. 
But this is not enough, surely. What guarantees that everything which 
the understanding encounters will be mine? A question which bears a 
close relation to the problem discussed above. Let us suppose that I 
start to be aware of 'someone else's' thoughts. Insofar as I 
understand those thoughts, and situate them in time with respect to my 
'own' thoughts, I must already be synthesizing them according to 
concepts of meaning and order, etc. They are mine in the sense of 
'being inside my head', but they 'belong' elsewhere. I might think 
myself suddenly telepathic, such that the 'elsewhere' is outside me. 
Or else consider myself chronically schizophrenic, where 'elsewhere' 
now means 'in a different personality occupying the same mental 
faculties', such that the representation is formed for me during those 
intervals when I am 'in possession of all my faculties'. What could 
possibly convince me that these thoughts are not in fact mine in one of 
these restricted senses? Could any sense be made of the proposition 
that 'these are not my thoughts, but are also not someone else's 
thoughts'? It seems clear that this proposition is nonsensical. 
Suppose however, rather than having 'voices in my head' as the 
phenomenon is often represented in fiction, I have full-blown thoughts 
in my head. That is, rather than discovering within me an unexplained 
manifold, I encounter something already synthesized and understood. 
Kant at any rate would claim this was impossible. He might argue, as 
at the note to B133, that concepts are only concepts if they already 
exist in possible or actual synthesis with other concepts. Thus to be 
presented with a judgement that was already synthesized in isolation -
that is, discontinuously and claim it lS immediately and non-
synthetically understood, is impossible. 
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/ 
Such ~ hypothetical examples thus present no counter to Kant's account 
I 
of apperception. We conclude that, for Kant, mineness can only mean: 
continuously synthesized, where 'continuity' however is not contingent 
(Locke and Hume) but necessary a priori. 
Necessarily then, we encounter OSUA as the synthetic unity of ourselves 
(which makes possible analytic statements about our identity) but, as 
that which precedes any given act of synthesis, it is just the 
transcendental understanding as such as that which projects itself as 
everywhere synthesizing. 6 
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1.3.3. Form and Consciousness. 
Kant twice and each time very explicitly compares the unity of 
apperception with the forms of intuition (B139 and B144) Apperception 
becomes the 'form of consciousness'. What is the meaning of this? 
Obviously, Kant wants to create some limited analogy between the forms 
of intuition and the form of consciousness, particularly in the way 
they govern the givenness of certain presentations. But how far can 
this analogy be taken, and does it help us clarify any outstanding 
issues? 
Part of the answer lies in the notion of continuity introduced above. 
The field of the understanding itself is only continuous in the sense 
of 'no concept 1S without the possibility of synthesis', which is 
simply a statement about the definition of conceptuality - i.e. the 
'conceptus communis'. This is insufficient, since the total field of 
concepts is possibly both closed and finite. 'Continuous synthesis' 
here would just mean that, given a concept, I can form a judgement 
about it with respect to any other given concept. The continuity 
required by apperception, on the other hand means 'everything is 
necessarily given for possible synthesis', which is a transcendental 
and a priori projection of givenness with respect to the understanding. 
'Continuous synthesis' now means that, before any givenness, I can 
guarantee that the givenness will be encountered as manifold and 
therefore given to the manifold. 7 But this guarantee takes an odd 
form: that is, it guarantees something about a presentation that has 
nothing to do with its content. 
As we saw above, this continuity corresponds to the self-projection of 
the understanding which Kant calls the 'intellectual synthesis.' But 
this is not in fact itself an act of synthesis, under any recognisable 
definition of synthetic act. And again, it does not function as a rule 
for the determination of any or all syntheses (though we sometimes 
express ourselves in that way). Even the categories, once intuition is 
encountered, function as rules. 
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Thus, the unity of apperception, as 
original, carries no determining content either in itself or in its 
application. 
The transcendental unity of apperception cannot be accompanied by any 
other representation (as Kant says, B132) and is thus a senseless and 
intuitionless 'image', the mere form of unity, not even the tag of the 
'I think' around all my representations but just the bare possibility 
of such. Such apperception is nothing like a subject. Intuitions and 
manifolds, Kant implies, have I-ness in the same way as (outer) 
intuitions are not in space but spacial. As with space, such an I-ness 
is very difficult, perhaps impossible, to think beyond the thing that 
is me, the I as subject, such that the 'I think' is then is some part 
of me. Further, the unity of apperception avoids the tired, unKantian 
metaphysics of a possible analysis that precedes synthesis by emptying 
self-consciousness of all content, making it mere form. The AlA (which 
says 'everything accompanied by 'I think' must be ascribed to me' - we 
have shown that this means 'everything in the possible form 'I think X' 
must first have been given as a manifold subject to ruled synthesis') 
bears a very tight analogy to that tautology with which some 
commentators dismiss the Aesthetic (i.e. 'everything outside me must be 
in space' - which we have shown means 'everything represented in space 
must first be given spacially') These seem to be tautologies without 
consequence precisely because it is difficult to think through a 
condition of possibility which is not also a predicable content (i.e. 
a generic concept). 
To explore this further, we require a brief diversion. 
Kemp Smith, in his commentary, explores why Kant might have felt the 
need to strain critical philosophy in the direction of a transcendental 
self. The contemporary critics of the first edition of the Critique 
took the arguments in the Principles as definitive and concluded that, 
for Kant, everything was appearance (in the strong sense) and no 
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reality could be found - this meant that all appearance was essentially 
unconditioned and thus always only illusion. Kant felt the need for a 
rethought defense. Although Kant continued to maintain, of course, 
that the only knowledge we have of the self is mediated appearance in 
inner sense, none-the-Iess we can - and here is where his language 
reaches its limit - discover in the mere 'I think', and indeed as its 
equivalent, the 'I am', that is, the undetermined existence of the 
self. In the Paralogisms Kant desires to show, at great length in 
proportion to the weight of the tradition he is attacking, that merely 
from the 'I think' we can have no knowledge of the soul as substance _ 
that is, as a determinate form of existence. Being violently brief, 
the argument is that the representation of the unity of consciousness 
is not an intuition, and therefore not an intuition of an object to 
which categories could be justifiably applied. We must dwell here for 
a time. 
One famous note at B422 deserves special attention. Descartes' 
argument, as Kant reconstructs it, is the following: Everything that 
thinks, exists; I think; therefore, I exist. Kant asserts that the 
problem here is that the 'I think' given to me in self-consciousness is 
not Descartes' 'I think', and that the 'exist' in the conclusion is not 
the same as the 'exists' in the major premise. The I think is for Kant 
equivalent to the I exist, but the existence is indeterminate. The 'I 
think' precedes (or rather subsists with?) any intuition of the self as 
a self that would allow it to~ be determined 1n experience. Any 
temporal intuition of myself is necessarily already my intuition, and 
thus cannot be said to bear information about what this my-ness is in 
itself. Kant then says that the category of existence is not capable 
of being indeterminate - a thing either is or is not. 
'I am' is not categorical. 
Therefore, the 
Here, Kant calls the 'I think' an empirical proposition. We can assume 
that this means that, although its possibility 1S a priori, 1S 
actuality is given in some 'I think X'. Further, as we saw in the 
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Deduction, the 'I think' is a thought- it is, as it were, a comment on 
a synthesis. And yet Kant asserts that it 'expresses' an indeterminate 
sensible intuition or perception. The strain on Kant's language is 
evident - remember that the concept of feeling was also invoked in the 
Prolegomena - certainly what is thereby expressed cannot be an actual 
intuition, for it cannot~spacial or temporal or even manifold if it 1S 
to remain necessarily indeterminate. We are left with the analogy of 
an intuition. Kant continues, asserting that, as given to thought 1n 
general, this indeterminate 'intuition' is not an appearance, but also 
not a thing-in-itself, and yet exists 'actually' (in der Tat, whichL'not 
one of Kant's reserved words or phrases) and thus is not an illusion 
(for example, of pure reason) either. With these three, though, we 
seem to have exhausted all the possibilities and still not found our 
selves. 
Now Kant uses the notion of form very widely to cover any mental entity 
which prescribes without content. Apperception could be called a form, 
because, as we saw above, it generates (the possibility of) a 
representation that is never necessarily accompanied by any other 
representation; the pure categories are forms - 'forms of thought', 
Kant calls them - because they can determine no object a priori; the 
forms of judgement are forms, if indeed they are different from the 
pure categories; and the forms of intuition are forms. Are all of 
these meanings to be understood as synonymous? Clearly not, if the gap 
in the faculties is to be maintained: the being of the intuition-form 
must be different from the being of the thought-form. The difference 
here 1S evidently that between the within of intuition and the under of 
sUbsumption. 
Apperception makes possible any determination of representations as 
mine, though in itself it does no determining - but does it do so by 
subsuming representations under the concept of sUbjective ownership, or 
does it do so not by granting a relationship to a subject or concept of 
a subject but to other same-order representations? Apperception 
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certainly does not subsume, for if it did, it would be effected through 
or in an actual transcendental synthesis, which it cannot be - as Kant 
says, the unity of apperception is not the category of unity. 
Therefore, apperception must behave like a form of intuition. 
At B136 Kant writes that, 
The supreme principle of the possibility of all intuition 
in its relation to sensibility is, according to the 
Transcendental Aesthetic, that all the manifold of 
intuition should be subject to the formal conditions of 
space and time. The supreme principle of the same 
possibility, in its relation to the understanding, is that 
all the manifold of intuition should be subject to 
conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception' 
(B136, my emphasis) . 
There are a number of problems in this passage. How can a form be a 
'principle' at all? In what sense does intuition have a 'relation' to 
sensibility? How can a manifold be subject to (beforehand, 
afterwards?) space and time? In any case the import is clear, and we 
have hinted at it above: the significant phrases are the 'in relation 
to's. Thus Kant is asking not just 'what is the condition of 
givenness' but 'what is the condition of givenness-to-X'. It thus 
seems plausible to paraphrase the passage as: 
The unique a priori forms under which presentations, when 
considered without regard to synthesis and lawfulness, must 
be given are space and time. The a priori form under which 
the same presentations, but now to the understanding, must 
be given is apperception. 
Where by 'apperception' is meant: the possibility of continuous 
'stretched' synthesis. 
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Let us allow ourselves the luxury of a moment of pure speculation: 
The self-projection by the transcendental understanding out of itself 
and onto manifoldness is certainly not a temporal event according to 
Kant. And yet any actual 'I think' is within time. For Kant, this 
simply means that our self-affection is inner sense as intuition. 
Still, however, it must be possible for this articulation in time of 
the 'I think' to happen - in particular for the 'I think now' to happen 
- and this possibility must lie partially with apperception as the form 
of consciousness. If this were not possible, then any act of 
association or synthesis would be just another element in the 
continuous stream of representations. There would be many 'I think ... 's 
- i.e. representations of identity - but no 'I think now, or thought 
then, or will think'. Space and time themselves are insufficient: it 
lS only synthesis which finds in intuitions a here and now, and 
synthesis depends upon apperception. 'I think here and now' must come 
before and make possible an representation of a mere here or now. 
Apperception lS necessarily spaced out in a certain manner in order 
that the 'I think' might acquire a now from out of the unpunctuated 
stretch of temporal intuition, without of course apperception itself 
containing either the actual 'I think' or the now. Appercept ion 
contains the possibility of the 'I think now' - of self-consciousness 
in the full sense in a way precisely analogous to the way space 
(time) contains the possibility of here (now), as we described that 
above. Namely, as the form of an unlimited network of differential 
betweens. Indeed, what is made possible in each case is not just the 
intuition or even the synthesis, but the grasping of that synthesis in 
a here (which also means now), a now (which also means here), or the 'I 
think here and now' - although these are not themselves given. Clearly 
we have discussed such an idea far too quickly, and yet it certainly 
illuminates in what way and to what extent apperception is the form of 
consciousness. Apperception must also be spaced, have spacing. 
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If transcendental apperception is indeed a form analogous to space and 
time, then (just like in the Schematism and Principles) the categories 
will necessarily encounter aporia in attempting to think it. But, is 
this not precisely what we have been discussing with respect to the 
Paralogisms? Namely, that the categories of existence, substance and 
causality make the soul thinkable but cannot properly be applied in 
order to determine it. Thus Kant gets into trouble since, in the 
Deduction, all he needs for apperception is the formal self-projection 
upon manifoldness of the pure faculty of understanding - but in the 
Paralogisms he seems to want to posit an ' indeterminate' intuition 
through which the 'I think' is at the same time an 'I am' but without 
the latter referring to any categorical mode of existence. That is, in 
the Paralogisms, there is something given about apperception while in 
the Deduction, it is generated [zu Stande bringenJ. These can only be 
reconciled if we recognise: a) 'generation' or 'production' does not 
mean a synthetic act as SUChi b) any characterisation of this 
'givenness' other than with the predicate 'original' - which Kant uses 
throughout the Deduction would be an illegitimate judgement. 
Ultimately, the paradox of given/produced is nothing other than the 
paradox of spontaneity itself. 
1.3.4. The Form of the Ideal. 
Kant writes suggestively, 
, All manifoldness of things 1.S only a correspondingly 
varied mode of limiting the concept of the highest reality 
which forms their common substratum, just as all figures 
are only possible as so many different modes of limiting 
infinite space.' (CPR A578=B606, my emphasis.) 
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Is this meant to be merely an illustrative simile? What exactly is the 
relationship between the forms of intuition and the ideas? We will 
find many interesting structural analogies, and be able to suggest that 
these structural analogies were precisely why Kant felt he could throw 
any metaphysics claiming knowledge of the supersensible out of court 
from the beginning. 
Now the Dialectic has an interesting and revealing history, for the 
details of which I depend upon Norman Kemp Smith's Commentary. In 
Kant's silent decade of the 1770s, when the critical program had been 
thought of but its details not worked out, the following three 
principles have the role of the table of categories: 
1. The relation of substance and accident. 
2. Ground and consequence. 
3. Parts and composite whole. 
To these three correspond three ideas, Kant's conception of which (as 
is clear too in the Critique) had more than a passing relation to 
Plato: 
1'. A subject that was never a predicate. 
2'. A ground that is not also a consequence. 
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3'. A 'unity, which is not itself composite' (Reflexionen ii.578, 
quoted in Kemp Smith, p433). 
Of course, these three 'principles' become the categories of relation 
and the associated ideas the three Ideas of Reason: soul, cosmos, God. 
If 3' had been retained as it stands, the question of spaciality in its 
relationship to the divinity would have been very clear indeed. But 
this third was revised and was eventually replaced by community and 
reciprocity. This altered, as Kemp Smith briefly explains, Kant's 
whole conception of the treatment of the Ideal and made for some odd, 
artificial tensions in that chapter of the Dialectic (cf. Kemp Smith, 
p434). For our purposes now, however, what this original and its 
alteration shows is the close connection between the two problems of 
reciprocity and non-composite wholeness. It is a connection that we 
have been suggesting for some time, but it is more than a little 
interesting to see that, for Kant, this relationship is most pronounced 
with respect to the Ideas. 
By the second edition of the Critique, Kant recognizes his problems 
with the categories are not over, and he adds paragraphs 11 and 12 to 
the chapter on the Categories. In the former addition, he singles out 
the third category of relation for attention - what does the logical 
form of disjunction have to do with community? Kant argues that the 
disjunctive 'or' in signifying mutual exclusion also signifies mutual 
and coordinated definition. He writes, 
'Now in a whole which 1S made up of things, a similar 
combination 1S being thought, for one thing 1S not 
subordinated to another, as effect to cause of its 
existence but, simultaneously and reciprocally, 1S 
coordinated with it, as cause of the determination of the 
other ... ' (BI12). 
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But we are lead to ask, in what way does disjunction serve to make up 
a whole? T. K. Swing observes, 
'Since Kant takes the disjunctive judgment in its strong 
rather than its weak sense, it can be argued that the 
disjunctive judgment states the incompatibility or mutual 
exclusion of the disjointed members' (Swing, 25). 
Kant deserves to give this point much more attention than he does. Let 
us see if we can render it plausible. Now Swing (and other 
commentators) are certainly correct in seeing a problem in moving from 
the logical form of disjunction to a concept of community in the sense 
of unity. The conjunctive logical form (Swing suggests) might well be 
better suited for this purpose. 
But what distinguishes a wholeness (we might wish to say 'what is 
proper to wholeness') is that the whole as such is (in some sense) 
already given, and the parts are limitations upon it as Kant 
patiently explains in the quotation that begins this section and the 
paragraphs that follow it in the Ideal of Reason. Kant says that, 
strictly speaking, it lS inappropriate even to say 'limitation' 
[Einschrankung] of 'primordial being' [Urwesen], for even this is to 
imply that the latter might somehow be the sum of dependent beings, 
i.e. that Urwesen is of the same order as dependent beings. 8 Better 
(Kant asserts) to think of the limitation of all that follows from the 
Urwesen, such as appearances. This squares more closely with space and 
time as forms of relations of sensations (not their container) such 
that the totality of possible appearances in space is not itself space 
(as it was for Leibniz) although that totality is indeed what lS 
thinkable in space - and in particular squares with the notion of space 
and time as that which grants actuality. As we discussed in our 
opening chapter, intuitions 'in space' are not in space, or part of 
space, but are spacial. This is the meaning of space being prior to 
its parts: not 'greater' than its parts - that would be merely holism -
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but the Being of 'its' parts, the condition for their being in the 
first instance 'parts of'. Urwesen is not some materia prima - or on 
the side of form a first mover on the ordinary understanding of that 
concept nor is Urwesen the totality of matter and forms (the 
universe) . Rather, Urwesen is the Being of any parcel of matter or 
delineation of shape or movement such that they necessarily refer back 
to such primaries and totalities. 
Thus we must think of the disjunctive syllogism as a making-actual of 
the potential or the possible. Thus the Ideal is constructed by reason 
out of the ascending series of possibilities, not actualities. But, as 
we discussed in our first Kant chapter, this making-actual occurs by 
way of a being within a whole, within which alone exclusion is 
possible. An appearance 'elbows' its way into space and time and the 
relational field reorganizes and closes over it - which means that the 
wholeness already contained this 'elbowing in' as a possibility. 
Similarly, the disjunctive syllogism posits a whole which makes 
possible any given becoming-actual. Thus the form of disjunction, with 
its associated logical laws of non-contradiction and excluded middle, 
becomes a much more plausible 'clue' to the category of community. 
The above provisional exposition of the Ideal indicates that its final 
significance is its relation to the whole of the Dialectic. Indeed, 
the reason why the whole and part relation could not be maintained 
(from Kant's thought in the l770s) merely as a category of relation is 
precisely its overriding importance for the whole of the Dialectic, not 
only that division's last third. So let us take a brief step back and 
find a broader view. This is no place for a comprehensive 
interpretation of the Dialectic, of course; we will instead be 
concentrating on the relations between the faculties that are 
constitutive for Kant's most central theses. 
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1.3.5. Ideas and Closure. 
Arguably, the central and opening gambit of the Dialectic takes place 
right at the end of the Introduction. Here Kant discusses the unity of 
principles as demanded by reason as being the principle of a search for 
the totality of the conditions which necessarily stand above or behind 
even the major premise of any syllogism. As Kant explains at a later 
point, the major premise consists in the complete extension of a 
predicate under a condition, which Kant calls universality. Applied to 
experience and knowledge, and thus determined by the relational 
categories, this universality becomes the totality of conditions for a 
given appearance, and therefore the transcendental concept of reason is 
a concept of the totality of conditions. But what makes this totality 
possible is the unconditioned, which is the ground of any possible 
synthesis of the conditioned. The transcendental concept of reason is 
'explained by' the concept of the unconditioned (A322=B378-9).9 
But the logical principle with which this argument begins, Kant then 
cunningly writes, 
'can only become a principle of pure reason through our 
assuming that if the conditioned is given, the whole series 
of conditions, subordinated to one another - a series which 
is therefore itself unconditioned - is likewise given (that 
is, in the object [Gegenstande] and its connection 
[Verknupfung] ) Such a principle of pure reason 1.S 
obviously synthetic (A 307-8=B364) . 
The emphasis on 'pure' requires explaining. If Reason 1.S pure, then it 
cannot be conditioned by receptivity, and cannot therefore comprehend 
what 'manifoldness' or 'time series' means, and so the whole series 
must be contained in the object. The logical maxim, then, with respect 
to reason qua reason is not the beginning of a regulated search for (or 
the expectation of) completion or totality, but simply the content of 
130 
a concept or judgement - more particularly, the content of the object 
and its connection. Now'Verknupfung' (here, 'connection') is not one 
of Kant's major terminological words and thus poses a problem. Since 
it is not here in the plural, it cannot mean an object's particular 
relations or connections to other objects. We must understand it as 
the unity in synthesis granted the obj ect in general i that is, in 
accordance with the unity of apperception and the categories. Where 
could the 'whole series' lie, at least in its possibility, that is, 
formally? The primary unity is not however the category of unity, but 
the synthetic unity of apperception; the transcendental unity of 
apperception must be such as to indicate (formally) what a total series 
of conditions might be, such that the total series is itself 
unconditioned and yet 'determined'. We should keep our interpretation 
of apperception in the back of our minds. 
Clearly, Kant is playing a game here the field of which is the entire 
Dialectic. He sets out these propositions about the givenness of the 
unconditioned hypothetically and then, without drawing attention to the 
fact, proceeds to disprove a remarkably similar contention in the Ideal 
of Pure Reason. This at least leaves him room to manoeuvre for, 
throughout his later life Kant constantly wavers between the 'official' 
scepticism and relatively 'unofficial' theological positions. What is 
important for our purposes is the link, which lies in the very heart of 
Kant's project, between Kant's arguments here and the question of unity 
and wholeness. Kant writes: 
'Now since it is the unconditioned alone which makes 
possible the totality of conditions, and, conversely, the 
totality of conditions is always itself unconditioned, a 
pure concept of reason in general can be explained by the 
concept of the unconditioned, conceived as containing a 
ground of the synthesis of the conditioned' (A322=B379). 
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This seems a contradiction: if x makes possible y, how can be then say, 
in the same sentence no less, that y is itself x? Only if x and yare 
a very special object: a mere unity will not do (self-identity), what 
is required is wholeness (auto-constitution). We still have to 
differentiate: the totality is not different from the unconditioned, 
but differently grasped. Working towards the totality is thinkable, 
grasping in what way that totality is its own condition is not, except 
'through' the idea. 
Kant of course does not say that the conditions are in a series 
subordinated each to the next, but rather each to the other. At issue 
is not a temporal - nor even a hierarchical - series of conditions. 
What is being described is a network of conditions such that each has 
a part in determining everything else. The series need not in this 
case be finite. In the Critique of Teleological Judgement, Kant 
discusses similar self-constituting wholes, such as the living 
organism, and is concerned again to show that such wholes cannot be 
made available in their propriety to the understanding with its 
category of causation. The unthinkability of this kind of series does 
not depend upon the unconditioned condition, but upon a projection 
towards teleological (non-mechanical) causation. But this 
unthinkability is again not appropriate to the Dialectic. The organs 
of the organism are not parts, working together, but generate each 
other - which is not a universal phenomenon. Nevertheless, this is an 
important clue, and one which Kant gestures towards in several 
prominent metaphors. 10 
We have to say that the totality of conditions, understood in this way, 
is thinkable in its form, though not in fact. One fine exemplification 
of these classic issues is in the debate between Copleston and Russell 
on the existence of God. ll Note Russell's essentially Kantian 
distinction between the meaninglessness and the unintelligibilit1T of 
the universe. The universe is meaningless - how can the universe have 
any relations to entities that are not themselves part of the universe? 
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- but not unintelligible: entities within the universe obey laws, which 
is not to say that a complete description of the universe is materially 
possible, but only formally so. Russell accordingly, and much to the 
exasperation of Copleston, sees no need to posit that the 'universe' 
must have a cause, or even that such a positing would make any sense. 
But an important further step comes when Russell rejects the Sartrean 
designation of the universe as 'gratuitous'. He replies: 'Well, the 
word 'gratuitous' suggests that it might be something else; I should 
say the universe is just there, and that is all.' What Russell does 
not like about 'gratuitous' is that it implies that, in the context of 
something else outside the universe which makes the universe what it 
is, the universe is conditioned to be 'gratuitous' that lS, 
'gratuitous' suggests that the universe has this meaning: 'the universe 
has no meaning'. A universe that is just there we might describe as 
'unconditioned' in this sense: nothing causes the universe to be this 
universe. 
In Kant, reason cannot be satisfied with this. The need for complete 
and absolute determination forces the positing not just of a totality 
of conditions (which would be unconditioned in Russell's sense) but the 
unconditioned itself. But again this does not mean some first and 
highest mover. Rather, the unconditioned would be such in the sense of 
conditioning itself, auto-constituting: the unconditioned would make 
itself necessary. Only in this way could the unconditioned be said to 
ground the synthesis itself of the conditioned, and not just its formal 
possibility. 
It lS important to note that Kant, at several points, speaks of the 
synthesis of concepts in reason as a parallel to the synthesis of 
intuitions in the understanding ( see for example, 'Regulative 
Employment' A643-4=B671-2: ' reason unifies the manifold of concepts 
by means of ideas ... '). But, as Kant insists, reason generates no 
concepts only orders them, and therefore the idea is not, strictly 
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speaking, a higher order class concept that could contain other 
concepts right down to the empirical. And why not? First of all, 
certainly, the idea has no possible content, but more importantly an 
old friend reappears here in a place no one would have expected. Kant 
writes, 
'This unity of reason always presupposes an idea, namely, 
that of the form of a whole of knowledge - a whole which is 
prior to the determinate knowledge of the parts and which 
contains the conditions that determine a priori for every 
part its position and relation to the other parts. This 
idea accordingly postulates a complete unity ln the 
knowledge obtained by the understanding, by which this 
knowledge is to be not a mere contingent aggregate, but a 
system connected according to necessary laws' (A645=B673). 
This of course is in its form the same argument used in the Aesthetic 
with respect to space and time not being concepts. That it should be 
found here, at the end of the Dialectic and 500 pages later certainly 
poses an astounding and interesting puzzle, and may well turn out to 
indicate one of the most central insights of the whole Critical 
project. So, what is going on in the unification of the manifold of 
concepts? The 'synthesis' must bridge the gap between the 
experienceable and the non-experienceable, a gap which is essentially 
formal. It is now clear that there is a vital analogy between the form 
of intuition and ideas, or rather the objects of ideas. The notion of 
wholeness that was distinctive of intuition is found to pertain to the 
ideas, and indeed are such as to be conditions of the possibility of 
anything like a critique of pure reason. 
Let us elaborate. The Ideal remains regulative because no experience 
would be adequate to it. But what does this mean? That a supreme 
being could not make itself perceptible? Obviously not. It is not 
that experience is not big enough or long enough to 'hold' such an 
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intui t ion, but rather that experience, by its very form (that of 
thought: synthetic unity under the categories) is inadequate to the 
idea because of its form. 
Considered as an entity represented, a rational idea-object is an 
absolute whole for which notions like representation, part or 
production are entirely inappropriate. However, cons ide red as an 
'entity' within human reason, a rational idea is a representation of an 
infinite synthetic activity, or a completed infinity, where the 
infinity of the regress is the categorical interpretation of an 
absolute formal heterogeneity. In accordance with this latter, the 
idea in itself is nothing but a certain course of action formally and 
not materially prescribed by the feeling of need. No single element or 
group of elements in this course is or could be correct by virtue of 
anything other than this feeling. 
But, as the latter half of the above quotation states, the idea is also 
and essentially a rule (or rather the form of the rule, since the rule 
will only ever be hypothetical, see A646-7=B674-5) for the 
systemisation of knowledge from above. Are we now to think that the 
'course of action' does have a content after all? 
'[Ideas] ought not to be assumed as existing in themselves, 
but only as having the reality of a schema - the schema of 
the regulative principle of the systematic unity of all 
knowledge of nature. They should be regarded only as 
analoga of real things, not as in themselves real things. 
We remove from the object of the idea the conditions which 
limit the concept provided by our understanding, but which 
also alone make it possible for us to have a determinate 
concept of anything. What we then think is a something of 
which, as it is in itself, we have no concept whatsoever, 
le5~ but which we none the think for ourselves as having a 
relation to the sum [Inbegriff] of appearances which is 
analogous to that in which appearances have with respect to 
one another [unter einander]' (A674=B702). 
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We think that we can now understand bits of this at a profound level 
indeed. The schema is the use of the regulative idea, giving the 
conditions under which an instance of it can be recognised. But this 
schema is not formed by the addition of the ordinary conditions (pure 
intuitions), for these have already been removed. Rather, the 
additional conditions are merely analogies of actually subsisting 
thought-relations in the field of appearances. This is not a schema 
making possible an experience, but just the reverse: a schema making 
possible a thinking. 
As we mentioned above, the idea is regulative in the sense of being a 
project. The condition for this project is formal incompatibility: 
neither the idea, nor what it purports to represent, nor the principle 
of pure reason which stands behind it can be brought to thought. The 
rule is regulative and not given, only representing the form of the 
idea as a closed wholeness, i.e. as a formally possible series. The 
rule 1S a rule of analogies, legislating for the totality of conditions 
and not the unconditioned as such. The analogy above is the following: 
the relation between idea-object and sum of appearances is like the 
relations that pertain among appearances. The relations among 
appearances are governed by the categories of relation - particularly 
here causation. In this way, the something which the idea represents 
is like the cause of the sum of appearances. But relations and 
analogies work both ways: just as the effect refers us back to the 
cause, so does the sum refer us to that which the idea represents. In 
this case, the sum refers because it is the schema, it lS object-
directed. The sum or totality of appearances is available to thought 
so that what it refers to, what conditions or causes it, might operate 
within thought - or rather be a part of thought's operation - without 
itself being thinkable .12 
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The idea as schema of wholeness, then, lies at the very border of 
thought, shrouded in paradox, representing that which can only be 
represented in the schema and only then as analogy. But there is no 
way we can say that the idea first exists, and then becomes depicted in 
analogy, without hypostatising. The idea is a consequence of reason's 
natural tendencies and urges. The analogies and the schema for thought 
corne first, the object is posited afterwards as transcending the 
former. This is the point behind Kant's often scoffed at formulation 
that the ideas are simply concepts with their thought-conditions 
removed. In entirely other words, reason necessarily posits the 
opening up of the schema's closure. 
For Kant, the difference between closed and open when considered with 
respect to the ideas of reason is clearly marked: in the introduction 
to the Dialectic, Kant distinguishes between 'totality of conditions' 
and 'unconditioned'. Now the former of these is formally although not 
actually available to thought, because the units out of which it is 
built (x conditions y) are thinkable units, as are the individual 
synthetic acts. The latter, however, is not available to thought 
(except negatively) either formally or actually. In this way, the 
unconditioned transcends both thought and thought's object: the 
totality of conditions. The totality of conditions, by virtue of the 
demands of reason, is 'opened up' as the unconditioned itself. This 
openness is figured as a wholeness which can explain because of its 
priority and its essentially-never-a-part-ness, without ever being just 
another element in the series, or the total series considered as a sum 
of elements, or being just any categorical explanation. Just as with 
the notion of experiential syntax discussed above, closure can be 
opened. Openness and closure reduplicates the divide between intuition 
and thought, Urwesen and phenomenon, unconditioned and conditioned, 
Being and entities. Not that all these differences can be reduced to 
the same difference, but rather that for Kant they are structured the 
same way. 
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There is no need now to delay: this structure 1.S spacing. It is 
certainly no surprise that Kant, even here, should be talking about 
limits, ascending, aggregates, etc. The unconditioned as a certain 
spacing which alone allows the conditioned to appear as what it is: the 
actual, the self-identical and self-different, the enclosed. 
The essence of space is spaciality. Spaciality in its form is spacing, 
considered as the unthought possibility of the categorical cluster: 
actuality, identity, totality, difference and nothingness. These are 
the root concepts of existence. Therefore, the Being of things qua 
things is spacing. 
Vis a vis Kant, all this borders on nonsense. But only borders - for 
Kant certainly suggests it, implicitly perhaps but none-the-less 
elaborately. Heidegger will articulate such themes more explicitly. 
But before we allow our second subject to speak, it is necessary to 
point to one last and illuminating set of phenomena which spacing 
suggests and explicates. 
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Chapter Notes 
1: I:'lliat. is seldom noticed is a quite consistent but always implicit 
~lstln~t:on between what ~e have just called AlA (Kant uses the phrases 
Identltat der Apperceptlon' or 'analytische Einheit') and OSUA. 
2. My daydream of a unicorn does not have a fixed or determinable 
measurement, does not obey the laws of physics, can not be brought to 
the same location as my tumble dryer, cannot be seen by other 
observers, etc. But surely we are missing something important if we 
say that it is not a spacial representation at all. In what way then, 
we would ask, is its horn in a 'different location' from its tail? In 
what way then do its hooves 'move' when I imagine it galloping? In 
what way is it not 'a' unicorn - lS it rather 'unicornness'? It would 
be nonsensical to claim that the unicorn is not represented as a 
particular being in space. 
3. See the discussion below. 
4. This qualification is necessary, since something like this X seems 
posited in Kant's account of aesthetic experience. This does not 
contradict the argument here: the understanding remains that faculty 
which can find a mere sensible manifold in any presentation. But, Kant 
argues, it is possible for this objectifying intentionality of the 
understanding to be deflected or delayed in favour of a comportment 
towards law-analogies. 
5. There are three possible examples: the forms of intuition, as 
forms, do not present manifolds, and therefore a) we could never assert 
that such a form 'existed' or had such-and-such categorical properties; 
and b) we could never become conscious of such a form as some kind of 
representation within us. All this accords nicely with the 
difficulties we have had in calling space and time objects. Similarly 
for the 'I am' of pure apperception and the regulative/presupposed 'it 
is' of a noumenon. 
6. The 'as that ... ' raises its own problems, for it thinks of the 
understanding as a thing, which is then either my thing or not, and 
which then messes up the account of mineness as continuous synthesis. 
Properly, the understanding is a faculty, i.e. a potency. 
is that the manifold will be a manifold 
why arguments about a second space 
intuition) which, though ultimately 
plausible. Cf. our chapter 1.1. 
7. What this cannot guarantee 
of space and time. This is 
(essentially a third form of 
inconclusive, nevertheless seem 
8. This is, of course, the ontic-ontological difference expressed as 
clearly as possible. 
9. Why does Kant choose not to depict the Ideas of reaso~ a~ derive~ 
from the categories of relation, but rather from the syllogls~lc forms. 
Since, if the former were true then, as commentators have pOlnted out, 
it would be impossible for Kant to discuss the ideas a group, ~hat lS, 
as arising from essentially the same need of reason for totallty. 
10.· For example, see A834-5=B862-3. 
11. Conveniently to be found in Edwards and Pap, A Modern Introduction 
to Philosophy. 
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12. Operate regulatively, like the indeterminate postulation of the 
existence of the causing object in the second Analogy - thus the use of 
the term 'regulative' here is also an analogy. 
1.4.0. 
1.4 
Pleasure is Like an Organism; 
Space and the Aesthetic Judgement 
Introduction. 
Up till now, our work on Kant has concentrated on the propriety of the 
forms of intuition, especially space, and the relationship these forms 
maintain with the structures of the understanding and with reason. 
Although the Critique of Judgement is not a text about the metaphysics 
or the epistemology of space and time, yet in important and not always 
obvious ways, it furthers and expands upon Kant's earlier thinking. 
First of all, the aesthetic judgement of taste asks of both the 
imagination 
dwellings 
and the understanding that they leave their ordinary 
the residence of the imagination being synthesis, 
schematism and memory i the residence of the understanding being 
concepts and their unity - in favour of the abyss of indetermination 
and free play. That we must link this exodus with a certain spaciality 
is indicated by the words Kant himself uses to describe it; swing, 
play, vibration, harmony, etc. Further, that which causes such a 
migration is nothing other than the pure form of an object - that is, 
an object considered merely as a set of relations in space and time. 
Secondly, in the Critique of Teleological Judgement, we find an 
organism being described as both cause and effect, both end and origin. 
Now, in discussing the forms of space and time as wholes - as opposed 
to unities or totalities - we have already observed a very similar set 
of concepts at work. Kant himself explicitly draws this parallel. 
What, then, is the relationship between these two Kantian themes? 
Finally, we also need to look at the sections on genius and aesthetic 
ideas and ask what it means for an 'aesthetic idea' to be contained in 
a purely formal intuition. What is the implicit formality within the 
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very concept of an idea such that an aesthetic idea is possible? 
Clearly, our work on the Dialectic in the previous chapter has 
relevance here. 
Once again, the concepts we have called 'spacing' will reappear. But 
far from being just another example of this bizarre migration of the 
language of space, Kant's aesthetics shows us in what way we might come 
to have access to spacing as such. Briefly: that difference ln 
attitude and cognition between aesthetic and ordinary experience which 
most theorists of art have assumed for centuries, can be described and 
is indeed necessitated by the form of spacing. 
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1.4.1. Of Feeling. 
Historically, Kant's concern with feeling in the second and third 
Critiques is understandable, since English moral sense theorists were 
one of his biggest targets. And yet on the terms set up in the first 
Critique, feeling certainly seems an unlikely subject for 
transcendental philosophy, because of its radically subj ect i ve and 
empirical character. At one level feeling is a fairly simple concept: 
it is my subjective response to a representation, insofar as that 
representation consists in or contributes to some goal [Absicht]l, and 
thus (to be perfectly accurate) is opposed to sensation [Eropfindung] 
which although subjective must be considered part of the content of a 
representation. 
Thus while sensation is a representation, feeling is not. Kant is 
often confused on these point, sometimes though not often even calling 
feeling a representation. Moreover, the term feeling has at least four 
distinct uses in Kant: the feeling of pleasure, the feeling of the 
spacial difference between left and right (in "What Does it Mean: To 
Orient Oneself in Thought"), the 'feeling' of the noumenal I 
(Prolegomena), and rational or moral feeling. 
(being an apparently substantive noun) lends 
The very term feeling 
itself to confusion. 
However, the Critique of Judgement makes attempts to clear up this 
issue. First of all in making a clear distinction between sensation 
and feeling (in the first sense above, which will be our immediate 
concern here). 2 Secondly, we find passages like the following: "But 
that which is subjective in [an] a representation, which can be 
absolutely no element in knowledge, is the pleasure or displeasure 
connected [verbunden] with it."l The feeling is both in and connected 
to (not caused by, notice) the representation. As such it could only 
ever seem to be a predicate. Finally, Kant asserts the identity of the 
consciousness of the cognitive harmony with the pleasure itself, which 
we inaccurately say 'arises from' it 4 - just as there is an identity 
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between the determination of the will and pleasure. This vital passage 
will be discussed in detail below. 
Thus, even though having a sensation of some shade of red is my 
criteria of reality for a red object (modal category of reality), 
nonetheless the sensation as representation is distinct from the 
object. A feeling however is not distinct from the sUbjective state: 
we do not have a feeling of ... in the same way we have a concept of ... 
or a sensation of .... We just feel the state. 5 In this way Kant could 
talk about clearly object-linked feelings (my feeling of pleasure in 
the owning of a new car) as well as objectless feelings (my state of 
depression, for no clear reason). What we feel in the first case is 
the proposition 'I own a new car' considered as a mental state; in the 
second, my depression is itself a mental state. 
First of all, a question of terminology: what would it mean for a 
feeling to feel different? The question assumes that feeling is a 
distinct representation that is then felt, and thus fails to take over 
the full radicalness of Kant's (and, it is important to note, Hume's as 
well) account of feeling. Strictly speaking, a feeling is neither a 
subject which could take a predicate (A bad feeling) nor a predicate 
(How does it feel?) which can be passed around between different 
subjects. A representation (for Berkeley, Hume and Kant) is something 
had by a subject, and thus must be 'in' that subject in a manner which 
is founded on both the representation and the subject. This 'manner' 
(the word is Hume's) is precisely the feeling of the representation. 
Given that our subjective constitution is fairly constant, then if a 
representation feels different, it is because the representation is 
different. 
In the Anthropology, Kant writes, "What irrunediately (through sense) 
urges [antreibt] me to abandon my state is unpleasant to me lit 
hurts me; what urges me to remain in a state is pleasant to me, it 
glves me enjoyment. ,,6 Kant writes in general that pleasure [Lust] lS 
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"the agreement of objects or acts with the sUbjective conditions of 
life. ,,7 Pleasure and displeasure are defined by and indeed as the 
impetus which sensation gives to the will. Feeling is evidently not a 
mediate stage, since sensation operates "immediately". Thus it seems 
Kant would like us to understand pleasure as behaviour, which works 
well enough for differences in amplitude. But what about qualitative 
differences? Such a question is too complex for discussion here. We 
should only note that all feelings are different in themselves and by 
their very nature, but this need not rule out different (classes of) 
differences. If a feeling is the in-me-ness of a representation of 
sense, and if in the aesthetic and moral feeling of pleasure we wish to 
be pure from sensation itself, then what alone remains to 
'differentiate' feeling is the form of the representation-in-me. This 
will be precisely Kant's solution. 
In two huge areas of his critical philosophy feeling assumes an 
importance. In the first part of the Critique of Judgement, the 
feeling of pleasure is not of course an objective property, since no 
feeling is, but via the subjective constitution of the human 'Gemut' or 
mind, and providing that certain extraneous factors can be eliminated, 
such pleasure can be linked necessarily to formal features of the 
representations of objects. Thus our judgements concerning beauty can 
be universal, communicated, symbols of morality, etc .. Similarly, in 
Kant's practical philosophy, the notion of moral feeling (respect or 
reverence) is not constitutive of duty, but is the completely 
subjective effect of the moral law within our rational freedom. This 
feeling serves a purpose in providing the interest [Triebfeder] for 
moral action to our amoral, empirical self. Kant argues that we have 
no way of knowing whether our actions in anyone case were motivated 
sufficiently by moral interest or not. 
These two instances have two opposing properties in common: 1) that, as 
subjective, feeling contributes to no knowledge whatsoever; 2) that, as 
purely subjective, feeling has a universal validity. Kant overcomes 
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this contradiction by inventing two new categories of non-discursi-le 
'knowledge': the practical, which culminates in faith; the aesthetic, 
which culminates in a culture of taste. 
But the two applications of feeling have another feature in common. We 
can introduce this through two classic debates which are remarkably 
similar although this similarity has not been sufficiently discussed. 
We noted above that, for Kant, it is impossible to judge whether the 
ultimate sufficient cause of our actions had its origins in practical 
reason. And yet Kant also seems to feel that we can, in any given 
case, distinguish a moral interest from a pathological one. Yet, so 
far as either our empirical self or our theoretical reason is 
concerned, all feelings are alike in being sensuously conditioned, 
precisely because the peculiar causation by which the practical reason 
effects a feeling is incapable of being thought. Given this, how could 
Kant ever claim that qualitatively or however you please a 
distinction between feelings could be noticed and thus judged. 8 Yet 
this is precisely the claim Kant seems to make: in a footnote to the 
Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, Kant writes of the moral 
feeling of reverence, 
"It might be urged against me that I have merely tried, 
under cover of the word 'reverence', to take refuge in an 
obscure feeling instead of giving a clearly articulated 
answer to the question by means of a concept of reason. 
Yet although reverence is a feeling, it is not a feeling 
received through outside influence, but one self-produced 
through a rational concept, and therefore specifically 
distinct from feelings of the first kind, all of which can 
be reduced to inclination or fear".9 
The point here is the notion of a specific difference. 10 
to understand the possibility of such a difference? 
How are we 
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A precisely analogous problem occurs in the Third Critique. How is the 
feeling of pleasure which arises from the aesthetic judgement proper to 
differ from the pleasures we take out of interests in objects? We 
might point to certain passages in Kant ll and argue that the question 
is irrelevant, since we do not judge on the pleasure, the pleasure 
being only a consequence of judging. All pleasures are alike, it is 
the source that is at issue. On the other hand, though, we could cite 
different passages 12 and maintain that there must be a specific 
difference in how the pleasure feels (if such a phrase is not in itself 
contradictory) for Kant's aesthetic system to 'work.' If pleasure is 
our only access to the harmonious accord of the faculties (as Kant 
sometimes implies), and if that pleasure is not distinct from other 
pleasures, then an aesthetic judgement would not be possible. 
What I want to propose is that - to the extent that pleasure cannot be 
separated from the pleasurable representation, and is indeed nothing 
but the way that representation is a representation-in-me - aesthetic 
or moral pleasure must be considered formed as the representation-in-me 
is formed, in a manner not merely distinct but radically so from other 
representations and thus other pleasures. That is to say, when Kant 
argues that we can distinguish among pleasures by virtue of their 
origins (which is the thesis of the first moment of the analytic of the 
beautiful), he is not necessarily or only asking us to reflect on the 
causes or 'grounds' of the pleasure. Rather, and as if from a 
different point of view, he is asking us to reflect on distinct 'types' 
a priori of pleasure, giving the concept of type the only intelligible 
content it could have with respect to pleasure. 13 Because of the very 
nature of feeling, Kant necessarily equivocates between two points of 
view: the behavioural (all pleasures determine the will in the same 
way, though these pleasures may arise from different sources) and the 
original (essentially different origin-forms produce different 'types' 
of feeling) .14 
1.4.2. SUbsumption and Finality. 
Kant writes: 
" since the freedom of .the imagination consists 
[bestehen] in its schematizing without a concept, so must 
the judgement of taste [Geschmacksurteil] consist in a mere 
sensation of the mutual enlivening [belebenden] of 
imagination in its freedom and understanding with its 
conformity to law [Gesetzmassigkeit]; and therefore the 
judgement rests upon a feeling [Gefuhl] which allows the 
object to be judged [beurteilen] by the finality of the 
representation (through which the object was given) for the 
promotion [Bef6rderung] of the cognitive faculties in their 
free play. And taste, as sUbjective judgement, contains a 
principle of the subsumption, not of intuition under 
concept, but of the faculty of intuitions or presentations 
(the imagination) under the faculty of concepts (the 
understanding) (CAJ 143). 
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Much here we already know, belonging as it does to the famous formula 
that Kant never tires of repeating: that the representation of the 
object brings the imagination in its freedom and the understanding in 
its lawfulness into a sUbjective and final harmony, thus producing a 
feeling of pleasure, and so forth. We are not in a position yet to 
make of this paraphrase anything but a parody. Every time Kant repeats 
this formula he varies it slightly. In the instance quoted above, a 
number of new elements are introduced, chief among which is the notion 
of schematism. The function of schematism in the first Critique was to 
show how it might be possible for a concept, which itself involved no 
reference to space and time in other words, a pure concept or 
category - to ever apply to an intuition which is only ever given in 
space and time. The category must be schematized by the imagination, 
must be made to present itself as if it were an intuition. 
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Here, however, the imagination is asked to schematize without a 
concept. Such a schema would be an intuition of the general lawful 
character of the understanding. But can the understanding just be 
'generally lawful'? - most commentators take this at face value and 
move on quickly. Elsewhere in critical philosophy, 
which falls under one 
when Kant says 
of the twelve lawfulness he means 'that 
categories' . Certainly, he cannot mean that here. And yet, Kant is 
also not saying 'indeterminate but determinable' meaning 'that which 
would fall under a category if we knew which one to apply'. For apart 
from the obvious problems about what type of entity the 'that which' 
would be, the 'object' of the aesthetic judgement is not contingently 
indeterminate but necessarily so .15 Nor does Kant mean ' that which 
falls under two contradictory categories at once', for paradox is not 
law. We can only conclude that lawfulness means: ' that which has 
something in common with (analogous to) the categories but is not 
categorical', that is, cannot be thought as such. 
So, what would such a schema look like? Rather, without a concept 
there is not a schema, nor schemata, but schematizing: an activity 
without a product. The very freedom of the imagination is said to 
reside in this undetermined schematizing. What then happens, according 
to Kant, is that the imagination is subsumed under the understanding. 
Now what could this mean? We would like to be able to say, as Kant 
does explicitly with respect to the sublime, that the representation 
(of art or nature) is itself the schema - of, perhaps, an aesthetic 
idea. But there is no clear indication as yet that this is what he had 
in mind. Rather, we must remain provisional and merely say that the 
object judged as beautiful - or rather its representation - has some 
property or other which makes it possible for the understanding as such 
but without any determinate concept to enter and organize the 
imagination as presenter of manifolds. 
We also know that such subsumption, such mutually enlivening play, is 
also final. Oddly enough, in a book crowded with references to 
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sUbjective finality, Kant is very vague about what exactly it might 
consist in with respect to the aesthetic judgement. 16 
"The consciousness of the mere formal finality 
[Zweckmassigkeit] in the play of the subject's cognitive 
faculties [Erkenntnis-krafte] upon a representation wherein 
an object has been given, is the pleasure [Lust] itself, 
since it [referring to consciousness] contains [enthalt] 
the determining ground of the subject's activity in respect 
of the enlivening of the cognitive faculties, and therefore 
an inner causality (which is final) in respect of cognition 
in general, but without being confined [eingeschrankt] to 
a determinate cognition, and consequently a mere form of 
the sUbjective finality of a representation in a aesthetic 
judgement. [the pleasure] involves a causality within 
itself, namely of preserving without further aim [absicht] 
the state of the representation itself and the engagement 
of the cognitive faculties. We tarry [weilen] by the 
contemplation of the beautiful, for this contemplation 
strengthens and reproduces itself of itself." (CAJ 64). 
We might remark on the fact that "consciousness of" here is pleasure, 
which is not to say that pleasure hijacks consciousness (ecstasy), nor 
even that pleasure is the sole object of consciousness, for in this 
case consciousness has, strictly speaking, no object. Pleasure, as a 
sensible feeling , arrives at consciousness through inner sense and 
within the form of time. Nevertheless, it is a pleasure bound up 
within the closed circuit of the cognitive faculties. Closed indeed. 
Kant tells us above that the consciousness of finality in cognitive 
play contains the determining ground of cognitive activity. We are 
back to a peculiar phenomenon discussed in the previous chapter: here 
is an x which contains but also is the ground of y. What does all this 
mean? 
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Now Paul Guyer makes a distinction here, which is quite clarifying, 
between a first 'judgement' which receives pleasure and associates it 
with the representation of an object, and a second more proper 
judgement which looks at the conditions of that pleasure and asks: was 
I disinterested, was I judging apart from any concept, etc .. Only the 
latter is the judgement of taste proper (Cohen and Guyer, 22). Guyer's 
distinction plays on the ambiguity in the concept of 'reflection': 
reflection in the sense of 'reflection upon the conditions of' and 
reflection in the sense of reflective judgement or not-yet-determinate 
judgement. Let us survey this with a digression. 
In the Critique of Pure Reason (in the last appendix to the 
Transcendental Analytic), Kant defines reflection as "that state of 
mind in which we first set ourselves to discover the subjective 
conditions under which [alone] we are able to arrive at concepts" (CPR 
276). In particular, this involves determining the faculty of the mind 
(either sensibility or pure understanding) where a given concept first 
arises. Here Kant states that all judgments require reflection (after 
the fact) if they are to be critical. Then, in the introduction to the 
Critique of Judgement, Kant immediately differentiates between two 
forms of judgement, the determinant and the reflective (CAJ 18). In 
the terms of the first Critique, we can understand this distinction as 
between an 'automatic' but unobserved judgement and one that calls 
attention to itself (Kant writes, "something which makes us 
attentive" (CAJ 28) and indeed, "even when it has no intention of so 
doing" (CAJ 30)) by immediately bringing in either pleasure or 
displeasure via the a priori assumption of finality in nature. A 
judgement, that is, that proceeds by conscious reflection upon a 
feeling of the mind. 
For both the first and third Critiques, then, the concept of 
reflection, in its purpose, essentially remains the same. For ln 
calling attention to itself in this manner, the reflective judgement 
demands immediate reflection back upon its own task of groping after a 
concept. 
communis" . 
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Kant develops this in his discussion of the "sensus 
Here, the common sense - or rather the common critical 
faculty of self-reflection is that which allows the universal 
communicability of an aesthetic judgement and simultaneously grounds 
its demand of universal assent as a judgement. The critical faculty 
Kant describes is precisely the "confining [of our] attention to the 
formal peculiarities of our representation or general state of 
representative activity" (CAJ 151); ie, as in the first Critique, the 
determination of the subjective conditions of, not a concept, but a 
lawful but undetermined synthesis of imagination. Guyer's distinction, 
then, clarifies what is involved in the judgement of taste, but does 
not show how the two moments are essentially linked, or if their 
distinction is real or ideal. 
We have still not realised the full radicality of this judgement Kant 
is attempting to describe. The act of judgement, in turning towards 
the representation-in-me, is sustained in that turning by the pleasure. 
This Kant expresses in saying that consciousness and pleasure both have 
an "inner causality" and a "causality within itself". But why should 
this sustaining occur, unless the judgement about the conditions of the 
'first' judgement is itself a judgement concerning finality (i.e. the 
finality of the cognitive harmonies at play), and thus generative of 
pleasure? 
Remember that it is precisely the 'formal peculiarities' of a 
representation which are the ground of the judgement's being reflective 
and thus aesthetic. Further, the feeling of pleasure is not some thing 
that is distinct from the act of judgement about finality such that the 
two could be separated. In any ordinary judgement, one could focus on 
the cognitive elements and ignore any associated feeling. But in the 
aesthetic judgement, there are no cognitive elements, such that the 
feeling itself is the judgement and is our only access to the accord of 
the faculties. Consequently, any second judgement about the conditions 
of the first judgement must also be a judgement about the conditions of 
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the pleasure. But pleasure is precisely the consciousness of finality. 
Thus, any secondary reflection on conditions and purity must 
necessarily be caught up in these 'formal peculiarities' and itself be 
a reflective and aesthetic consciousness. It follows that there is no 
point at which the reflective judgement can 'get on top of', so to 
speak, its nature as reflective. Only thus Kant can say that the 
consciousness both contains the ground of and is identical with, the 
pleasure. The aesthetic judgement is certainly peculiar. 
Guyer defines Kant's concept pleasure as the feeling of the accord of 
an object for "some basic need or objective" (Cohen and Guyer, 30), a 
definition he derives logically enough by abstracting the definition 
given in the second Critique from its concern with the faculty of 
desire. But here the possibility exists that 'objective' and 'feeling' 
may collide in one representation or consciousness of representation. 
The feeling may be its own end. It can be so in this sense: 
pleasurably judged to be final is the accord between representation and 
the cognitive powers (the beautiful representation as in-me); but 
pleasurably judged final also is precisely this first pleasure 
which grounds 'enlivening' of 'cognition in general' (CAJ, 64). 
Kant writes, 
the pleasure can express [ausdruckenJ nothing other 
than the conformity [AngemessenheitJ of the object to the 
cognitive powers, which are in play in the reflective 
judgement and insofar as they are in play, and thus express 
merely a subjective, formal finality of the object" (CAJ 
30) . 
Note the 'insofar as they are in play'. This means that the 
pleasurable conformity with the (representation of the) object is 
conditional upon the play; but of course, we must also say that the 
play is conditional upon the conformity.17 
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What 1S happening here is not a carelessness in Kant's philosophical 
writing. Rather, there is an attempt to describe what, as far as Kant 
is concerned, literally indescribable. Here is a mental state which is 
its own condition and its own end, and which thus generates and 
sustains itself. One cannot even escape by saying that the mental 
state is conditioned or brought about by the presentation of a 
beautiful object - for it 1S not the object that is judged but its 
representation, and not as a representation but simply by being a 
representation-in-me. 
Pleasure (consciousness of) causes pleasure and is produced by pleasure 
it is a pleasure machine that only exhaustion or distraction can 
grind to a halt. And not a machine, for a machine was built for ... , 
has ~end or design and is thus not simply a finality. Pleasure is 
more like an organism: a pleasure organism. 
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1.4.3. The Form of the Organism. 
Above, we asked what it might mean to say that the understanding itself 
subsumes the imagination. We now find an additional question of what 
it means to say that such a sUbsumption, otherwise known as play, 
serves itself as a concept for an object. This concept, if it were a 
concept, would be the end for one gets the impression in the 
aesthetic judgement that the obj ect was produced precisely for the 
generation of this harmonious play. Nature, Kant says, is seen on the 
analogy with art (CAJ 92). But of course, there is no concept, not 
even an indeterminate concept, but merely play - and thus we are left 
with mere formal and subjective final~ty. The formality is the key to 
the immediacy of the aesthetic judgement which Kant insists upon - and 
which is left out of so many interpretations of Kant. And again, we 
have to return to our first question - a question now broadened and 
deepened - of what it is about this play, this harmony, this accord, 
this sUbsumption, that serves as finality, and how is this play brought 
about by a representation. 
But we already have half of the answer: the withinness and innerness of 
the auto-generation of pleasure in finality. In order to understand 
how this might be related to our problem, we must look to the Critique 
of Teleological Judgement. Kant is here describing his conception of 
an organism as a natural end or end-in-itself: 
"In such a product of nature every part is thought as 
having its presence there through all the others, and also 
as existing for the sake of the others and the whole; that 
is, thought as a tool [Werkzeug] or organ; which however is 
not enough each part 1S [also] an organ producing 
[hervorbringendes Organ] the others, and consequently each 
the others reciprocally" (CTJ 21-2) . 
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The telos here is internal, inherent, in itself. Furthermore, it is 
reversible: the parts constitute the whole, and the whole directs the 
parts. More, the whole is the condition for the parts not just being 
things, but being tools or organs. The concept of 'part' is no longer 
adequate. The organism, then, exists not as a conglomerate of objects 
that work together (a machine), but a set of materially constitutive 
relations .18 Kant goes on to claim that such a notion of causality 
cannot be thought by any concept of causality native to the 
understanding. But - and this is important - the distance of such a 
concept from our concept of the causal law does not make the organism 
lawless, without law. 
We are already familiar, however, with such a concept of 'causality'. 
First of all from above in talking of the pleasure organism. But 
perhaps more importantly for our purposes is the propriety of space and 
time. Space, then, functions like a natural end insofar as its open 
whole is prior to its parts. Kant makes this explicit later on in the 
Critique of Teleological Judgement: space, he writes, "has some 
resemblance [.AhnlichkeitJ" to the real and supersensible ground of the 
teleological judgement (CTJ 65). Let us examine this passage in more 
detail. 
Having already noted that such a causality lS not our category of 
causality, Kant then asks what type of understanding might indeed be 
able to form an adequate conception of a natural end or organism: it is 
the intellectus archetypus. The comparison is strategically similar to 
the issue of intellectual intuition in the first Critique. But here, 
the intuition is granted - that is, there are organisms available as 
objects of sense. The problem for Kant is no longer the finiteness of 
intuition (that intuition always intuits the particular) but in the 
finiteness of the understanding. Or rather, the type of form available 
to the discursive understanding. The intellectus archetypus would be 
capable of thinking the part entirely from the whole without moving 
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through the intermediary of a representation, thus erasing the 
contingency of the part as particular instance. Kant writes, 
"But following the very peculiarity of our understanding, 
it can not happen [for us] that the whole could contain 
[enthalte] the ground of the possibility of the nexus of 
parts - which in the discursive type of cognition would be 
a contradiction - rather and only, the representation of a 
whole could contain the ground of the possibility of the 
form of that whole and the nexus of parts that belong to 
it. But now, in that case, the whole would be an effect or 
product, whose representation would be seen as the cause of 
its possibility; but the product of a cause the determining 
ground of which is the mere representation of its effect is 
called an end" (CTJ 64). 
And thus, Kant concludes, it is because of the very lack in our 
understanding that we must necessarily think in the supplementary terms 
of teleological ends rather than, as would be more appropriate, 
intrinsic finality. Teleology is only a substitute for the 
unthinkable. 19 We will return to this passage in a moment. 
Kant continues: we know further that the whole organlsm we observe is 
only a phenomenon, for if it were a thing-in-itself then " ... the unity 
[Einheit], which constituted [ausmacht] the ground of the possibility 
of natural formations [Naturbildungen] would be simply the unity of 
space" (CTJ 65). Now this is a more complex and important issue than 
Kant makes it appear. Space is not real, Kant continues (and after 
nine years of Critical philosophy, he no longer feels he has to argue 
this point) . Although, he then says, the form of space has a certain 
resemblance to the real ground. Thus the full argument must be this: 
The organism lS either a phenomenon, or a thing-in-itself. Its 
constitutive unity appears as a unity in space. If the organism were 
a thing-in-itself, then its unity would be identical with this spacial 
unity, and space would be something real. 
therefore the organism is a phenomenon. 
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But space ~s not real, 
The importance of this passage for us ~s not the issue of 
phenomenon/thing-in-itself, but the tight link between the final unity 
of the representation and the propriety of the pure intuition of space. 
It is not enough to say the unity is given in space - what outer unity 
is not? - but there is this essential resemblance which helps foster 
the stubborn illusion that the organism is a thing in itself. Space, 
as we already know, as an intuition not a concept, exhibits appearances 
as purely relational and thus, so far as the discursive understanding 
is concerned, inherently final. A closed representation in space would 
be final with an end which is potentially distinct from the 
representation itself, though that end need not be determined and 
given; an open representation would indeed be final, but without an 
end, and such that any thought of an end as such would be self-
contradictory; we may name this pure finality. It is our finitude (we 
must think categorically) which forces us to think teleologically 
rather than in the more appropriate terms of inherent finality. But, 
and this is the important part, this more appropriate manner is most 
closely approached by the 'unity' of the intuition of space. 20 
Immediately above, we found Kant observing that, by way of a 
representation of a whole, the necessary entrance was found to the 
teleological principle. Kant wrote, rather and only, the 
representation of a whole could contain the ground of the possibility 
of the form of that whole and the nexus of parts that belong to it." 
Not the whole, but the form of the whole - in other words, the whole 
considered formally, apart from any 'matter'. That the representation 
should be the ground of the whole thing itself would mean asserting 
that noumenal reality itself and not just this synthetic reality was a 
product of the representation: i.e. intellectual intuition. The 
representation can only be a determining ground and not a cause. But 
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such a 'form of that whole' is the whole considered merely as a spacio-
temporal set of possible relations. 
If we then translate this back to the situation presented by the 
aesthetic judgement, we find something similar. Certainly, Kant 
insists that the representation is only to be considered formally _ 
here because any sensation would make the consequent feeling of delight 
dependent upon empirical interest. Kant is equally adamant with 
respect to the aesthetic judgement that it is the representation we are 
Judging both because beauty cannot be considered an objective 
property and because, similarly, the object (being conceptually 
indeterminate) is not yet constituted and pro-jected as an object - for 
it is precisely a priori concepts that project the horizon of 
objectivity in the first instance. Taking this further, then, we are 
not strictly speaking Judging a representation, nor even a mental 
state, since these concepts depend upon a complete act of synthesis. 
The concept of the representation-in-me, valuable as it is, none-the-
less has validity only for (to borrow a relevant expression of 
Fichte's) an external observer. 
It is this latter point which is perhaps most important: it was the 
notion of 'representation of' which distinguished our mode of 
understanding (intellectus ectypus) from the intellectus archetypus 
which could think the propriety of both intuition and the organism 
without need of the teleological supplement. In other words, what is 
at issue here is nothing less than the constitution of the 
representation as a representation by a synthetic act of the 
understanding, which has been our theme since chapter one. Kant is 
here indicating anew and in a new context what we have discovered over 
and over again: that this constitution is in its essence alien to the 
above mentioned propriety. We will need to return to this in detail. 
How does all this help us understand what Kant means by aesthetic 
judgement? 
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1.4.4. Reconstruction of the Aesthetic JUdgement. 
Combining, then, Kant's discussion of teleology with, first, his 
discussions of sUbjective finality, and second the propriety of space 
as form of outer intuition, we find that we can formulate the following 
preliminary conclusion: the lack of any determinate sUbsumption of the 
intuited representation under a concept is itself the condition for the 
possibility of the release of the intuition generally from the 
constraints of any concepts of space and time and associated concepts 
of causal laws, and thus a release for the inherent finality of 
spaciality (which now means: spacing) beyond either discursive or 
teleological thought. It is in this sense that we anticipated that the 
aesthetic judgement could (rather loosely but revealingly) be called an 
intuition of intuition. 
Let us take another look at the following passage from the Critique of 
Judgement: 
"The consciousness of mere formal finality in the play of 
the cognitive faculties ... is the pleasure itself, because 
it contains a determining ground of the Subject's activity 
in respect of the enlivening of its cognitive powers, and 
thus an internal causality (which is final) in respect of 
cognition generally ... This pleasure is also in no way 
practical. ,,21 
Meredith translates 'belebend' as quickening, which is a lovely, rich 
and ancient word. Sadly, I have been forced to the decision that, in 
order to retain more obviously the connection of 'belebend' with life, 
I would translate the word as 'enlivening', as I have done above. What 
this word does is to clear up the meaning of a phrase that Kant uses in 
the very opening section of the Critique. He writes that the aesthetic 
judgement differs from a cognitive judgement in that here the 
representation wholly becomes referred to the subject and indeed to the 
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subject's feeling of life [Lebensgefuh1], under the name of a feeling 
of pleasure or displeasure ... " (CAJ 42, my emphasis). But Kant is not 
simply appealing to the values attached to these words - that is, 
'life' is not merely used as a metaphor in the same way as, for 
example, 'animation' often is. 
In the Anthropology, we recall, Kant writes that the alternation of 
pleasure and pain just is life. 22 We can say that, analogously, 
aesthetic pleasure 'alternates' or 'oscillates' in the important sense 
that harmony also necessarily involves restriction: restriction of the 
imagination's potentially senseless freedom, and restriction of the 
understanding's ability to subsume. This restriction realises the 
pleasure as pleasure in the mere form of finality. Without this 
restriction, the beautiful could not be said to 'enliven': there would 
merely result the univocal and terminal pleasure of a determinate 
judgement. Finally, in the late Metaphysics of Morals, Kant says that 
anyone who did not have moral feeling would be "morally dead. ,,23 What 
we are attempting to show is that this supposed mere 'metaphor' of life 
is used very broadly and according to strict rules of analogy. In no 
other way that by investing this metaphor with philosophical content 
can we simultaneously explain all five of the following: 1) why 
pleasure is essentially the feeling of life; 2) how the feeling of life 
can be associated with a purely formal representation; 3) the manner in 
which pleasure as 'consciousness of' carries causality within itself; 
4) why an aesthetic representation is judged to be final and not merely 
lawful; 5) why is it appropriate to speak of a representation having or 
lacking a soul [Geist] which is 'animating' [belebende 1 . More 
traditional interpretations which generally place the judgement 
itself in a purely epistemological horizon - cannot explain the above. 
One epistemological stumble is the' quite concrete difficulty of 
reconciling Kant's description of the feeling of unity without concepts 
in aesthetic judgement with the apparent requirement of the categories 
for any unification in the Transcendental Deduction. How do we prevent 
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Kant from removing the cornerstone of his own philosophy? The by-now 
classical solution to this issue is indicated for English readers by 
Paul Guyer24. In the Transcendental Deduction it is necessary to take 
seriously Kant's explicit distinction between subjective and objective 
validity, and thus to distinguish between synthesis resulting in 
knowledge and synthesis (probably according to laws of association) the 
result of which we believe or which we merely feel. However, though 
Kant does talk in this way, he also speaks of any 'empirical unity of 
apperception' being necessarily derived from the 'original unity' 
always 'under given conditions in concreto' .25 Thus the possibility 
of a judgement resulting in a feeling of unity is never just a free-
floating possibility. 
Using Kant's examples, we can see this. His first example is of word-
association. Even a brief analysis of such a situation would show 
that, though the relations between the words associated are certainly 
SUbjective, the words themselves have to be treated as objects (i.e. 
not mere sound-sensations) and as distinct unities. Similarly with 
Kant's other example - 'If I support a body, I feel an impression of 
weight,26 which necessarily involves quite elaborate. objective 
concepts of body and weight and, most importantly, of 'I'. The 'I' 
appears in this experience both as an object (my body supports ... ) and 
as a consciousness (I feel ... ). Again, the relationshtp between all 
these elements has not been 'thought through', and is thus merely 
subjective, but the elements themselves cannot so be if the 
relationship lS to be able to come to consciousness. The elements 
'pre-exist' the relationship (in objective knowledge) and effect it. 
Thus for Kant, any SUbjective judgement is always grounded in a prior 
objective judgement. 
Although this opens up a possible avenue for interpreting the aesthetic 
judgement, it also forecloses on the uniqueness of such a judgement. 
The latter becomes merely an uncompleted determinate judgement. Quite 
apart from erasing any distinctive content that Kant's not ion of a 
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reflective judgement might have had, or of the 'rule' which Kant says 
judgement gives to itself, this interpretation certainly falls short of 
what is required when we corne to aesthetic ideas. The latter, Kant 
tells us, not only are not objectively judged, but cannot be. 
Let us examine this more carefully. Any subjective judgement, as one 
that 'seems' or , feels' , is necessarily based on prior 
objectifications. But In the aesthetic judgement, however many 
objectifications may have been made or be possible, the judgement 
itself proceeds independently. In the sUbjective judgement of the type 
'x seems unified with y' where x and yare separately determinate 
objects (i.e. parts preceding the whole relationship), because of this 
prior objectification the seems is always capable of becoming an 'I 
know is (or is not)'. But in the analogous instance in the third 
Critique, which is the way in which the aesthetic attributes make up 
and give forth the aesthetic idea, however determinate the former are, 
the latter can never become an element in an objective judgement. 
Further, if the beautiful representation-in-me did not have the form we 
have described, my feeling of pleasure would have to be a feeling of 
unity and not a feeling of harmonious finality as unity. That is to 
say, the understanding would have no role, and there would be no 
harmony between the faculties. The unity would just be purely within 
the manifold given by the imagination, and it is difficult to see just 
how pleasure could come from this. Indeed, because of this pure 
within-ness, the feeling of such a unity would not even be subjective -
in the sense of that which something gains by merely being in a 
subject and we have already shown this to be an inappropriate 
interpretation of Kant's notion of feeling. 
If, for example, I refrain from objective synthesis and just associate 
words together, I may indeed feel a certain pleasure from this 
diverting game, but this pleasure cannot be construed as coming from an 
unexpected accord with the understanding. And if I then stumble upon 
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an exciting conjunction of words, my pleasure now comes from abandoning 
my subjective state (where we mean by sUbjective merely non-
obj ect i ve27 ) and objectifying a certain association, e.g. as a 
metaphor. Thus, I must either be freely subjective without reference 
to cognition as such, or I must bring cognition to bear in applying a 
concept. And this is the case even if my cognition does not 'exhaust' 
the content of the association. An aesthetic idea must be more than 
this since, strictly speaking, any sUbjective conjunction of words will 
have practically inexhaustible similarity content, certainly without 
being poetry or even being a 'successful' metaphor. 
Finally, Kant describes the consciousness of beauty as containing a 
quickening internal causality and yet being indeterminate. If the 
'parts' of the representation are felt as belonging together, this 
would imply that in making up a unity, they would have to be 
determinately related to that unity as cause to effect. But Kant 
argues in the Cri tique of Teleological Judgement that the supposed 
'internal causality' cannot be categorical. 28 Further, if the unity 
were felt without any rule of unification, then we would have to say 
that the parts as appearances are in themselves causes, which is surely 
unkantian. Indeed, Kant explicitly tells us that to ask of the 
imagination that it be both free and in itself conforming to law is a 
contradiction. 29 If we insist on saying that the beautiful 
representation ~n itself and as a manifold conforms to law, then such 
a law must be a law of the understanding and thus the imagination 
cannot be essentially but only contingently free. 
corresponds to our first point above. 
This argument 
Granted, then, an intimate connection between feeling and the life of 
an organism (either sensuous or rational), which connection is r.o mere 
metaphor for Kant, it remains a question what "enlivening of its 
cognitive powers" might mean. Do our cognitive powers suddenly assume 
a life of their own? This seems absurd, and yet soon after th~ above 
quotation from the third Critique, Kant writes, "[The pl~c'l.sure 1 
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involves an inherent causality, that, namely, of preserving the state 
of the representation itself ... We dwell [wei1en] on the contemplation 
of the beautiful because this contemplation strengthens and reproduces 
itself" . 30 Is this not precisely how Kant describes life and the 
operation of pleasure and pain in the Anthropology? There is nothing 
figurative here: indeed, the remainder of the passage indicates clearly 
that this first description is the literal to which other forms of 
pleasure are only "analogous." Pleasures of sensation are mediately 
auto-causative, operating through my will; but aesthetic and moral 
pleasure are immediate, containing something like a separate primitive 
will within their very representations-in-me. The representation of 
the beautiful is within me as a pleasure organism. This is no mere 
clarifying and colourful description, as it still was for us above, but 
is the essence of the situation. 
We thus return to our 'preliminary conclusion': The representation of 
the object of contemplation stands in a relation of categorical excess 
to the faculty of the understanding and imaginative synthesis in 
general. This representation effectively de-centres the faculties of 
cognition, which we call the freeing of the representation for its pure 
formality in space. This excess sets the imagination and the 
understanding into a self-reinforcing harmonizing akin to the activity 
of life itself. This harmonising is final both for itself and with 
respect to the judgement of the representation. Moreover, this 
harmonizing consists In the schematization of the general lawfulness of 
the understanding. We asked how we are to understand the notion of 
schematization and subsumption? 
As we saw above, this lawfulness cannot be categorical; rather, it lS 
'natural' - that is to say, the lawfulness is precisely the unthinkable 
law of natural organization, for as Kant says in one of his most famous 
but bewildering passages: through Genius, ' nature gives the rule to 
art' (CAJ 168). And for this reason, the lawful representation also 1S 
final without a determinate exterior end, for it is pleasure or a state 
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that is auto-reproductive, both cause and effect, and purely formal. 
The imagination and the faculty of intuitions more generally, which 
contains an analogy of this very rule or law in the pure but closed 
forms of space and time but not as a rule or law, is subsumed under the 
understanding which contains lawfulness but not this rule or law, thus 
producing a bizarre form of cognition. But also: nature must be 
'regarded after the analogy with art' (CAJ 92). Thus this 
'subsumption', which is nothing other than the representation-in-me, is 
not only final within itself but also final with respect to the 
judgement of an object - i.e. with respect to a judgement about the 
initial aesthetic judgement's being a true aesthetic judgement, and 
thus maintaining a universal though sUbjective relation to an object. 
The odd relation Kant posits between nature and art provides an index 
to the distinction between an aesthetic judgement, and the judgement 
about that judgement. 
The object reaches an accord with this cognitive harmony because, as a 
purely formal representation in space, it too contains or rather 
precisely consists in the same inherent finality which is directly 
analogous to a natural end. This then is the answer to our over-riding 
question of what it is about a purely formal representation in space 
and time that forms a condition for the possibility of the harmonizing 
play of imagination and understanding. The form of cognition produced 
by the harmony of imagination and understanding is thus a 'thinking' 
(via or within spaciality) of the beautiful, with the feeling of 
pleasure and finality as schema. 
Granting, then, this interpretation, our difficulties are not over. We 
can introduce the next stage by asking: if it is the mere form of space 
in a representation that brings the faculties into accord, then will 
any. representation do? Are all intuitions beautiful? Clearly this is 
not the case: something must be missing from our account so far: 
namely, what is it about particular representations that make them 
suited for bringing the faculties to harmony? These questions follow 
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from the fact that Kant has interrogated merely the subjective 
conditions for the judgement of taste in the opening sections of the 
third critique. (This trend culminates in the Sublime.) Now, however, 
it is necessary to think nature and art as, as it were, beautiful 
objects. Kant raises this issue by introducing, towards the end of the 
Critique, the question of genius and the related issue of the aesthetic 
ideas. How does our interpretation of the finality of the aesthetic 
judgement bear upon these passages? 
1.4.5. The Analogy of Excesses. 
Kant's first move is a move beyond mere taste 
, 
essentially the sole defining element within 
which until then 
the realm of 
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was 
the 
beautiful. The artist, merely using taste as a dynamic feedback 
But works of fine art, as mechanism, can produce works of 'taste' . 
products of genius, must have soul, must be alive in a particular 
sense: that is, must in-corporate aesthetic ideas. Very schematically, 
Kant lays it out like this: an aesthetic idea is a representation of 
the imagination which as an excess-to-mere-thought functions as a 
'substitute' presentation for a rational idea, and which in soulful art 
is communicated from genius to observer via the work. A genius is a 
genius and his work a work of genius to the extent that the activity 
involved in the beautiful representation-in-me functions in this way. 
Let us examine Kant's theory in detail. 
Aesthetic ideas are representations of the imagination to which no 
concept can ever be adequate; they are not ideas in the rational sense 
(to which no intuition can be adequate), but rather are the mirror 
images of these rational ideas. This inadequacy of any concept is not 
simply quantitative, for that would be the sublime. We can already 
suspect that the content of any qualitative difference must be formal. 
Kant says, the aesthetic idea has bound up within it so much 
representational wealth that the mind is pleasurably carried away. 
Each of these two 'ideas' always strives to close the gap (between the 
sensible and the intellectual) and thus, as it were, meet precisely 
itself at the back of the mirror. This meeting, however, is strictly 
impossible, for the aesthetic idea is always out there, on the other 
side of the understanding - which lS as much as to say that it lS 
another flesh. It is this mirrored striving, this duplicated and 
mutual excess, that is the "most important reason" for breaking Kant's 
own rules of nomination and calling these representations 'ideas' (CAJ 
176). None the less, it is quite definitely one mirror: the aesthetic 
idea is a product of the imagination as confronted by a particular 
168 
rational idea. The two are (to use Kant's various metaphors) attached, 
linked, or companions. 
questions. 
How this is possible will be one of our major 
The aesthetic idea lS attached (at a distance) to its concept 
(eventually, a rational idea) which exceeds it (since the product of 
genius is never actually perfect, and because a concept as such is 
discursive and thus cannot be an object of intuition) and which it, in 
turn, exceeds (it induces thought which goes beyond the confines of any 
concept, no matter how 'huge'). The mechanism of attachment is the 
aesthetic attribute, a substitute image (Kant's examples are symbols), 
which serves in the place of a logical attribute. The aesthetic 
attributes then "grant [gebenJ" the aesthetic idea. The talent that 
constitutes genius, then, seems to be both the ability to generate the 
aesthetic ideas, and to hit upon the attributes which - out there in 
paint, stone or poetry - will grant the aesthetic idea back again in 
universal communication. That would be a fairly common reading, but is 
not quite what Kant says. Rather, the aesthetic attributes are part of 
the conceptual "expression by means of which the sUbjective mental 
condition induced by the ideas and as the concomitant of a concept may 
be communicated to others." (CAJ 180) 
communicated, not the idea itself. 
It is the mental state which is 
This is important as we move to 
discuss the type of being proper to an aesthetic idea. 
The aesthetic idea is clearly not just an ordinary intuition (even 
though we know that the imagination for Kant is the faculty of 
intuitions), for as such it would amount to a direct presentation of a 
rational idea, which would be quite uncritical. As we now know, any 
intuition as such can not be conceptually grasped, but in its excess 
just any intuition cannot be linked to a particular rational concept. 
On Kantian terms, the aesthetic idea is quite simply an impossible 
object. Certainly, we might call it an indirect presentation of the 
rational idea by way of attributes. 31 But this leaves open just ~hat 
kind of 'thing' the idea itself is. The notion of attribute supplies 
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the answer. Attributes 'grant' the idea, Kant says, leading the mind 
into a "field of kindred representations" (CAJ 177) This leading-
into-the-field-of is precisely the cognitive harmony. Then, as we have 
just seen, it is not the idea which is communicated by genius (as we 
might have expected) but the mental state. The idea 'is' not at all in 
itself, but only 'is' insofar as 'it' induces a mental state - but all 
we (as reflecting subjects) have access to are attributes and mental 
harmonies. We are forced to the conclusion that the aesthetic idea 
just is this "field", this "manifold of partial representations" (CAJ 
179), insofar as they are representations-in-me and also, while being 
a manifold, they none-the-less belong together without the possibility 
of synthesis. This aesthetic idea can only reside in the form of the 
relations or "affinities" between and among the attributes. This is 
not Kant's conclusion, but then he does not properly interrogate the 
aesthetic idea as to its location in the transcendental-critical 
anatomy. 
As a product of the imagination (faculty of intuitions) the aesthetic 
idea is only and purely a formal network, a regulative idea of a 
wholeness. As formal, the idea consists only in a set (in this case, 
an always incomplete and indefinite set - i.e., not a manifold in the 
way that intuition is a manifold for the understanding) of relations, 
or to use the word Kant prefers ln this section: 'Verwandtschaft', 
affinity. The aesthetic idea, considered from the point of view of the 
understanding, is not an idea strictly speaking, because it is not an 
object. A rational idea, on the contrary, is an idea - that is, can 
function in thought through its being a schema, and indeed precisely by 
always referring itself to the unthought - which is why dialectical 
inferences are a necessary though regrettable movement of thought. 
How, then, does Kant's discussion of the aesthetic idea and the state 
of mind it conjures up relate to the final harmony of the understanding 
and the imagination which we discussed above? Once again the obvious 
solution schematism is not explicitly mentioned by Kant with 
respect to aesthetic ideas. Further, the section entitled "The 
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relation of genius to taste", which we might expect to be useful, 1S 
not terribly. There we learn that, since art demands a prior concept 
of what it is to be, taste merely is required to laboriously hit upon 
the proper form of a representation of that concept. This is not fine 
art yet, however, for the concept might well be a quite ordinary one 
(as of, following Kant's example, how to appoint a table). Thus we 
learn that the aesthetic idea, which is the contribution of genius, is 
the source of true art. 
But there is a danger here, and a reveall' ng one. If the beautiful 
(work of) art depends upon the presentation of a rational idea then it 
is not a finality without an end. Kant writes elsewhere (and too 
famously) : 
" the finality in the product of the fine arts, although 
indeed intentional [absichtlich] , must not appear 
[scheinen] intentional; that is, fine art must have the 
aspect [muss anzusehen sein] of nature, though one 
remains conscious of it being art" (CAJ 167). 
This is accomplished by the perfect exactness of the representation 
with respect to the rules of representation, but without this ruled 
character being at all apparent in the product. Only in this way can 
the work please in the mere estimate of it. Now this, of course, is 
utterly bizarre as it stands - which is precisely why the passage is so 
famous. It is rabbit-out-of-a-hat, fly-by-night philosophy. What this 
description lacks is precisely the equally famous "nature gives the 
rule to art" in the paragraph immediately following. We have already 
discussed the meaning of this phrase: nature being the source of the 
(spacially inscribed) law of a natural end. Isis, Kant points out 
exp.licitly, is Mother Nature. Thus when art takes the aspect of 
nature, this is not merely a question of "being clothed with" (as 
Meredith translates it) in the sense of a disguise which leaves the 
transcendent and sovereign essence of the work as work untouched, for 
1:1 
the aspect of nature is an aspect radically distinct from work, product 
and production in the ordinary sense - that is, from finality with 
determinate end. Rather, this aspect of nature is a transforming of 
production itself. 
As an intellectus ectypus, I can only understand the peculiar final and 
formal organization of attributes of the beautiful representation-in-me 
as dictated by a pre-existing aesthetic (and correlatively, rational) 
idea which conditions it, and by a post-existing aesthetic (rational) 
idea towards which it strives. If, however, I were an intellectus 
archetypus, the attributes and the idea would be within the same space: 
the whole would be in there determining the parts, as it must be if we 
are to accept the above description of the being of the idea. Thus, it 
is only when we think of the aesthetic idea as linked to a rational 
idea as the representation of the supersensible does teleology enter 
the picture: the end is an end because it is (partly, minimally) 
discursive. Such a judgement would be alien to the aesthetic judgement 
on Kant's own terms and despite his fudge, and also alien to the 
essence of a rational idea which is clearly not just any concept or 
representation. This is not to imply that the aesthetic judgement 
proper is the work of the (merely hypothetical) intellectus archetypus 
but rather that, qua aesthetic and reflective, it formally approaches 
such by crossing out the transcendental conditions of the intellectus 
ectypus. Thus Kant gets into those famous binds discussed above, and 
seems alternately to be prescribing representational realism and 
abstract formalism. 
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1.4.6. The Intuition of Intuition. 
We are left with one problem which can be expressed as follows: glven 
that there is no ordinary sense in which an aesthetic idea (or the 
network of attributes which constitute it) is an 'expression' for the 
rational idea and that, conversely, the rational idea is not, in any 
straight forward manner a conceptualisation of the former - given all 
of this, how are the two linked such that the aesthetic judgement is 
properly singular. First of all, what does this question mean? We 
mean in what way does art, for Kant, remain representational. In the 
first instance this means: not representational 1n the sense of 'being 
a picture of' but rather in the minimal sense of singularity. I.e. 
what could prevent Kant from prescribing the destruction of all works 
of art bar one? Since all works give pleasure, having more than one is 
redundant. The pure formalism we have been describing seems inevitably 
to lead to this. Now this will prove to be a fairly simple 
misunderstanding, but a revealing one. 
The ultimate object of communication, as we have already pointed out, 
is neither the attribute nor the idea, but the mental state: the 
SUbjective, pleasurable, self-sustaining, cognitive harmony. It is not 
immediately clear to what extent this harmony is a particular: does it 
make any sense to claim that one harmony at time t1 is the same or 
different from the harmony at t2? This 1S the crunch. Remember, 
however, that this harmony is (and above all else) something felt. As 
we discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the key to Kant's theory 
of feeling is that, from an external (i. e. behaviourist) viewpoint 
those feelings are identical which have the same effect on the will; 
from another subjective viewpoint, however, they must be capable of 
distinction. This duality of truthful descriptions is made possible by 
the observation that a feeling is not an entity, but 'is' a 
representation-in-me. The feeling of pleasure is singular in precisely 
the same way that any intuition is singular, and necessarily so. 
However, have we solved our problem? What 1S to prevent this 
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singularity from being just contingent? This is just the particularity 
of a random number, or a momentary image in a kaleidoscope. Such a 
singularity says nothing about the necessity and universality of the 
aesthetic judgement. 
We should begin at the lowest level, with the attributes. Now the 
communicable concept of the attribute is always "original" - in the 
sense of new, not contained in prior rules. The originality of the 
attribute means that the work of a genius 1S not duplicable and 
'followable' in the same way as the work of a great mathematician. It 
is thus at a radical remove from the origin-al (now in the sense of 
that from which something de-pends, as a pendant) rational concept. 
This 'remove' guarantees that no conceptual analysis can lead from the 
latter to the former. This is because the object of the rational idea 
has no properties, in the sense of categorical properties - and the 
attribute has none other. However, as we have seen, in the Dialectical 
movement of the 'as if' the categories arrive as analogies of the 
uncategorical. The notion of the analogy, in the first as in the third 
Critique, bridges incompatible forms - or rather broaches, meaning 
spans but also divides. The 'originality' of the attribute simply 
means that, qua analogy, there is no possible proof of the correctness 
of the attribute. Jove's bolt of lightning seems correct as a 
representation of godhood, but that correctness ultimately depends on 
other analogies: height, light, fire, anger, phallus, power, weapon, 
etc. 
The possibility of a (apparently) complete distancing of original and 
attribute is always available, and indeed, in Kant's discussion of the 
representation of war or death, the attributes must take a "pleasant 
guise" [sich gefallig ausnehmen] (CAJ 174) We have to assume the 
possibility that the guise and its object have only a conventional 
relationship. Further, Kant claims that models of taste in poetrl" must 
be composed in a dead and learned language (CAJ 75). Bes ides the 
simple ridiculousness of the outmoded, there are perhaps t,:.'o l-easons 
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for this: in the fl'rst 1 b ' pace, ecause poetry In a modern language 
might, through evolution of the language, lose its conventional 
'object'i but even if the object is preserved (and often enough it is _ 
we understand, for example, Milton well enough), there is the danger 
that the structure of attributes and their affinity In which the 
aesthetic idea and its essential excess precisely consists will be 
gradually erodes away (we understand Milton, but he may fail to affect 
us in a properly aesthetic manner) . 
The notion of rational feeling is taken up by Kant in "Was Heisst: Sich 
in Denken zu Orientieren". It lS of course linked to awe or respect in 
the second Critique and performs a similar regulative guiding function. 
Respect is not the origin of my duty - it is the signpost of that duty. 
And in the same way, 
aesthetic judgement 
a highly particular feeling of pleasure in the 
lS not the origin of that judgement, but the 
indicator of its validity. Thus the important metaphor of orientation. 
The familiar point here lS that, as indeterminate thought (of the 
supersensible) , a rational idea is capable of virtually any predication 
- thus the dialectical inferences of the first Critique. But rational 
feeling in its various guises provides a guide, a way of orienting, 
either for metaphysics at its limits, or for practical action, or for 
the aesthetic and teleological judgements which exceed discursive 
validity. Thus we can see that as soon as Kant links the beautiful to 
the idea of the supersensible (by way of genius and the aesthetic idea) 
such that it becomes even a symbol of morality, then the pleasurable 
feeling of the aesthetic judgement must also be linked to - indeed, 
identified with - rational feeling. This feeling guides, and forms a 
nondiscursi ve (that is, not productive of knowledge) criterion of 
correctness. Thus representations, when these are purported to be 
representations of the supersensible, can never be merely conventional. 
Kant calls up a comparison between a despotic state and a hand-mill. 
He writes, " ... there is certainly no likeness between a despotic state 
and a hand-mill, whereas there surely lS between the rules of 
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reflection upon both and their causality" (CAJ 223) I th d 
. n 0 er ~or s, 
there is no visual or other sensible similarity, but a similarity In 
the application of certain concepts in the proper understanding of 
each. However, this is not what Kant means by symbol in the most 
important sense, for a 'despotic state' is an ordinary concept and not 
an idea of reason. He moves into this field in talking of our 
knowledge of God as being symbolic and, of course, beauty being the 
symbol of morality. Now the latter of these has a long heritage in the 
secondary literature, and does not directly concern us here. But the 
idea of God as supreme being is clearly a certified rational idea which 
might and often does appear In fine art. God differs from a despotic 
state in as much as there are proper modes of description for the 
latter, but only symbolic for the former. A new trinity (and indeed 
scale of being) is postulated: God the symbol (intuition), God the idea 
(thinkable) and God the unconditioned conditioning 'being' (unthinkable 
and unintuitable, except through analogies) . 
Now without further ado we can identify the symbol with the aesthetic 
attribute. What is missing in Kant's account of the symbolic lS 
precisely the manifold of symbols and the form within which they reside 
- in other words, the manner in which the symbols/attributes 'give' or 
'grant' the aesthetic idea (or rather the mental state = feeling) which 
exists in analogy with that for which the rational ideas are 
'schemata' . If I say 'God is our father', I am using a symbol (under 
Kant's definition), but I have not yet written a poem. Nonetheless, 
symbols both in and out of art works are representational. And yet, 
symbols must function together and purely formally in order to exceed 
thought as fine art does, and thus to free imagination and cognition 
from their former constraints and functions and for the presenting of 
absolute form within their enlivening harmony and its accompanying 
pleasure. 
But this latter presenting is always a presenting from a certain 
direction, from out of a particular set of attributes. There are thus 
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two 'representations' going on, which roughly parallels Kant' s own 
famous distinction between the contributions of genius and taste. In 
the first instance, there are the symbolic relationships which, by way 
of particular schematic analogies, and guided by feeling, can be said 
to be representations. Also, however, the together-in-me-ness of these 
attributes grants a relationship (which lS no longer strictly 
representational or produced) to the supersensible in its formal 
essence 
is, a 
(so far as our natures are capable of apprehending it) That 
relation to that which formally makes the supersensible 
necessarily beyond possible experience. 
But in the latter too, the relation is given in and as feeling. In 
art, for Kant, we are quite literally overwhelmed by the supersensible 
- it is within us and indeed as us. We expressed this above by saying 
that the aesthetic judgement must be seen as somehow 'approaching' the 
intellectus archetypus. For Kant, art is thus the ' intui t ion of 
intuition' where this phrase is understood as follows: 'wi thin a 
particular both a representation given as appropriate of that which 
lies beyond thought and the formal essence of the beyond thought 
itself. ' We must also say that by overwhelming us with the 
supersensible, art brings us to (something approaching) our noumenal 
selves - which necessarily also means our noumenal not-selves: the 
whole formal field of supersensible - in the manner of feeling. Thus, 
art is an essential component in a major critical project: revealing 
ourselves from within ourselves for what we are. Art brings us face to 
face with a constituting world which otherwise could only be 
encountered through the directives of pure reason. This will prove of 
the greatest importance in understanding Heidegger. 
With this chapter, our work on Kant alone is finished. We have traced 
the problems and implications of the theory of forms of intuition 
through much of the critical proj ect. Our goal, however, has not 
merely been to offer an interpretation of certain problems in Kant. 
Rather, we have constantly been concerned to show how that se::: of 
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concepts first encountered in the Transcendental Aesthetic, and which 
we have named 'spacing', is required to understand apparently distinct 
sections of Kant's work. In exploring Kant's work, we have also been 
exploring 'spacing'. We will now show how a similar odd cross-
pollination occurs in Heidegger's work. However, we might expect that 
Heidegger will offer some greater degree of illumination as to what 
this 'spacing' means, due to his greater concentration upon the 
language he uses. 
expectation. 
We will be only half disappointed in this 
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1. cognit~on, ~e say, is the aim of the understanding. Only when the 
understandlng dlscovers Nature behaving according to the expectations 
of reason (i. e. beha~ing teleologically) do we then feel pleasure. 
However, Kant ,then w~ltes that even the most everyday experience would 
not ~e posslble wl~hout the contributfon of such teleological 
expe~l~nce~. Thus, l,t becomes perfectly possible to say that every 
cognltlon lS accompanled by some form of possible pleasure insofar as 
every cognition is necessarily also a judgement about the finality of 
nature. 
2. Kant. Critique of JUdgement. Trans. Meredith. p44-5. Feeling is 
'subjective sensation - but for Kant, even 'objective sensation' is 
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6. Kant, I. Akademie Edition, IV 153f. 
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transcendental explanation comes to an end" (Science of Knowledge, 2nd 
Introduction, p61). 
8. Cf. Sullivan 1989. p.338n2,3. 
9. p.11n. (Translation modified) 
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the feeling of reverence together. 
11. For example, Critique of Judgement, p. 30. 
12. Such as ibid. p.32, 59-60. Cf. Aquila. 
13. Note just how easy it 
problem, and thus rewrite 
McCloskey 1987, p 26f.' 
is for commentators to elide this whole 
it in entirely empirical terms: e.g. 
14. Space and time, as forms of receptivity, are simply the way 
sensible representations are in-me. The in-itself prior to feeling 
would be a representation-not-in-me, which involves precisely the same 
contradictions as the non-spatial, non-temporal noumenon. And yet, we 
can generally abstract from our feelings about, say, some attractive 
hue, and judge the hue simply as a sensation. Feeling d.oes not 
completely 'rewrite' the representation. Further, space and time h~ve 
a certain priority, since feeling as linked to form must be a spaClO-
temporal-representation-in-me. Also, properly speaking, the 
'representation' is not a representation until formed by space and 
time. 
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Donald Crawford gets himself into (Cohen and Guyer, 172). Kant does 
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?eter~lnate Judgements (f?r If that were possible, we could always do 
It, wlth any representatlon), but that we are not able to so judge 
without foreclosing on precisely what is most valuable in the 
representation. This has to be kept in mind. 
16. See also CAJ 216. 
17. It is the playing of the cognitive powers which acts like a 
concept for the aesthetic jUdgement. This will become important later. 
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20. We here speak primarily of space and not of time because in the 
realm of nondiscursive 'thought', space has the priority. For Kant, 
the elimination or exceeding of discursive causality is also the 
reduction of temporal orientation and order to a general spacing. (cf. 
67-8, where time is reduced to simply the field of composition; also 
p107-8, where the reduction of time is explicitly discussed with 
respect to measurement and the sublime.) On the other hand, the 
feeling of pleasure certainly arrives back at itself via inner sense, 
which is time. 
21. CAJ p64. Translation modified. 
22. Kant, I. Akademie Edition. IV 154f. 
23. Kant, I. Akademie Edition III 241. 
24. Guyer, P. Kant and the Claims of Taste. pp. 96-99. 
25. CPR B140. 
26. CPR B142. 
27. certainly this ambiguity in the meaning 
to difficulties in understanding Kant's 
feeling. The two meanings mentioned above 
not do so. Probably Kant confused the two, 
28. CTJ, sec. 65. 
29. CAJ sec. 22 (General Remark). 
3 0 . CAJ P . 64. 
of 'subjective' helps 
theory of sensation 
do overlap, but they 
at least at times. 
lead 
and 
need 
31. Kant says that attributes must playa role in all arts 0bf speech 
and formative arts. And music is brought into the fold only y means 
of an essential kinship with language (cf. CAJ 194). 
Part Two. 
Being, Form and Spacing in Heidegger 
2.1. o. 
2.1. 
Methodological and Phenomenal Wholeness 
in Descartes and Heidegger. 
Introduction. 
Having just spent so long working out the issue of spacial wholeness in 
Kant, and the implicat ions for Kantian epistemology, ontology and 
transcendental method, any move forward a century and a half to 
Heidegger will be something of a shock. In order to minimise this 
shock, we will not be beginning (as we did with Kant) with an account 
of the phenomenology of everyday space. Rather, we will move directly 
into the problem of wholeness, especially as it relates to the familiar 
Kantian problem of the unity of experience. Further, we will be 
comparing Heidegger with Descartes rather than with Kant in order again 
to maximize clarity. This approach will show to greatest effect the 
parallel between Kant and Heidegger on those concepts we have called 
'spacing' . 
Only in the next chapter will we return to the phenomenon of space as 
Heidegger understands it. It will then become clear how, just as in 
Kant, issues of wholeness begin with the analysis of space, and are 
never able to leave space completely behind. 
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2.1.1. Methods and Lists. 
constitutive for all the familiar themes of Being and Time - such as 
Angst, Death, Authenticity and Ecstatic Temporality is a 
methodological point which while not easily overlooked is certainly 
easy to underestimate or misunderstand. This point concerns the demand 
for and possibility of getting to grips phenomenologically with the 
rsJ\ 
whole phenomena'. Heidegger is constantly emphasising the importance of 
this: we must not, he says, merely list and describe individually the 
characteristics of Dasein' s Being, but come to see Dasein in its 
wholeness. We cannot accomplish this seeing through lists, because 
listing predicates is an essentially inappropriate logical form for an 
entity like Dasein. Any such list, however exhaustive and rich with 
discriminating detail, would always miss Dasein itself. Heidegger 
writes, 
... It 1S beyond question that the totality of the 
structural whole [of Dasein] is not to be reached by 
building it up out of elements [Zusammenbauen der 
Elemente] . For this we would need an architect's plan. 
The Being of Dasein, upon which the structural whole as 
such is ontologically supported, becomes accessible 
[zuganglich wird] to us when we look all the way through 
[vollen Durchblick durch] this whole to a single 
primordially unitary phenomenon which is already in this 
whole in such a way that it provides the ontological 
foundation for each structural item in its structural 
poss ibil i ty. (BT 181) 
There is an interpretative problem here. The final 'so dass 
es ... fundiert' phrase is obviously a consequent, but what is the 
antecedent? Macquarrie and Robinson interpret it 1n the above as '[the 
phenomenon] is already 1n this whole in such a way that ... '. More 
interesting might be: 'we look all the way through this whole ... in 
183 
such a way that ... '. The implication being a very tight relation 
indeed between the ontology of the object of the look [Dasein] and the 
appropriate phenomenology of the look. In any case, it must be 
recognised that initially Heidegger's is merely a methodological point. 
That is, the phenomenologist must find a type of description that will 
be appropriate to the entity confronted. Since Dasein is not a mere 
entity present at hand, or even ready to hand, any type of description 
(in this case, a compilation of predicates, and predicated relations 
between predicates) appropriate to the latter two will not be for 
Dasein. 
But this methodological point quickly crosses over into something 
other. Dasein is that entity for whom Being - and in particular its 
Being - is an issue. Thus Dasein (and not just the phenomenological 
investigator) is already oriented towards or away from an appropriate 
grasp of itself; i.e. a grasp of itself as a whole entity. This 
orientation is essential, and the ways in which it might be appropriate 
or inappropriate are given from out of the analysis of primordial 
temporality. Also given are the ways in which Dasein, as Being-in-the-
World, is as a propensity for having an inappropriate grasp of itself. 
That is, Dasein necessarily tends to understand itself through (or, as 
Heidegger says, 'alongside') its world. One can say that it lS proper 
for Dasein to be inappropriate. 1 At issue now in general lS not an 
exterior 'imaging' (phenomenological/ontological grasp), but a self-
'imaging' , such that indeed the concept 'image' (implying 
I . f I) representatlon 0 ... lS no longer appropriate. 
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2.1.2. Cogito and Finitude in Descartes. 
We can better understand what Heidegger is driving at by taking the 
problem historically. For Heidegger is not the first philosopher to 
form links between method and implication. 
Take Descartes, for instance. The Meditations were written with a 
covering letter to the faculty of theology at Paris. Here Descartes 
writes, 'Whatever certainty and evidence I find in my reasons, I cannot 
persuade myself that all the world is capable of understanding them.' 
(156)2 The radical method of doubt is not for everyone, then. But a 
few pages later, Descartes is asking the learned scholars to look over 
his manuscript and suggest amendments and reformulations. In this way, 
he hopes they gain not merely the rhetorical clout and advertising copy 
of approval by the Paris school, but also a clarity and alr of 
exactitude. Such a clarity, Descartes says, will bring it about that 
'all the errors and false opinions which have ever existed regarding 
these two questions [of God and of the soul] will soon be effaced from 
the minds of men.' (158). 
Descartes, of course, is here very cleverly buttering up not only his 
own work but especially those he hopes will receive it. There is also 
an explicit understanding of the power of philosophical fashion, and an 
express desire on Descartes' part to jump on the gravy train as soon as 
possible. Even the most cursory examination of the passage will reveal 
that, for a rationalist, Descartes' reveals a very strange idea of the 
relat ionship between prest ige and truth. Though all this is very 
interesting, my point lies elsewhere: Descartes is announcing that, 
although this will be difficult, his work must be targeted for mass 
consumption ('mass' by 17th century standards, at any rate). 
truth will continue to be in a bad way. How do we explain this? 
At times, Descartes feels that this method - the method of radical 
doubt and of clear and distinct ideas - can be exchanged for any 
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content. If a natural scientist encounters a problem thinking about 
matter, then all he has to do is apply that method radically enough, 
and he must eventually arrive at true premises and eventually true 
conclusions. Descartes himself spent years doing just this. Thus, 
Descartes says, the Meditations are just another application and test 
of the method (156). And yet nothing could be further from the truth. 
For the method can only justify itself by way of Descartes' theological 
and metaphysical conclusions, which are precisely to be found in the 
Medi ta tions. The' I think' has no consequences, except insofar as 
Descartes can prove that God exists and is no deceiver. Only then can 
Descartes move on to problems in physics, biology, etc. 
In other words, Descartes' method can be called a 'tool', but only if 
we recognise that for a certain ideal (the economic community of one) 
the issue is not merely do we know how to use the tool, but rather that 
no one can be said to use a tool properly unless they can build it.] 
God is not a deceiver, and thus human beings are, in their essence, in 
the truth, surrounded by it, saturated with it. Only internal 
prejudice - which for Descartes is never merely internal but rather is 
always communal - leads us away from truth. But anyone who does not 
pursue the truth - which means to pursue it in such a manner that 
simultaneously proves its possibility - is scoffing at this divine 
privilege. Even the philosopher whose theories are in agreement with 
things, whose conclusions are 'correct', is astray if there has been no 
reflection upon what makes that agreement possible. (cf. Second 
Replies, p. 238-9) Descartes' sometimes amusing arrogance has this 
root: he is not only philosopher and scientist, but also priest and 
prophet. 
There is thus no way that Descartes' method is purely formal: it 
inevitably leads to its own conclusions. Not surprisingly, his method 
is also a metaphysics. Further, both method and object are posited as 
Whole. Descartes, in his 'Preface to the Reader' rai Is in advance 
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against 'those who, without caring to comprehend the order and 
connections of my reasonings, form their criticisms on detached 
portions arbitrarily selected ... ' (160) This kind of advice is common 
amongst philosophers. It gives the texts the air of craftsmanship, or 
even of art, and usefully discourages not only premature criticism but 
any criticism at all. In Descartes, however, it must be said that 
there is additional justification for such advice. Namely, his method 
is both linear and self-grounding, and can plausibly enough be placed 
in a narrative form. Because of the way that method elaborates both 
itself and its object, it is indeed (or should be) impossible to 
thoroughly disengage anyone section of Descartes' text. 
For exactly the same reasons, Descartes' method posits the absolute 
,oJ. b' 11 '1 h unlty lts 0 Ject. A phl osop y and science is one, and has a certain 
order and orientation. In the Principles Descartes calls this 'the 
true philosophy' (302 or 305). He writes famously, 'Thus philosophy as 
a whole is like a tree whose roots are metaphysics, whose trunk is 
physics, and whose branches, which issue from this trunk, are all the 
other sciences' (305).4 
What is important to realize is that it is not the case that there are, 
for example, some finite number x of basic and closed axioms from which 
all knowledge is derived, and thus all knowledge can be said to be one 
knowledge. Descartes is not systematic in the way later rationalists 
are. Nor is it the case that all knowledge is a whole simply because 
it is all knowledge - i.e. in the same way the universe forms a whole 
simply because there is not anything else. For though in fact there 
may not be any other true propositions other than those contained in 
Descartes' 'true philosophy', nonetheless this completeness does not 
entail the root, trunk and branch metaphor. Nor finally, is knowledge 
one just because obj ect of knowledge has the predicate of being 
possibly doubted. For it is logically necessary that I at least doubt 
that I have knowledge of that of which I cannot have knowledge. 
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Rather, Descartes' method determines its obj ect as a whole. The 
important point is not that everything can be doubted, but that there 
is a position from which everything can be doubted. If I doubt 
everything that is not both clear and distinct, I am left with two 
propositions that I cannot doubt. First, that I am doubting. And 
secondly, that everything which is clear and distinct can be called 
true. But this latter proposition 1.S equivalent to: I exist in 
possible truth by virtue of a perfect and infinite creator. Why are 
these equivalent? 
The mUltiplicity of modes of the 
understand, etc.) and indeed of 
existentially by the I am. The I 
I think 
the 'I' 
think, 
(I feel, I doubt, I 
itself, are united 
in its generality, is 
equivalent to the I am, because I am a thinking thing. I. e. the 
essence of spiritual matter is to think. Thus 'I am capable of true 
thinking' is equivalent to 'I exist in possible truth'. And the two 
are equivalent in such a way that the 'I' in each is not a mode of some 
prior and more general I-substance, but are themselves one and the 
same. But 'possible' here clearly implies a defect for Descartes; thus 
to claim 'I doubt' is to claim 'I exist finitely'. In other words, 
this position from which everything can be doubted is not merely an 'I 
am' but an 'I am not in-finite.' Such a position ultimately has its 
possibility in a beneficent God. I exist in the possibility of truth 
by virtue of a transcendent, infinite and perfect being. 
A Heideggerian would recognise that this 'existing in' 1.S where 
Descartes first and primarily treats the soul as a thing, though 
certainly incorporeal. I exist in possible truth, not as possible 
truth. God alone exists as truth, not just because God is infinite but 
because God 1.S infinite and perfect. Knowledge becomes one, 
accordingly, by virtue of this perfection. Thus Descartes' method 
leads to the unity of its object: i.e. to true philosophy. But it does 
not constitute that object, rather it makes itself ready for an already 
given encounter with the object, but now as precisely that object which 
it is. 
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That is, an encounter with the one, true philosophy as both one 
and true. 
Thus Descartes' borrowing of the distinction between objective and 
formal reality. Thought, as a mode of a thinking thing, has no formal 
reality other than the self-identical formal reality of the thinking 
substance itself. Considered, however, as a representation, the 
thought does have objective reality. The ontological force of this 
distinction is to assert that clarity and distinctness, illuminated by 
systematic doubt (Cartesian method), is precisely what we mean by the 
adequation between idea and object (the whole of which is 'true 
phi losophy. ' ) For to define adequation in any other way would be to 
assert that corporeal objects are formal, material and efficient causes 
of ideas, which would force the reality of the cogito to be dependent 
upon the reality of the world. 
It no longer makes sense to say that, for Descartes, God and man have 
the same type of intelligence. The narrative and linear pattern of 
Descartes' philosophising (considered as a limit to that 
philosophising) is essential to it, since that philosophy is a 
construction of a unitary complex out of the simple. It would make no 
sense to attribute such an understanding to God. God presumably has no 
need to quest after grails, to construct things or thoughts, or to 
stri ve to think them adequately. At least one function of Kant's 
distinction between our understanding and the 'intuitive understanding' 
was simply to draw attention to the fact (as he makes clear in the 
third Critique) that our understanding functions by way of images and 
representations further, we have already explored in detail the 
relationship between 'intuitive' and 'non-representational'. As we can 
now see, this notion of image-thinking was explicit in Descartes' 
metaphysics but more importantly already implicit in Descartes' method: 
the giver of truth and the apprehender of truth are not the same. 
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2.1.3. Existing as Possible Truth. 
In Heidegger, however, we cannot only say that method points to and 
prepares us for a certain unity of its object. We cannot even merely 
say that method inevitably leads to the positing of such unity. It 
would be a distortion, which Heidegger himself sometimes falls into, if 
we suggested in this manner that Heidegger' s phenomenology and its 
method was in some ordinary sense a description of its phenomena. Even 
in the first division of Being and Time, the discussion of language 
would prohibit such an interpretation. Language is the explicit 
articulation of a projective understanding - and such an understanding 
cannot be reduced to a set of representational concepts in some 
subject's mind - or, for that matter, a reality-starved mode of a 
thinking substance. 
Rather, and in an important sense, method constitutes the unity of its 
object. Of course, this does not mean the absurd proposition that 
Heidegger's method creates Dasein. What has to be recognised is that 
Dasein is properly as its ownmost self - only insofar as it is 
capable of grasping itself as a whole. The paradoxes apparent ly 
involved in the previous sentence all stem from our continuing tendency 
to think of Dasein as a thing. It then becomes nonsensical for a thing 
to bring itself about by first apprehending itself. 
But if we avoid thinking Dasein as a thing, if we think Dasein 
existentially, then Heidegger's statement that 'Dasein is an entity for 
which, in its Being, that Being is an issue' (H191) becomes more clear. 
'To be an issue' translates 'urn gehen', a common expression which might 
be more idiomatically translated as 'to be about' or even more so, 'to 
be at stake'. It is the phrase, , an issue' that I object to, as if 
ontologically there were others. A German might say 'Es geht urn Leben 
und Tod' which is only inadequately translated as 'It makes life and 
death an issue'. Dasein's being is always the issue for it, even when 
Dasein has no issues in the ontic sense. Dasein is about its Being. 
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But this does not imply that, in each case, Dasein's Being about itself 
is factically identical. On the contrary, Dasein can be about itself 
1n many ways. Heidegger's insists, however, that phenomenologically 
there is an appropriate way to grasp the Being of Dasein. And thus in 
parallel there should be an appropriate way to have that Being as the 
issue of one's Being. This appropriate way he terms 'authenticity' 
which, temporally articulated, is anticipatory resoluteness. 
It is now clear that Heidegger's method is not something like a tool 
for getting the Being of things into one's grasp. The method is a part 
of that grasp. For, caught up in the Hermeneutic circle, only the 
grasp makes possible the adjustment of method to that grasp. In other 
words, we have to have an access to Being - and in particular an access 
to our own Being - before any question of an appropriate or authentic 
access to that Being can arise. The phenomenological method is a 
part of what Heidegger calls pre-ontological constitutive 
understanding. Dasein must get the whole of its Being into its grasp 
in precisely the same way as phenomenologists must get the whole of the 
Being of their object into their grasp. We are all phenomenologists, 
for better or worse. 5 
In Descartes, we saw method having necessary metaphysical consequences 
which eventually circle back and ground the method. Here in Heidegger, 
it is not the case that method is one thing, its consequences another, 
and its self-grounding a third, however logically inter-implicative 
these things are. Rather, method is the central characteristic of 
Dasein's authentic self-understanding. 
I would go so far as to suggest that this difference 1S the most 
radical point to which we can take Heidegger's distancing from 
Cartesian philosophy. As we saw above, in Descartes it is possible 
methodologically to step outside of our world and in such a manner 
grasp that world as a contingent mode of our essentially defining 
relation with God. Any reference to the wholeness of our world, our 
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experience or of our self has to be negotiated through a reference to 
God, as the not only infinite but perfect being. Without question, 
this theme is to be found throughout the rationalist and empiricist 
traditions and including most especially Kant. 
But in Heidegger, this reference relation is collapsed. Dasein exists 
as a whole by virtue of itself. There remain, of course, essential 
traces of the reference relation, such as when temporality is said to 
be 'ek-static', standing outside of itself, or that Dasein is said to 
be already ahead or beyond itself. Such phrases embody the continuing 
but unHeideggerian suggestion that Dasein is first a (spacial, 
temporal, substantive or semantic) point and only afterwards outside of 
itself. For example, see Heidegger's self-chiding regarding 'already 
out there' in Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, p. 167. 6 Heidegger's 
phrases are deliberately paradoxical in an attempt by Heidegger to 
wrench us out of entitative thinking. Further, the phenomenon of the 
everyday suggests that it is always possible for a Cartesian ontology 
to reassimilate and reinflate this collapse. But, phenomenologically, 
Dasein must look through itself for a wholeness that is already in 
itself. Above all, then, Dasein does not represent its wholeness 
across a space of difference from itself - and this is 1n the first 
instance because its wholeness is not discursive, that is, does not 
exclude difference in accordance with a classical/logical understanding 
of identity. Ontologically, Dasein is identical with itself by virtue 
of the way its self-divergences are its own. 
It becomes clear now why certain ways of talking about authenticity and 
falling are mistakes. For example, talking in terms of ethics or 
theology. To consider Dasein's authenticity as a choice, or even an 
indefinite series of repeated choices, is to misconstrue the spacial 
and temporal aspects of Dasein's Being-a-whole. In this interpretation 
of Heidegger, the concept of choice functions precisely like the 
concept of doubt in Descartes. Doubting means finding a position for 
doubt. In choice I I either have no reference to wholeness I or I 
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negotiate through a representation of my whole Being, with respect to 
something not constitutive of my Being. Authenticity, even though 
saddled with such misleading phrases as 'Augen-blick' translated 
'moment of vision', cannot be thought in terms of choice. Authenticity 
is precisely not the ability to disengage oneself from one's world, and 
to start having objective and dispassionate representations of that 
world. 
whole. 7 
Rather, it is the potentiality for Being-in-the-world as a 
Obviously, what interests me are the spacial metaphors. From the 
analogy of the architect's plan or of 'looking through' ln the 
quotation I read at the beginning, to Descartes' famous tree of 
philosophy, to the very notions of ahead of itself, or standing outside 
of itself. All of these are not merely prominent, but seem essential. 
Of course, one could just ask: what other metaphors could there be? As 
if such metaphors would only be interesting if we had a choice between, 
say, spacial and colour metaphors, and for some reason always 
(empirically) chose the former. Instead, it might just be possible to 
ask 'why are there no other metaphors?' or 'why does the very notion of 
"privileging space" involve a redundancy?'. 
If our interpretation of Kant ln previous chapters has been correct, 
then we have part of an answer. We have termed 'spacing' that which is 
ontologically most general and significant in the phenomenon of space 
(and thus, according to Kant, in time as well). Spacing, throughout 
Kant, is the intuitive (therefore nondiscursive) condition for the 
possibility of fully functional discursive concepts, and thus of 
experience. We have analyzed the necessity of spacing in Kant's 
account of the principles of causation and reciprocity and, through an 
analysis of open and closed models, in the schematism more generally. 
It is clear that all of these deductions depend upon the transcendental 
deduction and its problem of the possibility of the experience of self-
identity (the I) and self-positioning (subject-object) - but here too 
we have shown a necessary relation to spacing in the problem of the 
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'form of consciousness'. And we briefly carried the problem of spacing 
to the Ideal, showing how spacing was the model with which Kant 
constructs our concept of the (disjunctive) divine. 
Finally, we have shown how spacing, as the intuitive analogy of life, 
becomes definitive in Kant's account of the aesthetic. The aesthetic 
representation is the intuition of intuition that is, the 
presentation in a phenomena both open and particular of the very 
character of openness itself, or the supersensible. At first, 
chapter on the Third Critique looked like a test case for 
our 
our 
interpretation of Kant. Indeed, Kant would say that, as families of 
phenomena, aesthetic and teleological judgements are of secondary 
importance to the onward march of science and philosophy. However, he 
would also admit that the problem of judgement itself - for which the 
aesthetic and the teleological are central - is the essential 'bridge' 
between theoretical and practical philosophy, i.e. between our 
supersensible and our transcendental-cognitive selves. In other words, 
the third Critique is a radicalisation of the much earlier problem of 
self-coherence. Thus, our demonstration of spacing at work within the 
problem of judgement, in addition to being a test-case, completed our 
analysis of the relation between spacing and whole-experience. 
As should be clear just from the above few pages, we intend to show an 
overlap between Kant and Heidegger on precisely these ideas. It will 
seem odd that we should do so without concentrating on Heidegger' s 
extensive writings on Kant. However, Heidegger had other concerns in 
those texts, among which was not space and spacing. He evidently felt 
that the Transcendental Aesthetic, and all it entailed - historically 
locked as it was in a long and pedantic tradition - was irredeemable 
for the ongoing project of fundamental ontology. As far as it goes, we 
also hold this opinion, and this was one reason that we refused to read 
Kant as Heidegger might. Rather, we tried to read Kant with an eye to 
his very own problem of the spacing of intuition, allowing this 
question to accrue to its own perspective an interpretation of 
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transcendental philosophy. As if by accident, but almost certainly not 
so, this interpretation has also prepared us for a thoughtful encounter 
with Heidegger. 
With Kant, we began with the particular phenomenon of space as 
ordinarily understood, and showed how the essential content of that 
phenomenon could be generalised ontologically. This generalisation 
involved an elaborate description of wholeness which agrees at every 
point with Heidegger's methodological/ontological analysis - certainly 
with respect to the relationships of this wholeness to theoretical 
knowledge, to the concepts of representation and subjectivity, and to 
the operation of synthesis. In its turn, and for both thinkers, such 
wholeness demanded the presence of pre- or non- discursive intuition-
schemata or models (in Kant) or understanding of Being (Heidegger) if 
the 'categories' are to achieve experience, and thus be recognised as 
categories (for Heidegger, that is, if entities are to uncover 
themselves as already bearing significance). Again, as in Kant (where, 
in the Transcendental Deduction, the unity of apperception must be 
posited as the first and highest wholeness to which finite ontological 
knowledge can be taken back) , the problem of wholeness is 
particularised into the problem of grasping the wholeness of our own 
Being. 
What 1S fascinating, as we have already identified, is the consistency 
with which this problem of wholeness is imaged in spacial terms by 
Heidegger. Indeed, as we shall see below, the language of space is the 
only language which seems to be left over after the (always incomplete) 
destruction of the history of ontology. Is this an oversight, the mark 
of an impurity in the revolution in ontology? Or is there rather an 
essential connection between Being and spacing? 
This seems absurd: for Heidegger, the horizon for the understanding of 
Being 1S time. But we intend to show how, in Being and Time and other 
texts of that period, what is essential in the characterisation or time 
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as ontological meaning per se is nothing other than a radicalisation of 
Heidegger's (apparently earlier) analysis of the phenomenology of space 
- and the language of that analysis is still present. Which is not to 
say that we are elevating space above time, or some such nonsense. On 
the contrary, we are simply attempting to understand the relation 
between time and Being as thoroughly as possible. And this involves a 
recognition of the centrality of spacing - which itself has a relation 
to 'familiar space' only but not contingently via a family of 
metaphors. Because of the persistence of this family of metaphors, it 
seems fruitful to arrive at the problem of time and spacing by way of 
the problem of familiar space. Thus our sojourn with Kant, who first 
though probably unwillingly suggested the possibility of such an 
arrival at fundamental ontology from out of the ontic problems of 
space. 
This arrival will now be repeated in Heidegger's work (chapter 2.2). 
Further, just as in Kant we took spacing into a kind of test case with 
an analysis of aesthetics, so we will for Heidegger (chapter 2.3). For 
Kant, the problem posed and solved in aesthetics is of a kind of 
wholeness there, wholeness between the cognitive and the 
supersensible, if only by way of feeling. Similarly in Heidegger: the 
wholeness of Dasein and its history, the wholeness of a community, the 
wholeness of art, artist and origin, the wholeness of language with 
respect to Being. The linkage between all these apparently diverse 
problems is spacing, which describes the possibility of identification 
and origin and which, particularly in art, reveals itself as this 
possibility in this possibility. 
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Notes 
1. These themes are preserved in Heidegger's lectures from the late 
20's. See particularly the discussion of world and totality in 
Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, pp. 170ff. 
2. Descartes, Rene. from The Essential Descartes. 
3. Descartes' himself smugly asserts that there is no reason why he 
(even at the age of 50) could not himself fill out all the details of 
the sciences , given appropriate research funding (307). This jack 
wanted to become a king - and a mere practical matter stood in his way 
to the throne. 
4. Arguably, both Hume and Kant held similar notions. One difference 
1S that their methods (especially in Kant) are not so linear as 
Descartes'. No doubt this is one reason why Husserl found Descartes so 
attractive once his phenomenology had clarified its mission. 
5. Or 'All existing is already a philosophizing' (Metaphysical 
Foundations of Logic, p. 212). 
6. Heidegger, Martin. Metaphysical Foundations of Logic. 
7. At great risk of obscurity, I would say that Augen-blick is not a 
grasp of things in a moment of time but more like a grasp of time in a 
moment of things, where 'moment' in the latter is understood as a 
metaphor borrowed from physics. Heidegger himself uses the concept of 
'momentum' in an analogous context in Metaphysical Foundations of 
Logic, p.207. 
2.2.0. 
2.2 
Spacing in Being and Time 
, 'Nowhere', however, does not signify nothing; 
rather, it is where any region lies, 
and there too lies any disclosedness of the world 
for essentially spacial Being-in' 
(Heidegger, Being and Time, H186, tr. mod.) 
Introduction. 
Dasein's 'dependence' [Abhangigkeit] on space a 
'dependence' which manifests itself in the well-known 
phenomenon that both Dasein's interpretation of itself and 
the whole stock of significations which belong to language 
in general are dominated through and through [(ist) 
weitgehend ... durchherrscht] by 'spacial representations' . 
from those spacial relationships which making-present 
lS constantly meeting in the ready-to-hand as having 
presence, it takes its clues for Articulating that which 
has been understood and can be interpreted in the 
understanding in general. (BT H369) 
The prevalence of space is no problem for Heidegger, inasmuch as it is 
merely a determined consequence of falling everydayness. For that 
which provides clues for the articulating of the understood is a 
spaciality removed from its primordial temporality - space, that is, In 
its opposition to that time which we intend when, in our everydayness, 
we say 'space and time'. Our problematic, then, does not 'take hold' 
for Heidegger as a mystery; it is a derived phenomenon.' Given 
Heidegger's description of the understanding, and Dasein's Being-in-
the-world as a Being-alongside the ready-to-hand within involvement -
given, that is, concern in general 
Articulation will follow. 
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the observed properties of 
On the other hand, Being and Time itself 1S saturated with spacial 
language. Consider that set of carefully placed prepositions - in, an, 
auf, bei, vor, zu, gegen, and so on - or fundamental notions like 
'entwerfen', 'Horizant', 'Gegend', and of course 'Dasein' itself. More 
obviously, 'ent-fernen' and 'Ausrichtung'. Even in the passage quoted 
above Heidegger already seems to require several spacial 'metaphors' to 
express his point. The phenomenon is well known. Making it more well 
known is pointless unless that burden finally breaks some stubborn 
camel's back. 
It is easy to see, moreover, that even Heidegger' s treatment of 
primordial temporality is infested by and indeed depends upon spacial 
language: time 'stretches', is 'spanned' and 'ec-static' or standing-
outside-of-itself, and so on. We might add Heidegger's bizarre diagram 
in Metaphysical Foundations of Logic. In itself all this demands no 
particular alarm. Even should we insist on purity, we could readily 
adrni t a certain inadequacy in Heidegger' s language which 1S to be 
corrected by increased vigilance. A transcendental proof would be 
required to show that any description of temporality could not remove 
itself entirely from spacial language. But whatever it might mean, and 
whether it can be said to be necessary or not, spacial language does 
exhibit a certain prominence, even where we least expect it. Further, 
Heidegger's explanation above is not helpful enough. It assumes that 
Dasein's everyday understanding of itself through its world is of no 
consequence. In fact, it clearly proves more difficult for Heidegger 
to wrestle himself out of spacial language than out of, for example, 
the language of transcendental consciousness - which is the fight he 
has most stomach for in Being and Time. This is because in 
authentici ty, when Dasein grasps itself ontologically as a whole, 
Dasein does not cease to have space. Space is not just a 
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misinterpretation or an ideal hypostatization, ~n the way 
transcendental consciousness is for Heidegger. 
Space lS not merely that within which we movei while the understanding 
is not simply the non-spacial juggling of concepts and representations. 
Instead, the two merge in the space of concern. Dasein has space a 
priori, but not in the same way that a stone does - not, that is, as an 
object present-at-hand in an abstract space of coordinates. For 
Heidegger, Dasein has space - or more correctly, spacing - because, 
with greater primordiality, Dasein's Being is care. Dasein understands 
also ~n the manner of care. And understanding, as a grasping of 
involvement and a projecting of Dasein onto its possibilities, is an 
operation in spacing. Dasein's understanding is [as] Dasein's space. 
We will examine these two issues in more detail as Heidegger presents 
them. We will find that they only offer us a beginning, and that we 
must dig at Heidegger's text to its very end - through the issues of 
death, Nothing, and temporality - in order to uncover their roots. 
Spacing, it will be discovered, is an issue throughout Being and Time, 
and the space of concern as such lS only its most everyday 
manifestation. However, we will eventually find a certain failure on 
Heidegger's part to bear witness to the radicality of his own text's 
treatment of spacing - a shortcoming particularly obvious in passages 
like the one quoted above. How much this failure is due to the 
incompletion of Being and Time remains unclear. 
The goal of the following chapter lS to first explicate the 
phenomenology of space proper in Being and Time, and second to apply 
this to non-spacial objects of description which none-the-Iess are put 
in spacial language. At no point are we merely aping Heidegger: not 
only is the phenomenology of space underdeveloped in many details, but 
Heidegger says nothing interesting at all about our second goal. 
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2.2.1. Being in a Fisheye Lens: Dasein's Spaciality 
Immediately in paragraph 22, the space of the 
distinguished from the space of the present-at-hand. 
ready-to-hand is 
The proximity or 
closeness of the ready-to-hand, we read, is not merely such that we 
encounter the entity first in the order of our experiences, but that it 
is ' in der Nahe' (BT HI02). This common expression is adequately 
translated by 'close by', but surely Heidegger keeps the literal force 
of the spacial preposition (perhaps paradoxically, Heidegger is among 
the most ' literal' of philosophers). The entity is ' in nearness', 
then. Heidegger writes, 'Every entity that is 'to hand' has a 
different closeness, which is not to be ascertained by measuring 
distances' (BT HI02). What is the Being of this closeness? 
Nearness, within which ready-to-hand entities are, is regulated by 
circumspective concern. Similarly, entities are set up in their 
directionality, which again is not merely their 'Stelle' (position) but 
their 'Platz' (place), in the sense of the English expreSSlon 
'everything has its place'. Equipment belongs-to a place because it 
belongs-to a context of involvement - that is, an equipmental totality. 
But more generally, such a totality has a place which makes that 
totality possible as such. 
(region) (BT HI03). In the 
nearness and directionality. 
This place Heidegger calls a 'Gegend' 
German, this expression captures both 
A region is that area wherein an involvement is dist inct ly given. 
Although it may well be, a region is not necessarily an area in space 
like a kitchen or a yard - with the cheese grater or the hedge-clippers 
each in their place. Nevertheless, the region signifies the level at 
which concern, at its most 'abstract', coincides with space. 
constant entities ready-to-hand grant (have already granted) 
The most 
reglons, 
and places for equipment are oriented there-abouts. Let us consider 
Heidegger's example. The sun's pattern of (apparent) motion grants 
definite regions of utility within which more-or-less speciali::ed 
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equipmental-totalities are located: the arrangement of windows and 
rooms in a house, the layout of streets and gardens, the symbolic 
location of church axes and grave-yards. Regions, as ready-to-hand, 
and the specific ready-to-hand entities whose places - as members of a 
totality of involvement - belong within them, are given beforehand to 
Being-in-the-world. Being-in-the-world (care) makes possible Dasein's 
specific spaciality. But it is important to recognise that the 
essential structures of this Being-in are always spacial. 
In this description of what we will here call 'neighbourhood-space', 
which as yet is only preliminary, Heidegger asserts that any equipment 
context is not In a priori space (3-dimensional, coordinated space), 
but generates space a priori. Here Heidegger says only that this 'bare 
space' is, as yet, 'veiled over' (BT H104). Later, he writes of the 
thematization of space, in which the world is de-involved, and this 
naked space revealed. Let us call this other space 'mathematical 
space' . This kind of wording, 'veiled' and 'revealed', allows one to 
think that mathematical space lies 'behind' Dasein' s space as its 
transcendental condition. But, Heidegger insists, such a space is 
always a subsequent move, and space is in any case only possible within 
a world. 
Now, a thesis of this type goes against common sense in a violent 
fashion. And yet, it is inescapable at least to the limited extent 
that one's existence precedes in chronological time one's ability to 
measure abstractly. Any measurement of a thing, Heidegger points out, 
is a measurement using tools and procedures ready to hand. The coming 
to measure must also involve measurement and thus an infinite series -
which is counter-factual - or else we must assume that at a certain 
inevitable point Dasein just 'knows what it is doing.' Such an ad hoc 
'rule' is an understanding not of a given material or sub-process in 
abstract isolation, but of its always particular involvement-character 
in a broader system; that is, of a material or sub-process's projection 
in and through an equipmental totality. A good engineer, we might say, 
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does not necessarily have a greater knowledge of engineering science _ 
its models, procedures, tools and materials than some less able 
colleague; rather, in a way that is not strictly a form of 
propositional (Kant said 'discursive') knowledge, he can successfully 
apply that knowledge. This skill of application may be arrived at 
through, although still not capable of formulation in terms of, 
experience with certain materials and tasks, or perhaps through 
something like 'natural talent', or both. In any case, it involves a 
notion of understanding-how-to-work-with that is much closer to the 
kitchen's cheese grater than, say, the totality of a nuclear power 
plant. Formally speaking, the power plant is just a huge number of 
cheese graters to which clearly two types of approach are possible: an 
approach by way of the individual cheese graters or by way of the huge 
number considered as organised number. This is too simple of course: 
the cheese grater lS what it is because of the cheese, quiche, oven, 
people to feed, etc. (i.e. the kitchen environment). Thus the nuclear 
power plant must be 'there' in the 'cheese graters' which make it up, 
but not there in the same way as in the consideration by number. 
How does Dasein move and function in neighbourhood-space? 
The two principle characteristics of Dasein' s spaciality are de-
severance (Ent-fernung) and directionality (Ausrichtung) . In 
encountering entities, Dasein brings them close, it de-severs their 
remoteness. Dasein brings things to hand, considers them, prepares 
them, discovers them in proximity to things it holds most dear. De-
severance is not a measurement of some displacement or interval; 
rather, Dasein estimates the de-severed in ways that are ready-to-hand 
for it: 'a ways off', 'a good distance', 'just around the corner', 'as 
far as I can spit'. In language borrowed from a slightly later 
Heidegger, we might say such expressions are strict but not exact. 
They are, Heidegger says here, 'thoroughly intelligible' (BT HIOS). 
De-severance, then, is the discovery of the spaciality as the readiness 
of the ready-to-hand. It brings close ent it ies out of a radical 
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distance which is simply non-concern, d' t b' th an l rlngs em to that 
neighbourhood where concern has met them. Heidegger's example has 
become famous: a path along which one walks is de-severed the moment it 
is encountered by concern as 'that along which I must walk in order to 
And our 'subjective' evaluations of whether the path's end is 
'distant' or not are proclaimed by Heidegger as the discovery of the 
'true' or 'most real' world (BT HI06). Again, this can be understood 
as an inversion but remaining-within of common sense: this most real 
world is that world we occupy most of the time and in the most 
immediate manner. As a first approximation, this is at least helpful. 
The apparent 'subjectivity' of the issue, however, can be mUltiplied by 
a different example. Consider a deep cut which Dasein discovers on the 
back of its own hand. Such a cut might, if only for a moment, but 
perhaps at odd intervals for days, leap out for Dasein, de-severantly 
taking over its neighbourhood-space completely. Certain entities might 
drop from space altogether, crowded out of Dasein's zoomed focus: the 
room one is in, the people one is with. Clearly, concern distorts 
Dasein's 'space' around it, like a fish-eye lens. Consider my glasses: 
they are closest to me in mathematical space, but in the space of 
concern they are nowhere, out of sight - unless of course they draw 
attention to themselves by being dusty, bent, broken, uncomfortable, 
lost, or a philosophical example. Familiarity, for Heidegger, is a 
kind of being far away, being out of mind and going on without one. 
Thus, bringing-close as de-severance does not alter the location of an 
object (how could it?); rather, an object is brought into the range of 
a concern. This - the coincidence of the near and the far - lS a 
paradox only in mathematical space. Here there is a suggestion, and 
certainly for the Heidegger of a few years later, that memory and 
imagination are also explicitly forms of de-severance. We say that a 
vivid memory or a powerful image 'strikes me', 'comes to me', 'could be 
happening here now' - or alternatively, that a memory 'seems distant'. 
Two points need to be made. First, that de-severance carries hints of 
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a peculiar temporalitYi and second, that these cognitive phenomeo.en< ,A._ 
indicate that the understanding is never far away. 
But at this point we need to ask: why speak of this 'space' as space at 
all? Why not speak rather of the intentional objects of a roaming and 
guided consciousness? For then we could talk of Dasein as a being 
which simply ignores or recognizes, at different times and with 
differing evaluations, certain features of an environment which is 
tidily laid out in mathematical space. Is not the mere fact that we 
might describe such a cut as 'being oppressive to us', 'never far from 
us', 'pushing other concerns out of sight' - in spacial vocabulary -
leading us to speak of our concern as some kind of 'space'? 
Such a problem at first seems purely nominal. Heidegger's point is 
something like this: mathematical space, while the immediate basis for 
science - including the physiology and biology of the human organism -
is simply not something with which Dasein normally concerns itself. 
More importantly, it leads to an ontologically inappropriate grasp of 
Being-in-the-world wherein Dasein is nothing but the 'thing' which lS 
its body (and perhaps soul). Further, even should Dasein, in a 
calculative or scientific mood, explore space mathematically, it always 
does so out of what we have called neighbourhood-space. Now, one can 
always give a mathematical account of 'familiarity', as if for example 
the human hand were the robot arm of the production line, but as we saw 
above, Dasein will not recognize such a description as its own. 
Dasein's space has a world. What is most interesting is not the 
relation between these two possible spaces, but their lack of relation, 
or rather, the radicality of their opposition, which can itself be made 
to do much philosophical work. The fact also remains that we do use 
spacial language. Why? What is the significance of this? It may 
never be possible to fully answer these questions, but they are genuine 
questions none-the-Iess. 
205 
Yet we have still not an w d th b sere e query a out the space-ness of 
primordial space. Certainly, we cannot answer this question by simply 
referring the latter back to everyday space nor by singing 
'Everything you can do I can do ontologically' as if the two were one, 
differently described. Rather, neighbourhood-space - with which we 
mean to designate the spaciality (or better, spacing) involved in such 
concepts as de-severance - is 'space' just because spacial metaphors 
uniquely work and fit. Yet we can hardly call such language 
'metaphorical' in the absence of anything like the literal being even 
ideally possible - nor can we call such language 'literal' and hope for 
other possible metaphors. This is a unique situation. Even the 
paradox of the near and far is anything but a consequence of a loose 
metaphorical language, for it goes to the heart of the matter very 
economically. 
Another property of neighbourhood-space is directionality, which will 
help clarify the paradox described above. Directionality draws 
attention to the fact that the entities around Dasein are not just an 
assortment, but belong at a place in a region. De-severance brings-
close out of a region, which is unified in terms of a certain task or 
involvement. The region, we said above, is where concern meets 
abstract space, and bursts it. For the region to be a region - to 
house an equipmental totality - every entity's place within it must be 
to-hand, even though those entities may vary widely in their measured 
distance. Every place in a region, that is, must be close enough to 
disappear in the distance. We have above used the phrase 'radical 
distance'; we must clarify this. The paradox of near and far is 
signalled in Heidegger~s very word (and the translators are careful to 
duplicate this): Ent-fernung. Normally, ent- is a privative prefix, 
but in this particular word, it also intensifies (as does the 'de-'). 
Thus de-severance is the bringing-close that makes far - indeed, which 
in familiarity radically removes from apparent neighbourhood-space 
altogether. 
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There are three distinct reasons for this. First, very simply, de-
severed objects are already directional - that is, they are already 
familiar to us. Bringing them close does not make them more familiar, 
rather, it makes them (as distinct objects) disappear into the task. 
Second, Heidegger 1S pointing to the non-coincidence of conscious 
attention and de-severance. Which is ultimately why neighbourhood 
space is indeed space. For only if it were some discrete and isolated 
activity of the subject which distorted space could that 'activity' be 
reappropriated as a mode of the mathematical description of space. 
Conscious attention would be just a way of viewing the activity of an 
ultimately mechanical entity. Heidegger, however, insists that Dasein 
is essentially de-severant, not just now and again. Thus, it is at 
least possible to give neighbourhood space the ontological and 
epistemological priority. 
Thirdly, de-severance is possible only because Dasein exists as in a 
structured world, and the world is not a thing which could ever be 
close. Dasein never encounters an isolated entity and then brings it 
into its (conscious) world; rather, through directed de-severance will 
inhabit a region, alongside the entity, and take up a task with it. If 
the entity is indeed isolated in some determinate way, this is 
discovered privatively. Ultimately, then, de-severance preserves 
distance in that it obdurately (though rarely explicitly) reveals 
world, and not merely an object present-at-hand. By making possible 
nearness, world implicates distance and no-thingness, and constantly. 
It is an essential part of this task (or tool, region, proposition, 
activity, etc.) that there are other tasks, actual and possible, 
present, past and future. This is another way of saying that any 
encounter of an entity takes place from out of a task-horizon which 
ultimately refers to a for-the-sake-of-which (Worumwillen) which exists 
as a potentiality-for-Being. The essential involvement of the thing 
carries it and Dasein with it into a necessary outside. To de-sever, 
then, is to bring close and also make far a most illuminating 
paradox, and one which could not be expressed without spacial language. 
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Heidegger later revises his vocabulary to emphasise transcendence, the 
stepping over or beyond of beings towards Being and world. Whatever 
one may make of Heidegger's later texts, it must be admitted both that 
the spacial language perseveres and that the central set of operative 
analogies do so also. 
Heidegger further explores directionality with the concept of slgns 
(Zeichen). To concern are given signs which function as equipment in 
the giving of directions. Since a region depends upon its direction, 
on its 'whither', signs 'keep explicitly open' regions (BT HI08). 
Unsigned, a region would close, would drop entirely out of concern, and 
would be inaccessible. But what is a sign? A sign, as Heidegger 
earlier defined it, is 'an item of equipment which explicitly raises a 
totality of equipment into our circumspection so that together with it 
the worldly character of the ready-to-hand announces itself' (BT H80). 
Formally, the sign belongs to reference. A piece of equipment, so long 
as it belongs to an equipmental totality, refers in its 'in order to 
... ' towards the heart of that totality's structure. The sign, then, 
is simply the explicit setting forth of equipmental structure and 
region. The sign does not represent the totality or region, but is a 
part of that totality as that which makes it accessible in a certain 
way. Before the sign, the equipment is ambiguous; it is as-yet-
unallocated. But it is still ready-to-hand in as much as we can only 
ever come across it while engaged in some other task within another, 
along-side or over-lapping region. Many things serve as signs, and 
they need not have been intended as signs. 
The slgn, by explicitly revealing totality, grants the next 
neighbourhood-space in its structure and as such. It is not that space 
balloons open around the sign relation; Dasein is always already de-
severant, directional, and in-the-world. Though Heidegger does not 
mention this, we must recognise that the sign-structure lS the 
condition for the possibility of Dasein modifying its space and its 
concern, of Dasein's mobility. Since, however, Dasein's taking over of 
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possibilities, regional and otherwise, is Dasein itself in its 
existence, signs also, and in an important sense, grant Dasein as such. 
But how can this be, if signs are - as we have described them here, at 
least - a peculiarly human vocation? If, ontically, the phenomenon 
commonly called 'creativity' is a feature of human behaviour, this is 
grounded ontologically in the ability of Dasein to sign to itself. For 
Heidegger, this means that Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, exists as 
always already having an understanding of that world. It is thus no 
accident that the concept of understanding is first introduced in the 
numbered paragraph immediately following that concerning signs. We can 
now ask the question which is absolutely fundamental to our entire on-
going project: what is the relationship between spacing and the 
understanding? 
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2.2.2. Dasein's Understanding 
As we saw above, the discovery of the ready-to-hand in the world is a 
discovery of its referring to a totality. An entity referred exists in 
the way of involvement. Involvements drive their way through a total 
task, in the manner of the 'towards-which': that hammer is for 
hammering, the hammering drives the nail, the nail makes fast, the 
making fast provides shelter, shelter for Dasein (Heidegger's example) . 
Invol vements circle back towards the ' for-the-sake-of -which' which 
always bears upon a possibility of being of a being of Dasein's nature 
(BT H84) . 
Discovering something as ready-to-hand, then, is a 'letting something 
be involved'. Heidegger writes, 'to the extent that any entity shows 
itself to concern - that is, to the extent that it is discovered in its 
being - it is already something ready-to-hand environmentally ... ' (BT 
H85) . But its involvement as ready-to-hand is only possible on the 
basis of a prior discovery of the 'that-for-which' (Woraufhin), a 
totality of involvements. And this is to already signal world; the 
ready-to-hand can not be otherwise than ready-to-hand within-the-world. 
Heidegger then writes, 'the previous disclosure of that for which what 
we encounter within-the-world is subsequently freed, amounts to nothing 
else than understanding the world - that world towards which Dasein as 
an entity always comports itself' (BT H86). But what does Heidegger 
mean by world, exactly? It is precisely here, in first discussing 
understanding, 
worldhood. 
that Heidegger tackles the specific problem of 
Dasein, J..n understanding a relational context - or, we might say, 
grasping a region as region - assigns to itself an 'in-order-to' J..n 
accordance with its own potentiality-for-Being. That is to say, Dasein 
participates 'possibly' in the involved machinery of a totality, and 
this identically with encountering the ready-to-hand as such. 
Heidegger says, 
Now, 
'the 'wherein' (Worin) of an act of understanding which 
assigns or refers itself (sichverweisenden) - as the 'on 
and for which' (Woraufhin) of the letting-entities-be-
encountered in the kind of Being that belongs to 
involvements - is the phenomenon of the world. And the 
structure of that, on and for which Dasein assigns itself, 
is that which makes up the worldhood of the world' (BT H86, 
translation modified) . 
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Note that we have allowed the translation of Woraufhin to change, even 
from the previous page of Heidegger's text. This is because the 'that 
for which' has exhausted itself, as it were, in the question of 
previous disclosure, and thus disclosed itself as also an 'on the basis 
of which'. Now, the various relationships of assigning Heidegger calls 
signifying. Thus 'Dasein signifies itself', inasmuch as 'primordially, 
it gives itself its Being and potentiality-for-being to understand in 
regard to its Being-in-the-world' (BT H87) . 
Already, the understanding's relationship to the spaciality of the 
world is clear. By belonging to a region, an equipmental totality 
structures the - space opened up previously by concern. Concern is 
Dasein's, and Dasein always 'occupies' a specific environmental region. 
The understanding assigns, as a possibility, Dasein within the region, 
disclosing significance. The understanding, then, is precisely the 
bringing of Dasein to and indeed as its possible neighbourhood-spaces. 
Of course, not all things understood will be spacial things: we can 
understand words and thoughts, for example. If by space we mean left 
& right, up & down, meters & circumferences then such things are non-
spacial. Heidegger's explicit derivation of everyday space is from out 
of the same ontological structures of space as are used to describe the 
understanding. We called these structures spacial because such 
structures are not only constitutive for our ordinary understanding of 
space but because, conversely, 'metaphors' apparently borrowed from 
that ordinary understanding seem to be essential and are certainly 
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everywhere present. The understanding occupies space - or much better: 
the understanding ~s spacing. Let us put this differently: the 
understanding is Dasein's Being-about-itself as Being-spacing _ for 
spacing is the possibility of structure and, perhaps more importantly, 
is the possibility of possibility. 
The understanding, not surprisingly, provides the occasion for 
discussing possibility. In German, 'verstehen' sometimes coincides 1n 
meaning with 'vors tehen', to manage or pres ide. To be capable of 
something, though, is not merely one property of Dasein among others; 
rather, Dasein is its being-capable. Nor is possibility to be 
associated merely with some abstract 'free will', since Dasein always 
already occupies definite possibilities. Dasein is 'thrown 
possibility'; it has been 'delivered over to itself' but always as 
Being-in-the-world (BT H144). 
possible. 
Understanding is the Being of Being-
But why should the understanding operate with the possible? Because, 
Heidegger answers, its structure is that of projection (Entwurf). 
Proj ection signals the always already of Dasein' s essent ial Being-
possible. Dasein is thus more than its factual at-handness; it is its 
not-yet (and its has-been). Further, projection allows us to see that, 
for Heidegger, the understanding has nothing thematic or theoretical 
about it. To understand a situation thematically fails to maintain the 
possibility as possibility, and rather reduces it to 'given and thought 
contents [gegebenen, gemeinten Bestand]' (BT H145). Cooks do not 
function like cookery books, nor snooker professionals like applied 
geometry textbooks. Heidegger here puns on 'Gemein' (common; also 
pejorative) to indicate that such a represented possibility is no 
longer one's own, and thus not a possibility. 
Explicit understanding understanding that is developed (sich 
auszubilden) is interpretation. Wi th respect to circumspect i ve 
(everyday) understanding, interpretation (Auslegung) 1S a taking apart 
and laying out (auseinanderlegen). Laying out here means to disclose 
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the 'towards-which' : the entity is something as something. 
Interpretation is the explicitness of thl's 'as'. But as we have seen, 
discovery is always a disclosure. Thus interpretation has its object 
before-hand; it lS grounded in certain Befores. The Befores 
essentially enumerate the various manners in which Dasein's 
interpretation is never a pure approach. Fore-having (Vorhabe) 
indicates our prior Being-in-the-world, where understanding is 'still 
veiled' (BT H150), but within which an entity is 'taken'. Fore-sight 
(Vorsicht) - in accordance with the connection we have just developed 
between interpretation, sight and Articulation - is said to 'commence 
'-
cutting' (anschneidet, translation modified) at what is held in fore-
having. And finally, although a certain conceptualization seems merely 
the result of definite interpretation, the interpretation will have 
already decided on a conceptual 'approach' or 'grasp', that is, a fore-
conception. 
In what way, Heidegger asks, are we to relate the 'as' to the befores? 
When something in the world is discovered or understood, it has 
meaning. But strictly speaking, Heidegger says, we discover the entity 
or Being itself, and never meaning. Rather, he writes, 'meaning, 
structured through fore-having, fore-sight and fore-conception, is the 
'upon-which' (Woraufhin) of a projection out of which something becomes 
intelligible as something' (BT H151, translation modified). Meaning, 
then, grounds the projection of the as; this is to say, understanding 
something as in its totality of involvements requires the befores, but 
the befores have a prior totality: meaning. Meaning belongs to Dasein; 
only Dasein can be meaningful, that is, can understand, and this 'only 
so far as the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world, through the entities 
discoverable in it, is 'fillable' ['erfullbar']' (BT H152, translation 
modified). Meaning lS the fillableness of world-space. Space returns 
explicitly though in inverted commas - at the very heart of the 
discussion of understanding and intelligibility. But space is already 
there, without the inverted commas. In the above, we have deliberately 
skipped over the repeated spacialisation of the understanding. 
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First of all, Heidegger's use of the verb 'vorstehen' to illuminate 
'verstehen' is surely ironic. Although it is essential that 
understanding be co-ordinated with 'capable of', 'vorstehen' also means 
to stand out or protrude. But Dasein is its capabilities, it does not 
stand before them as a subj ect to its obj ects. The understanding 
always locates itself - is located - within a space that is prior to 
any constitution of subject-object space; the constitution of such a 
space occurs via thematised representation, which however robs the 
possibility of its character of possibility, making it 'common'. 
Neighbourhood space - as a space organized by involvement, disclosed in 
significance, and modified through reference is that wherein the 
spiel-raum of possibility is itself possible - that is, neighbourhood-
space is the condition for the possibility of possibility. The 
standing before of 'vorstehen' is meant to imply projection. Only now 
can we fully understand Heidegger's phrase that the understanding is 
the being of being-possible. Dasein, as essentially projective, is as 
its spacing-understanding. 
With this word 'ver-stehen' Heidegger thus draws our attention to a 
fundamental divergence of his thinking from metaphysical tradition: 
Dasein's understanding is so far from a thinking substance that, on the 
contrary, it is 'in there' with entities, alongside them, amidst them, 
projecting upon them. At issue is not the 'where' of understanding but 
the 'wherein'. Dasein for example has a brain, but the brain does not 
exhaust Dasein's content; nor, with equal vehemence, does the body. 
Mind-body identity theorists and, somewhat earlier, the behaviourist 
school, and earlier still empirical materialists, rational dualists, 
and even Locke, the odd man out, all found themselves making a variety 
of claims about human identity the consequences of which bulldozed 
riotously through common sense. The Aristotelian tradition, of which 
Heidegger in this instance is something of an honourary member, has 
fewer difficulties here at least: soul as form, as the actuality of a 
potential 'raw material', is thus extended in space and, more 
importantly, is life itself operating only ever with material in space 
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and time. Dasein is not within the world like an entity ready-to-hand 
or present-at-hand (the brain, the body, etc.) i Dasein's difference is 
to be more radically in its world than any entity. We might even say 
that Dasein's understanding is coincident with the specific worldliness 
of entities occupying places within a region. This is what is meant by 
Dasein being 'meaningful'. Spacing, then, is first accomplished by the 
abolition of a certain spacing (between mind and matter, for example) . 
As Heidegger goes on to define the word in the couple of years 
immediately following the pUblication of Being and Time, 
'transcendence' does not indicate Dasein's difference from the world. 
Rather, Dasein transcends in stepping across isolated things and into 
world - Dasein transcends a certain naive 'transcendence'. 
Similarly, sight, as Heidegger treats it, is never a looking out into 
or upon the world; instead, it is the look around from within: an um-
sicht. He writes, "intuition' and 'thinking' are both derivatives of 
understanding, and already rather remote ones' (BT H147). What 
adjective is translated here as 'remote'? 'Entfernt' of course. Here 
again the spacial question (of in the world opposed to above or before 
it) explicitly crosses tracks with that of conceptual difference 
(remote derivative). In the understanding of the environment, the 
former spacing develops into the latter; in the articulation of 
abstract understanding, the latter reveals itself as always already 
unfolded within the former; the two are more than isomorphs. Thus 
philosophy's historical 'getting lost' consists precisely in taking 
'lostness' (separation under the guises of transcendental subjectivity 
and Platonic ontology - which is not necessarily to say Plato) as the 
first truth of philosophy. 
Again, it is no accident that Heidegger uses the latinate verb 
'articulieren', and then describes fore-sight with 'anschneiden'. Both 
of these clearly express the spacial concept of a division, separation, 
making-space. Both these words, and hundreds like them, philosophy has 
always taken for metaphors, placed in inverted commas, and eventually 
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shoved aside in the resumed pursuit of the whole body prior to the 
anatomist's disclosure. Such terms pollute the vocabulary of academia 
and common language alike in a manner offensive to many tastes. But in 
Heidegger, these are no longer metaphors. Space - if by space we mean 
spacing, that is, a wider phenomenon which comes to language 
appropriately only in (ordinary) space - no longer serves as a model 
for the interpretation of the understanding, but rather is the 
understanding. 
It has thus become clear the manner in which understanding is to be 
removed from its dominant philosophical interpretation, as a juggling 
with conceptual representations. For Heidegger, the understanding is 
out there, in the world, projecting Dasein upon its worldly 
possibilities. But now we are already beyond Heidegger's own 
explanation of the 'wide-spread' use of spacial language. For 
Heidegger in the passage quoted at the beginning of this chapter, the 
spaciality which lay behind this language was the spaciality of the 
ready-to-hand, which is borrowed into the language of the 
understanding. What Heidegger failed to see was the close relationship 
which he himself set up between Dasein' s spaciality and Dasein' s 
understanding. No borrowing goes on because none is necessary: the 
understanding is already there. 
Heidegger's appropriation of the traditional and philosophically 
burdened term 'verstehen', then, is not simply bizarre, but rather is 
designed to point out certain fundamental features of Dasein's Being-
in-the-world: key among which 1S the fact that the hermeneutic circle, 
which has always been simply a philosophical problem, is first and 
foremost the condition within which we always reside, even within our 
most immediate contacts with the world. Thus for Heidegger there are 
two 'thinkings', two 'Denken's. One, scandalized in Being and Time; 
the other, valorized in the later writings as poetry's compan1on. ~';hat 
is the difference between the two but the concept of spacing '-'v'i th which 
they articulate themselves? 
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We noted that meaning, for Heidegger, is the formal 'fillableness' of 
world. That is, Dasein resides in meaning to the extent that the world 
is such that it can contain entities. This is somewhat artificial: the 
world is nothing without entities; without entities there would be no 
world. And yet, Dasein's world has formal structures. In what, then, 
does the can-be-filled of world rest? Not presumably in neighbourhood-
space, for though we describe world with space, we recognise that space 
is essentially worldly. Nor in the understanding, for the 
understanding is always an understanding of world. We can only answer 
that the can-be-filled depends upon existential properties of Dasein. 
Entities exists as part of a world only because of Dasein's-being-in-
the-world. But Dasein always already understands and occupies space. 
Heidegger insists that there is no space prior to entities which occupy 
it. This is no 'nature abhors a vacuum' thesis, but the description of 
neighbourhood-space as we have here presented it. Yet prior to this 
space, the world has the can-be-filled. However, the can-be-filled 
carries a spacial language that cannot be overlooked. It is now clear 
that neighbourhood-space is not the most primordial level to which we 
can take our ontological inquiry, but is rather a concrete image of 
something 'deeper'. (And yet, on every subsequent level, spacing 
reappears.) A question can now be roughly formulated. What, then, is 
the spaciality of meaning which precedes and makes possible 
neighbourhood-space? Meaning is the Woraufhin, the 'upon-which' of a 
projection. In other words, then, upon what 'existential property"' 
does Dasein grant the neighbourhood-space indicative of care and all 
its constitutive elements? We all know Heidegger's answer: 
temporality. 
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2.2.3. Temporality and Spacing. 
Neighbourhood-space is not pure space, whatever that is. In notions 
like possibility, involvement and projection it shows itself as also 
temporal. But this is as yet to speak very trivially, as if space and 
time were something added together to make space-time. Rather, 
spaciality is first constituted by worldhood, which is structured as 
the wherein of equipmental involvements. That is, space is opened by 
that which also reveals temporality. Heidegger, in the second division 
of Being and Time will propose that the meaning of neighbourhood-space, 
in all its complexity, is time. 
Ideally, we would like to here repeat our exposition of neighbourhood-
space in the horizon of time, for this is what Heidegger does with the 
whole of the analytic of Dasein. Such a task would be difficult and, 
moreover, redundant. Instead, let us give an exceedingly sketchy 
treatment of the background to the particular problem of temporality 
which we will be treating. Some of this material we have already 
treated in chapter 2.1 above. 
What are the basic phenomena which Heidegger uses to disclose time? 
Although Dasein never stops projecting itself on its possibilities, for 
some will always be outstanding, yet possibilities, in future time, 
become actualities one and all - either actually something or nothing -
except for the possibility of death. Dasein cannot be dead in the 
same way that Dasein can be sick with a cold, be exiting the motorway, 
or be chef at an Italian restaurant. Heidegger expresses this 
difference with a vocabulary distinction: Dasein expects possibilities, 
but anticipates death. Death is Dasein's finitude. In the 
anticipation of death, Dasein is as a potentiality-for-Being-a-whole. 
This Being-a-whole, as we discussed in chapter 2.1 above, is just the 
ontological appropriateness of Dasein self-understanding. 
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Conversely, however, Dasein's temporality has a 'past' and a concrete 
'present'. F H 'd D' , or el egger, aseln eXlsts as guilty. 'Guilty' signifies 
a lack, 
Dasein's 
or with more ontological appropriateness, 
fundamental 'not'? Although Dasein does 
a 'not' . What is 
not, of its own 
accord, bring about its thrownness, nonetheless it exists as that 
thrownness, and thus is as the basis for it. This means that Dasein 
never has - does not possess - power over its ownmost Being 'from the 
ground up' (BT H284) This 'never' is a lack or nUllity. Further, 
Dasein's possibilities are always more or less definite, Dasein 'is 
constantly not other possibilities ... not only is the projection, as 
one that has been thrown, determined by the nullity of Being-a-basis; 
as projection it is itself essentially null' (BT H 285). This nullity 
or guilt is the condition for the possibility of any factical guilt. 
As Heidegger sees it, interpreted correctly, conscience calls us to 
face this nullity and not just to accept it but to take it over as our 
ownmost selves. The call calls Dasein to its Being-factical. 
Understanding the call means projecting oneself upon Being-guilty, that 
is, wanting to have a conscience, and thus being ready for anxiety. 
This constitutes an important reversal on the Christian metaphysical 
tradition which in this takes its soul from Plato: I am not finite 
because I am guilty, but am guilty because I am finite. This 
disclosure of Dasein Heidegger calls resoluteness. 
These two temporal aspects merge: authentic Dasein lS anticipatory 
resoluteness. Dasein is as its possibilities; resoluteness is the 
possibility of Being-guilty which means authentic Being-factical; 
Being-guilty, however, must involve projecting oneself upon this 
possibility until the end, that is, unto death. Being-guilty thus 
demands Being-towards-death, or anticipation. Anticipatory 
resoluteness means the potentiality for Being a whole factically. 
Looked at in this way, it is inevitable that Heidegger should give the 
future precedence - Heidegger would say resoluteness brings itself to 
anticipation as it brings itself to its ownmost authenticity. For 
since the beginning of Being and Time Dasein was distinguished as that 
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entity wherein the whole preceded the parts. Dasein is not whole by 
way of a summation of its facticity, but by virtue of the anticipation 
of death. Indeed, only because of this, facticity itself conceived 
ontologically can not just be the facts about Dasein as 'thing' 
(factuality) . 
What is the relation of anticipatory resoluteness to Being-in-the-world 
as care? 
Earlier, Heidegger had summed up Dasein' s formal structure in the 
concept of care: 'ahead-of-itself Being-already-in (a world) as 
Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world)' (cf. BT H3l7). 
This summation, then, becomes the obvious place to begin a linking of 
the themes from the first division (space, understanding, state of 
mind) with those of the second (resoluteness and anticipation). Thus, 
in paragraph 65, 'Temporality as the Ontological Meaning of Care', what 
is essentially the last stage of Being and Time (in its incompleteness) 
gets underway. Meaning, as we have explored earlier, is the upon-which 
or on-the-basis-of for a projective understanding. Thus the meaning of 
care is that which makes care possible in the projection of its Being 
which discloses it as it is. This upon-which is temporality. 
When we noted above that Dasein is as its possibilities, this Heidegger 
will now rewrite as the understanding of those possibilities being 
essentially 'futural'. By futural, Heidegger means existing in that 
mode of time wherein Dasein's self is allowed to corne towards itself, 
in the sense of Dasein being its future possibilities itself. 
Similarly, Being-guilty 'signifies being Dasein authentically as it 
already was' (BT H325). But futurality is the key-stone: it is only by 
being futural that Dasein can authentically have been; that is, 
resoluteness must anticipate. Now, time has a third mode, which again 
is dependant upon futurali ty, and Dasein a corresponding manner of 
being: making-present (gegenwartigen). It is in making-present that 
Dasein brings itself into the Situation, to which we shall return. The 
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three aspects of care given above - 'ahead-of-itself', 'Being-already-
in' and 'Being-alongside' are thus exh1.'b1.'ted as fundamentally 
temporal - though, of course, we are not to identify these elements as 
future, past and momentary present, for that would be to think Dasein's 
Being as present-at-hand in time. 
How do these relate to the key phenomenon of the understanding? Sadly, 
Heidegger's discussion of the temporality of the understanding is 
something of an anti-climax. Even more so the brief· section on the 
temporality of space. They tell us little that was not already 
relatively clear from the first division discussions, and from the 
first chapter or two of the second division. Still, there are some 
important clues here. We are in chapter four, paragraph 68. 
What retains us here is the shift of emphasis on projection. Formerly, 
we could be content to understand projection in essentially spacial 
terms: occupying a region such that its whole 'towards-which', as a 
possibility, is constitutive for the occupying. Of course, it would be 
a reduction akin to classical structuralism to treat a region as 
atemporal. Arising out of the essential futurality of understanding is 
the authentic mode of making-present: the Augenblick or 'moment of 
vision' which surveys the Situation. What 1.S vital here, in a 
discussion which could easily lead directly to mysticism, is the 
ecstatic character of the Augenblick. This term, of course, would 
normally mean 'moment' in the sense of 'blink of an eye' or 'glance' -
however, Heidegger insists, it is paradigmatic of the nature of sight 
to act at a distance. The Augenblick 'takes it all in' and is carried 
away rapturously to its possibilities, but not in the manner of fallen 
Dasein - carried away into the they-self - rather, in such a fashion as 
to always be 'held in resoluteness' (BT H338). That is to say, carried 
away to it ownmost self as an entity that is essentially Being-
possible. Thus the temporality of understanding is more radical still; 
Dasein is not only ahead of and coming towards its Being-alongside, it 
has-been. 
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The having-been we have encountered before in the befores and in being-
guilty. But the befores are to be found both in authentic and 
inauthentic Dasein. The befores of inauthenticity are something like 
momentum in Newtonian mechanics. Resolute having-been is Dasein' s 
individual thrownness into, as Heidegger will make clear near the end 
of his book, history, which is to be 'repeated'. What is important is 
to see the seamless character of understanding's temporality. 
Certainly, one can in an ordinary way 'deal with' time - but such time 
is no longer constitutive: Dasein would be just 'in' time, rather than 
being temporal. 
Inauthentic understanding closes itself in and off (Heidegger's 
metaphor, cf BT H339) from this full temporality, but can only do so, 
of course, on the basis of that temporality. This closing off has the 
character of deflating time's spaciality, its essential 'stretch' and 
'span': Dasein forgets its throwness, ignores its own death, focuses on 
what is closest in the World but not as merely 'the closest'. But even 
this closing off is ecstatic, for it distances Dasein from its own 
self. In fact, it involves the abandonment of self into the they-self. 
The more one comes to oneself as present-at-hand, the farther one 1S 
away. Thus the ecstasis of temporality and the spacial language of 
authenticity cross essentially. 
With the Situation, as Heidegger admits, there is a spaciality, just as 
there is with the 'there' of Dasein. The Situation is the environment 
of concern as disclosed to resoluteness. The spaciality within which 
Dasein exists arises, as we have seen, from Being-in-the-world. But 
Being-in-the-world is, 1n turn, grounded in disclosure. Heidegger then 
writes, 
, Just as the spaciality of the 'there' 1S grounded 1n 
disclosedness, 
resoluteness. 
the Situation has its foundations in 
The Situation is the 'there', disclosed ln 
resoluteness, as which the existing entity is there' (BT 
H299, translation modified) 
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While Heidegger takes pains to distinguish the Situation from any mere 
present-at-handness, through the key notion of disclosure the Situation 
is bound to Dasein's Being-spacial-in-the-world. Resoluteness is never 
pure (in Kant's sense) but essentially factical and thus always already 
care. Furthermore, the notions of neighbourhood-space, emptied of 
their ordinary-space significations, become notions of spacing, which 
are very much active here. Let this be our preliminary justification 
for dealing with spacing on the same terms as temporality. The making-
present which brings Dasein into the Situation remains dependent upon 
futurality and having-been. And yet the spaciality of Situation defies 
logical gravity, as it were, and creeps up the hierarchical tree as 
Being and Time moves to a close, unveiling temporal structures in their 
primordial spacing. 
We expect this with respect to the ordinary understanding of time, 
whether like Bergson we bemoan it, or like Kant we assert its 
necessity. In Heidegger's brief exposition of Aristotle's essay on 
time in Basic Problems of Phenomenology (pp 237ff.), the definition of 
time is reread such that what is normally understood as the phenomena 
of 'earlier' and 'later' are interpreted as the 'from' and 'to' of 
motion. Time is experienced not as but in motion. This motion need 
not be spacial; it may be a property change, for example. And yet, of 
course, the language remains spacial: 'away from something, towards 
something' . This is because space preserves the past location in the 
way that substance or matter does not preserve the past property state. 
Change as motion can be seen, it is a good model. 
Yet, as Heidegger notices, Aristotle lS not completely happy with 
describing space with time. For example, if the now is compared with 
a point on a line, then it follows that in the coming up to this point 
and going beyond it, there will be a non-analogous pause at the point. 
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Why does Aristotle think this? We can guess that the answer lies just 
a few pages previously, in the discussion of place. It is too 
infrequently noticed that Aristotle does t no , in the Physics, talk of 
space and time, but of place and time. Correspondingly, the place-
nature of temporality (i.e. the now-that ... rather than just the now) 
is one aspect that Heidegger draws attention to. Place, for Aristotle, 
1S the shape limit of that which surrounds an entity. But this causes 
a difficulty which Aristotle treats with only a few words. We say 'the 
heart is in the body' and also that 'we are in our body'. The meaning 
of 'in' differs here, since the heart is clearly not 'in' the whole of 
the body. Rather, Aristotle implies, the heart is 1n the body as a 
part in the whole, since the body considered as a place runs 
continually through us, heart and all. Whereas 'we are in our body' 
means that there is a discontinuity between our place and the next 
place. 2 This discontinuity which is definitive of the first and proper 
sense of place (so Aristotle calls it) is the reason why the point on 
the line requires the pause which alienates it from time. But as we 
have seen, it is precisely this discontinuity at the essence of place 
which Heidegger recognises as being a problem. If we substitute for 
Aristotle's treatment of place the Heideggerian modification thereof 
(neighbourhood space), then spaciality aligns itself more closely with 
time. There would be no pause, time would stretch and its stretching 
would be world. 
As a model of the experience of time, spacial motion is unique. which 
does not lend itself to Bergson's critique since, as we have been 
trying to show for tens of thousands of words, such a model of time 
depends upon properties of space which Bergson chose to ignore. Let us 
pursue this briefly. 
If space is understood as the assemblage of actual empty containers or 
of possible positions, then of course we encounter the old problem of 
continuity. cons1'der the status of a 'from' Additionally, however, 
location or a 'to' location. What are they? From any standpoint, they 
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are empty or possible positions, like any other. A 'from' location is 
only such if someone remembers experl'encl'ng the ' h' movlng t lng at that 
location. That is, space itself has l'n no way 'preserved' th t e pas 
location, except in an empty sense. But in Kant, space necessarily 
contains indexes to other (sl'multaneous) d ' spaces, an tlme contains 
indexes to past and future times - this is how Kant describes the 
second and third analogies. Taken together (as they must be), space 
and time, as positions, refer to their whole. Such a 'commercium' is 
the easily forgotten contribution of the pure forms of intuition which 
persists into the understanding since, for thought to apply to 
experience, the categories must be schematised. In an important sense, 
of course, this 'commercium' too depends upon an experiencing subject. 
But within the experience, space and time themselves refer, and indeed 
this makes possible that experience. Similarly in Heidegger, the 
'possible' of a location is not an empty logical possibility, but is 
referred to and occupied in the mode of absence by entities within a 
world. Neighbourhood space, as we have called it, contains 'from's and 
'to's not as after-images and fantasies of an observing subject locked 
in the now, but as precisely its structure. Thus neighbourhood space 
as a model of the ordinary understanding of time is remarkably 
fruitful. 
But should we expect this spacial language within the authentic 
ontological analysis of time? Certainly, since the above ordinary 
interpretation, properly seen, is not a different phenomenon introduced 
from some elsewhere, but rather a mode of primordial temporality. 
Temporality, Heidegger writes, exhibits the properties associated with 
the spacial prepositions found in 'coming-towards-oneself' (zu), 'back 
upon' (auf), 'Being-alongside' (bei). It is this manner of not being 
here, in any traditional sense of here (hier), that leads Heidegger to 
write, 'Temporality 'is' not an entity at all. It is not, but it 
temporalises itself ... temporality temporalises' (BT H328). Further, 
this not-being-here of temporality, Heidegger associates with the Greek 
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word 'ecstasis' meaning 'standing outside'. Thus 'temporality is the 
primordial 'outside-of-itself' in and for itself' (BT H329) . 
It would be too trivial to appropriate this 'outside-of-itself' to 
space in any ordinary sense, but the undisguised spacial language makes 
it clear that what Heidegger is after is also our goal: the primordial 
event of spacing. We have already and several times discussed why we 
continue using the word 'space'. Still, using it in connection with 
time seems nothing less than perverse - and yet what is important to 
see 1S that there has been no fundamental change in Heidegger' s 
language or its implicit analogies from division 1, chapter 3 to 
division 2, chapter 4. What is essential to time is just this same 
spacing (first exhibited with respect to everyday neighbourhood space) 
considered most primordially. 
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2.2.4. History and Resoluteness. 
Time is not the realm of the present-at-hand, and does not receive its 
grounding in the 'now'. Time is always and essentially somewhere else, 
at a distance. This is to say, a proposition about identity is always 
(covertly at least) spaced in time, and is thus dependant upon a 
projective understanding of time - and similarly a proposition about 
temporal spacing demands the question of ecstatic identity, conceptual 
clarity and difference, etc. Spacing is primordial because it precedes 
entities as such; though Heidegger insists that space (ordinary space) 
only opens around entities in the world, yet the world is capable-of-
being-filled, and its capacity, its volume is not abstract 
mathematical-space/time, but care as temporal that is, care as 
spacing. And yet with ecstasis we do not seem to have come far enough; 
metaphorically, the self can be 'away from horne' only if it has a home. 
We must ask what makes this home possible, to which it is not enough to 
reply 'ecstasis', for that would be begging the question. 
At the beginning of Division two, chapter 5, Heidegger sets out upon a 
classic and by now familiar philosophical issue: not what makes Dasein 
Dasein, but what makes one Dasein always the same. That is, in what 
does the wholeness, connectedness or constancy of the self reside. 
Heidegger observes that this issue has always been posed precisely in 
terms of the connectedness of Experiences (Erlebnis), momentary nows 
within which alone the self is actual. But this is to treat the self 
as present-at-hand. All other 'locations' are the not-self, and 
subjectivity is constituted on the basis of a kind of isolation, within 
which the age-old problem of interaction and interconnection first 
arises. Heidegger writes, 'Dasein does not fill up a track or stretch 
'of life' with the phases of its momentary actualities. It 
stretches itself along in such a way that its own Being is constituted 
in advance as a stretching-along' (BT H 374). This specific stretching 
Heidegger calls historizing (das Geschehen). Again, what is important 
to see is what we already pointed out in chapter 2.1: this is not a new 
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theme, but occupied Heidegger in various guises since the openlng pages 
of the text. The problem of history is just a further explication of 
anticipatory resoluteness, that l'S an ex l' t' f h . be 
' p lca lon 0 ow Daseln can 
factically whole. 
Heidegger continues: while history is not a sequence of 'free-floating' 
experiences, equally it is not the connectedness of altering motions in 
objects, for Dasein itself is the non-objective object of history (BT 
H 388). Thus, it can only be that 'the historizing of history is the 
historizing of Being-in-the-world' (BT H388). Entities present-at-hand 
and ready-to-hand have, in every instance, already been 'incorporated 
into the history of the world' (BT H388). But Dasein exists, 
'proximally and for the most part' as fallen, lost in the they-self; 
its coming back to itself may be through the route of historizing, the 
repetition of possibilities that have been, which is the taking over of 
heritage. Again, Dasein is its self via its not-self. Thus Dasein's 
authentic existence lS accessible only through world-history, for 
repetition is the essential content of that resolute steadiness which 
is stretched-along. 
How can this be so? Let us speculate. In repeating, Dasein 
constitutes and discovers itself as historical. But to 'repeat' 
thematically or representationally would not be to repeat a 
possibility, and would instead be a form of not being one's self. 
Dasein must understandingly repeat. Thus historical understanding -
what for Heidegger underpins historiology - is revealed as linked to 
repetition. The understanding, we said, occupies space projectively; 
but, of course, Dasein's space is an always already understood space. 
Thus the understanding lS thus the disclosure of environmental spacing. 
Similarly, repetition as something like historized understanding 
(notice that the concept of repetition is first introduced in the 
section on the temporality of the understanding) - is the opening of 
spacing time (time's particular and always particularised differential 
stretch) in and for a Situation and within the Augenblick. In 
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repetition we understand time as the meaning of Being-in-the-world. 
But certainly not merely blind repetition, for this would not be 
authentically futural J , and in particular would fail to acknowledge the 
individuation that is the outcome of Dasein' s thrownness' 
, nor mere 
adaptation, for this would be to thematise. One adapts in 
chronological, everyday time, for at issue. is not repetition but the 
construction of representations and analogies. Resoluteness is not 
like mere stubbornness, for resoluteness involves the possibility of 
giving everything up (cf. BT H308). Entschlossenheit, as Heidegger 
draws attention to especially in 'On the Essence of Truth', is another 
of those words with an odd privative prefix. Thus the word cannot mean 
'closing down' without a 'but remaining essentially open'. Understood 
by way of an understanding repetition, this is not a paradox: l..e. 
resolution is only possible from out of temporalit~s ecstatic X 
, 
wholeness, but of course a most essential property of that wholeness is 
its indefiniteness. 
Repetition, then, by being repetition-with-difference - that is, by 
moving in and out of Dasein's individualization - establishes a space 
between the Augenblick, the future as coming-toward, and the having-
been. In repetition, time temporalises, spaces itself out. This space 
is analogous to neighbourhood-space, l.n that it primordially precedes 
the mathematical-time of a sequence of nows. History is spaced in a 
manner fundamentally different from mathematical-time; indeed, 
chronological time has the old metaphysical problem of continuity to 
solve, while history must grapple with the much more interesting 
problem of discontinuity. Just as projective understanding does not 
actually destroy the free-floating isolation of Cartesian thought, but 
rather reveals it as a derivative phenomenon, it is not the case that 
repetition destroys the integrity of the self in its now, but that the 
self is thereby constituted as ecstatic. Repetition discloses 
temporal i ty as essentially spaced, that is, as differentially 
articulated within the horizon of an essential possible wholeness - and 
thus first shows Dasein its stretch. In understanding time, what we 
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understand is our own temporality - that is to say, we come into an 
appropriate phenomenological-ontological grasp of our Being as a whole. 
Can it still be a surprise if the most essential aspect of Kant's 
theory of intuition's propriety reappears at the heart of Heidegger's 
ontology? 
And, on the other hand, in understanding ourselves as present, In a 
special type of radical isolation from the past and the future, we are 
- as we have seen above - already residing within the peculiar space of 
subject and object. We are back to our two 'spaces', first discussed 
with respect to the difference between neighbourhood- and mathematical-
space. This difference is repeated within temporality as well. The 
temporality within which repetition is possible - the temporality which 
repetition as such discloses - is a temporality with properties akin to 
neighbourhood-space. Within mathematical-space and chronological time, 
reference is only possible as representation - that is, as thematic. 
Consequently, such a self would be removed entirely from possibility as 
such; its 'objectivity' and 'detachment' would reduce to something like 
a bland and trivial freedom: choice by way of the negation of 
concretely realised choices. Repetition, seemingly so reactionary a 
concept (as, admittedly, it may well have been for Heidegger), instead 
is that which reveals - via the understanding of Dasein's temporality 
as ecstatic - Dasein's fundamental being-possible. 
However, repetition is only possible with Dasein's temporality as its 
condition. Repetition does not open possibilities in the way we said -
prematurely but suggestively - that neighbourhood-space seems to. For 
Heidegger, repetition' assumes a space within which a peculiar 
difference/identity is possible. According to Heidegger, Dasein 
repeats, and thus has history, only because Dasein 'first' has time. 
Temporality as such has still escaped our grasp. 
So, does temporality itself depend upon an essential spaclng In the 
manner we have hinted? Heidegger at least assures us that this grasp-
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escaping cannot continue: time must be 'earlier' than any other 
possible 'early' (Basic Problems, p. 325). But is there a 'temporality 
itself'? What could this mean, and why is it important? Now the most 
primordial constituent in temporality's unity is futurality. Dasein's 
death is its finitude, and this in turn is the condition of the 
possibility of Dasein's making-present in the Situation, and taking 
over thrownness as repeating the having-been. Further, although 
temporality is indeed ecstatic in its essence, it is not one but three, 
wi thin which the future has a privilege. We have already suggested why 
the future is privileged because Being-towards-death grants the 
possibility of Being-a-whole - but this 'granting' is still unclear. 
In what way does the peculiar wholeness of Dasein depend upon 
anticipation? Being-towards-death offers the first spacing: death, the 
possibility of the impossibility of Dasein, the nothing. 
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2.2.5. Not-Space. 
The fame of the nothing as a theme . H' d . In el egger lS all out of 
proportion to the amount of space it receives in Being and Time, and 
depends largely upon the later lecture 'What is Metaphysics?' - and of 
course on Sartre. The nothing, however, provides a clear - and for 
our purposes, all-important - point of connection between the Heidegger 
of the twenties and the later Heidegger, although one suspects that he 
came to be embarrassed by the 'drama', for lack of a better word, of 
his earlier treatment. 
We first came across 'nothing' in our brief discussion of Dasein' s 
Being-guilty. There we spoke of nUllity. But this was part of the 
division two, temporal treatment of the nothingness corresponding to 
anxiety as developed in division one. In the interests in being 
systematic, let us look there first. 
Anxiety is the state-of-mind In which Dasein is authentically 
disclosed. Anxiety, Heidegger asserts, is not anxious in the face of 
(Wovor) entities within the world, for in anxiety the significance of 
entities disappears entirely. What anxiety is anxious in the face of 
resides 'nowhere'. But 'nowhere' 'is where any region lies, and there 
too lies any disclosedness of the world for essentially spacial Being-
in' (BT H186). What a fascinating sentence! Thus the uncanniness felt 
in anxiety, where uncanny is 'unheimlich', is the not-being-at-home 
among entities in the world. 
We can understand this in a quite straight-forward manner: the region, 
as we have seen, is the wherein of an equipmental totality. Entities, 
in their involvement relations, bear the possibility of significance, 
and thus of a ' somewhere' . Thus, in the absence of significant 
entities or rather in the absence of entities' significance 
everywhere and somewhere are nowhere. No-where is no-thing, since a 
thing is its where. We stated it above, and there innocuously, ln 
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writing 'the world is nothing without entities'. But in what context 
did we write that? In discussing meaning as the fillableness of world 
, 
which we eventually disclosed as Dasein's temporality. What hidden 
relation does 'nowhere' and 'nothing' have to this issue? 
In division two, where death is brought in and moreover revealed as 
essentially temporal, anxiety is rewritten as the disclosure of 
Dasein's death as the "nothing' of the possible impossibility of its 
existence' (BT H266); accordingly, authentic Dasein anticipates death. 
As we saw above, the nothing is later redefined - or perhaps only 
clarified? - in Heidegger's discussion of conscience as the nullity of 
Dasein's thrown basis; and accordingly, authentic Dasein is resolute. 
Interestingly enough, Heidegger ends his discussion of nullity by 
noting that 'the ontological meaning of the notness' still eludes our 
grasp on the far side of all logic and dialectic (BT H285-6), which 
again only aggravates our question of the relation between meaning, 
temporality and the nothing. 
Throughout the discussion of the temporality of care, 'nothing' and 
'nullity' alike are reserved for the question of guilt. Where has 
death gone? 
surprisingly, 
The last extended mention of the topic comes, not 
in the section on state-of-mind in the repeated 
existential analytic. The nothing is, again, the nothing of the world; 
here Heidegger glosses this as the 'impossibility of projecting oneself 
upon a potentiality-for-Being which belongs to existence and which is 
founded primarily upon one's objects of concern' (BT H343) . Such an 
impossibility, though, reveals the possibility of authenticity. 
Anxiety brings Dasein back to the radical 'that-it-is' of throwness, 
and thus having-been is constitutive for anxiety; but it does so only 
to reveal thrownness as a possibility that can be repeated. And thus 
reveals an authentic potentiality which brings Dasein back to throwness 
from the future as coming towards. 
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We can suspect, then, that it is death's futurality as the primordial 
nothing which gives to Dasein's Being-a-basis its nullity as such; that 
is, without death, anxious Being-guilty would fail to have a factical 
meaning. This may indeed be how Heidegger thought the nothing of 
death, which however gets lost as an explicit theme somewhere after 
paragraph 53. Much later, paragraph 68b, Heidegger asks of anxiety's 
dependence upon having-been: 'In that case, does not anxiety get 
constituted by a future? Certainly; but not by the inauthentic future 
of awaiting' (BT H343). But the reader is left to complete this 
thought, and say, 'by the authentic future of anticipation of the 
nothing of death'. 
Perhaps, though, we are being overzealous; perhaps our unrelenting 
pursuit of ur-spacing leads us to look for the one nothing, futural 
nothing. But what number has nothing, nullity, nowhere?4 What 1.S 
significant about nothing is precisely its queer relation to 
temporality, such that it stands as the other of all that is, which 
includes Dasein's individuated stretch, and thus first opens the space 
within which what is is as it is, and in such a way as it may be as 
becoming. This other makes it possible for temporality's ecstatic 
unity to be the meaning of the Being of entities, and we could proceed 
backwards and reconstruct - out of nothing - the whole fabric of Being 
and Time. 
Now, Heidegger says Dasein is constituted as the stretching-between of 
birth and death, the between of 'two' nothings. We noted above that 
repetition, as that which stretches, is founded in temporality. But it 
can only do so if temporality is spacing, the formal space within which 
ecstasis stands out and repetition resolves. stretching is not in the 
abstract, though, as we necessarily considered it above, but always a 
stretching between. But not between two definites, i.e. two events 
which would make possible a synthetic discursive unity (as in Leibniz's 
complete concept) and thus reveals the stretched entity as a was, is or 
will-be present-at-hand. Rather, a stretching between precisely 
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indefiniteness - and thus no-thing(s) generates Dasein's space as a 
Poss ible-space. (cf. Heidegger' s t h' cornmen s on t e lndefiniteness of 
Resoluteness and Death at H258, H298 and etc.) Above, we briefly noted 
how neighbourhood-space makes possible the possible, precisely in 
allowing the understanding to operate authentically. But Dasein does 
not float above its possibilities; it exists always within a 
determinate possibility, but still as a possibility. Now clearly, the 
nothing leads Dasein to anticipatory resoluteness; but the nothing also 
generates that possibility, through the limit of guilt and the finitude 
of death. How? 
Without-limit is also without differentiation. That which is extended 
without limit (I do not say infinite, for infinity has numerous 
species) can have no organs, thus no organization. For its parts would 
either be unlimited themselves, and their relation to the whole always 
indeterminate, or else numerically finite, and their relation null. 
Entities could only ever be present-at-hand, unrelated, isolated. That 
is to say, mathematical-space necessarily presents quantitative limits 
within an undifferentiated without-limit. It is nonsensical to think 
of mathematical-space as organised - it is empty, and ideally so. 
Nothing, then, as the essence of all limit and in the guise of nullity 
and again as death's nothing is precisely Dasein's actuality as Being-
(finitely thrown)-in-the-world, granting the possibility of involvement 
and neighbourhood-space - that is, of world. s The nothing gives this 
place its site, its location, in a manner only a co-ordinate system 
could do for mathematical-space/time; a co-ordinate system that first 
gives content to the word 'arbitrary,.6 possibilities become 
possibilities in becoming differentiated from out of the whole not-no-
thing. Because of the indefiniteness of the limit, a whole is made 
possible from within which possibilities open up, which themselves 
remain indefinite (because always referring back to this '.'.'hole for 
their place), and even in the anticipating resolution, h~~~ever 
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determinate they become, remain possibilities. All space, then, and 
all time is not-space, provided only Dasein inhabits it.? 
Of course, this is nothing new at least to the extent that Heidegger 
had already linked the nowhere of anxiety to the condition of 
possibility for regions and spacial world-disclosure in general, as 
early as paragraph 40. Thus the ' nothing and nowhere' (Nichts and 
Nirgends) stands behind both temporality and spaciality in their as-
suchness - the 'nothing and nowhere' is spacing in itself and as such. 
Dasein, then, is const.ituted by nothing, and - to the extent that it 
exists as care - is continually so constituted. 
Still, so far as a faithful reading of Being and Time is concerned, all 
this is speculation and has been speculation indeed since this 
chapter first coined the term neighbourhood-space and linked it to the 
understanding. A certain retroactive justification of our reading (or 
rather, our extrapolation) is to be found in later texts of Heidegger, 
as well as the texts of those who have found him both interesting and 
challenging, albeit in very different ways; namely, Jacques Derrida and 
Hans-Georg Gadamer. One move, however, is so obvious that we can make 
it immediately, and so round out this chapter. That is, to Heidegger's 
infamous essay 'What is Metaphysics', post-dating Being and Time by 
only a couple of years. 'Infamous' because, for some, this lecture 
corresponds to the moment wherein Heidegger perfects his always 
apparent ability to write sheer nonsense - or, for the less sceptical, 
wherein Heidegger retreats from the relatively patient, rigorous and 
analytical mood of Being and Time. Against these odds, it seems 
entirely unlikely (and for other reasons undesirable) that our search 
for intelligibility will be assisted by a reading of this text. But 
that, of course, is the challenge. 
The question Heidegger here poses as the first question of metaphysics 
'Why are there beings at all and not rather nothing?' (WM, Basic 
Writings, 112, translations mine) - bears (on one interpretation) a 
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resemblance to the sll' ghtly m t d' , 
ore ra ltlonal question raised and 
dismissed in Being and Time: 'Does the external world exist in 
reality?' Beyond the ambiguities of 'world' in the question, Heidegger 
argues (paragraph 43a) that it answers itself in the asking, since 
Dasein is Being-in-the-world, and since world must exist for entities, 
whether real or not, to be disclosed. 8 Thus there can be no question 
of the 'reality' of 'the world as the 'wherein' (Worin) of Being-in' 
(BT H202-3). Being-in must have a wherein, yet Being-in is precisely 
what gives content to any concept of 'reality' with which the sceptical 
question is asked. This 'wherein' and its spaciality are here our 
clues. The world, as we have seen, is fillable, it exists as 
potential-space - that is, as primordially spaced - which just means it 
exists as the real site of the potentially extant. Primordially 
spaced, however, by what? Heidegger gives us the answer as care, and 
beyond that, temporality itself. (And behind that? Well, nothing.) 
In the lecture, this similar question is raised again in the context of 
science. Science is concerned with what-is, with entities, and beyond 
that nothing else. The passage is familiar enough to us all, if not 
from this version then from 1935 and Introduction to Metaphysics. The 
'nothing else', Heidegger argues, even in our everyday phrases and off-
hand remarks, serves to demarcate the totality of entities - and in 
demarcating, to grant them as a totality and as entities. Heidegger 
finds this odd, that at the very point where science should be 'most 
certain - its subject matter and task - it must 'speak of something 
other' (97, tr. mod.). Heidegger gives a preliminary definition of the 
Nothing as 'the complete negation of the totality of beings' (99). 
Does, then, Nothing follow and depend upon negation? That is, do we 
encounter Nothing by negating everything that is? For Heidegger, 
something like the opposite is true. The argument - for there lS, 
oddly enough, something like an argument here runs roughly as 
follows. 
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Negation is always a negation of something, thus negation as a possible 
operation cannot precede the existence of at least one entity. But 
since Nothing, on the logical account, th . 1S e negat10n of totality, 
this 'at least one' t b th mus e e totality of entities. But 
comprehending the totality of entities (in order then to negate them) 
is impossible, though everyday we necessarily experience entities as a 
whole. (Heidegger is distinguishing between his two uses of 'Ganz'; 
'totality of' and 'as a whole'. Here, Heidegger unfortunately glosses 
over this distinction but, fortunately, Kant has made it perfectly 
clear for us already.) But entities as a whole also cannot be negated, 
because this wholeness (as opposed to the totality of things) is not a 
thing which could be negated. 
Negation, though, 1S also always a negation of something definite. But 
entities-as-a-whole only are as that definite collection of entities 
which they are, if certain entities are not other entities. That is, 
if there are differences and contrasts between entities. Heidegger 
writes, 'negation does not conjure the'not' from itself as means for 
making distinctions [Unterschiedung] and oppositions [Entgegensetzung] 
in whatever is given, inserting itself, as it were, between what is 
given' (107) That is to say, differentiation through negation could 
only be a duplicate, thrusting its second 'not' between already 
differentiated and definite entities. Thus negation must proceed from 
the not. 
Although this argument is both incomplete and dubious, as arguments go 
- of course, it was never Heidegger's intention to produce a 'good' 
argument - at least it lends a certain clarity to the issues. Further, 
this not is already linked to spaciality: 'Unterschiedung' and 
'Entgegensetzung' mean, literally, 
above)' and 'setting up against'. 
'separating the beneath (from 
The 'this is not that' already 
operates, it would seem, wi thin a space. And a time, t:=:-=:: for 
. 1 't 1 te' for t:othing Heidegger writes that negat10n a ways comes 00 a 
(104) . What first opens this space? We know Heidegger' s ans' .. :er, for 
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it is the same answer we found at th h e eart of Being and Time, 
underlying even the structure of Dasein's temporality: the nothing. 
This not (between entities) which organises entities as a whole is only 
possible, as we argued above, on the basis of some limit. This limit 
is the nothing, which stands in constituting opposition to entities as 
a whole - but not as their negation, since they are not yet 'there' to 
be negated. And again not as some kind of limit in the sense of a 
border on a prior empty and infinite space. Kant had already shown 
this to be unintelligible in the Antinomies - which we here echo in 
saying that entities as a whole are not themselves an entity. Nothing 
grounds the not. Entities (as a whole) from out of the nothing, give 
themselves space and wrap it around themselves. 
The operation of the nothing is primarily spacing. This is clarified 
by Heidegger' s afterword, written some fourteen years later in the 
middle of the war (which may explain the rather disturbing emphasis 
there on sacrifice). The afterword is something like a self-
appropriation of the earlier text, and accordingly it picks up on 
precisely those points of continuity in Heidegger's thought we spoke of 
above. For now, let us briefly mention them. Nothing is hitched to 
Being itself as precisely indicating the otherness of Being to beings 
( 'this Nothing 'west' (appears, presences) as Being'); that is, the 
primordial radicality of the ontic-ontological difference. This first 
spacing generates the clearing (Lichtung) within which entities appear 
as such. Heidegger writes, 'Courage knows, in the abyss of terror, the 
scarcely tread space of Being, out of which clearing every entity first 
turns back to that which it is, and is able to be'. Similarly, 
Heidegger asserts that with respect to the Nothing, we should ready 
ourselves for one thing: 'to experience (erfahren) in Nothing the vast 
space of that which gives to every entity its warrant to be'. After 
all this, can we still think of the spacial language here as 'merely' 
poetry? It should be noted that this last quote says nothing different 
from the end of the 1929 lecture, where the first prioritj" of the 
philosophical 'leap' is to 'allow space for beings as a whole' (112). 
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The nothing is neither thing, place or phenomenon, but is spacing _ 
here and first, the spacing of difference between B . elng and beings 
within and indeed as which Being 'presences'. 
In the middle of 'What is Metaphysics?' we read the following: ' ... the 
nothing makes itself known with beings and in beings expressly as a 
slipping away of the whole' (104). This is important because it 
indicates the basic immanence of nothingness within both beings and 
their as-a-wholeness. How are we to understand this? One possible 
interpretation is suggested by Heidegger himself, but judging by its 
rarity, it is not an interpretation he was entirely comfortable with, 
at least exclusively. In 'On the Essence of Truth', Heidegger 
counterpoises truth - which is, for this essay, the free acceptance of 
the standard of the as-suchness of beings within the free open space of 
the worldly disclosure of beings - with untruth. Untruth is the 
necessary concealing within any disclosure. Just as with the nothing, 
untruth makes possible an experience (here named 'mystery') which 
brings man to his Dasein (as Heidegger is now in the habit of phrasing 
it). The within of concealing corresponds to the 'with and in' of the 
above quotation. Here, though, Heidegger makes an attempt to explain 
what he means: 'Precisely because letting be always lets beings be in 
a particular comportment which relates to them and thus discloses them, 
it conceals beings as a whole. Letting-be is intrinsically at the same 
time a concealing' (132). 
The point is simple: our taking up a particular relationship to a 
particular region of entities necessarily masks our (nonetheless 
transcendental) relationship to beings-as-a-whole (Being) . We 
transcend beings toward Being (the worldhood of Being-in) and in 
returning to beings, in the only possible mode of return which is care, 
that first constituting transcendence is erased. Thus Heidegger can 
write, expressing a by now familiar paradox: 'The human being is a 
creature of distance! ,9 Why should this be? Expressed another way: 
The nothing as spacing grants the possibility of an open space or 
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clearing for entities-as-a-whole (the clearing Wh1' ch l'S I ' a so tr.e 
lighting/appearing of Being) - and also grants the possibility of the 
concrete not which organises this whole such that determinate entities 
might show themselves (neighbourhood space). What is the connection 
between these two spaces such that the not erases the nothing? The 
particular comportment, the return to beings, the concrete not - all of 
these are the necessary falling of finite Dasein. The comportments, 
the beings, the 'nots' all themselves take over the task of explaining 
themselves in their Being. Why? 
The best one can say is that modes of interpretation and thus of 
experience are determined from within the origin - perhaps Heidegger's 
most sustained meditation on this 'within' lies in Introduction to 
Metaphysics. In any case, the results, Heidegger implies, are - on the 
thematising plane - various instances of psychology, physics and logic 
or epistemology, and on the everyday plane, the various modes of Being 
alongside the world, wherein Das~in understands itself back from out of 
a filled world. Because of this taking over of the task in falling, 
the necessary and persistent comportment towards Being, even within the 
comportment to beings, is erased and forgotten. 
All of this, however, 1S imaged spacially, and must be so imaged. Why? 
Space is the one constant, from the chatter of everydayness itself, to 
the phenomenological analysis of everydayness, to the 
ontological/temporal characterisation of authenticity, to the furthest 
reaches of the thinking of Being. Space, as a cluster of 
significations, alone guarantees the comprehensibility of ontology. 
And this, in turn, must be so because the understanding performs or 
occupies a certain spacing which contains, as a part or mode, the 
everyday experlence of space. Finally, everydayness (lostness, 
fallenness, etc.) 1S the necessary and constant position from ~ithin 
which ontology addresses itself to Being. 1o Why, however, should it 
be that spacing has space and not time as its most constant expression? 
Bergson's thesis about the imaging of time as space is only half the 
answer. 
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As Heidegger argues, even the everyday understanding of time 
never goes so far as to eliminate 'timeliness' - and yet space is again 
the constant. Ontically, then, a simply answer: space-language can 
designate space itself, or also time, difference, relation, etc. Time 
only designates itself, it exhausts itself in the attainment of the 
everyday concept of time. This is insufficient as an answer, but does 
carry some weight. 
Is space dominant then because it, as a phenomenon, contains (at least: 
analogies to) something 'profound' for thought? or because spacial 
language is what we use from out of our most thoughtless and trivial 
activities which are ceaseless? The important thing is to see both 
these answers as the same: space is the most constant expression of the 
way in which Dasein is always metaphysical, from the cradle to the 
grave and every kitchen and colloquium in between - and the way Dasein 
is always everyday, from the colloquium and back to the kitchen. 
Spacial language, then, is precisely the way in which the erasure of 
the transcendence of Dasein to Being and world is never entirely 
successful or permanent but also the way l.n which, in every 
ontological thought, Being is the Being of beings, and world is filled. 
'In order to exist,' Heidegger writes, 'everything genuine needs 
semblance' (Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, p. 212). It goes 
without saying that such a proposition must necessarily modify 
accordingly what we mean by 'genuine' and 'semblance'. 
Heidegger continues this analysis of the spacing operation under a 
baffling number of conceptual guises. Virtually every few years we 
find a completely new vocabulary at work. (As we have already 
suggested, the spaciality of that vocabulary is nonetheless one 
constant.) Among these vocabularies one (or rather one certain series) 
stands out. Because of the way a work of art (even poetry) is an 
individual thing, at an individual location in space and time, because 
of the way at least some works (here especially poetry) call forth by 
signifying things and locations, and finally because of the way the 
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work of art demands an approach, view or perspective both literally and 
'figuratively' - because of all these elementary facts, the question of 
the relation between everyday space and spacing, and thus the question 
of what ontologically is spacing, is raised most clearly and decisively 
in Heidegger's thinking about art. 
step. 
Which will be our next and last 
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Chapter Notes 
1., compa;e, ~owev~r, Me~aphysical Foundations of Logic, p. 138 and 
Heldegger s brlef dlscusslon of spacial language there. 
2. Aristotle Physics, IV, 211a. 
3. And futurality is precisely what' tradition should offer. At the 
end o~ 'The Principle of ~de?tity' Heidegger writes 'Tradition prevails 
when It frees us from thlnklng-back to a thinking-forward, which is no 
longer a planning' (41). 
4. As we shall see in 2.3 the question is not of number but of 'the 
nothing of ... ', of belonging. 
5. Heidegger would prefer 'individuation' to 'actuality', but is it 
any surprise that Aristotle should return, if briefly, at this point? 
Kant too, of course, and in more detail. 
6. cf. the discussion of the spatial model of time above. 
7. Heidegger agrees with Aristotle that 'actuality is earlier than 
possibility' but, the former adds, only because possibility is 
'higher'. What does this mean? In Aristotle, things are pretty clear: 
no actualisable (possibility) with an actuality to form and effect it. 
Heidegger then continues by arguing that it is nonetheless the 
essential destiny of every actuality to actualize. Or, in 
transcendental language, the condition for the possibility of any 
actual extant thing are its actualisables. 
8. Presumably, of course, one can argue about the actuality which 
belongs to these entities. Descartes' evil geniui is a possibility, 
but what has to be recognised is that what the genius is giving us is 
nothing but a real world. 
9. Heidegger, 'Distance and Nearness', Metaphysical Foundations of 
Logic, 221. 
10. Cf. Heidegger's discussion of 'involvement' at Metaphysical 
Foundations of Logic, p. 140. 
2.3 
The Cite of Situation 
2.3.0. Introduction. 
Like Kantt Heidegger privileges art and especially poetry (in both the 
broader and narrower senses). For Kant t the aesthetic judgement (which 
has art as its cultural and historical object) completes and unifies 
critical Philosophy both as a system of thought but more importantly as 
a programme for the advancement of society. The tfaculties t at wart 
which must be brought to a peace t are not just university faculties t 
but are also both political bodies and discernable activity regions of 
the human mind. Art reveals how all these faculties t origins and ends 
ought to relate one to the other. 
On this point at least t Heidegger follows Kant t and in two ways. 
First t art as a phenomenon requiring thought is precisely also that 
phenomenon which reveals what thought is in its essence. Second, art 
is never a private or momentary experience, but always an historical 
and community experience. That is, art always plays a role in 
delivering a historical community over to itself. These important 
areas of agreement between the two philosophers is at the highest level 
of abstraction t and this ignores particular and constitutive items of 
agreement (also, of course, disagreement - however, since the latter 
are so obvious t the former is the more interesting thesis to uphold) . 
Since the philosophy of art holds such a central but unusual role in 
the work of both these thinkers - a role which exhibits the importance 
of spacing - then if such agreements can be found t it will be one 
confirmation that our long exposition of the concept of spacing has set 
off in the right direction. This will further suggest that an 
extension of this exposition beyond the work undertaken here must be 
possible - unless, of course
t 
it is possible to entirely ignore both 
Kant and Heidegger. 
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The obvious place to begin is the middle-period essay 'Origin of the 
Work of Art', though we will find it useful to range quite widely. 
This extraordinary text is often the first Heidegger students read _ 
and often too the last. Certain passages display Heidegger at his most 
'occult' and incomprehensible. Coming to this essay from out of 
Heidegger's earlier work we hope to emphasise the continuity. We will 
go so far as to claim (often without adequate demonstration given the 
magnitude of that task) that what has changed since Being and Time is 
not so much the content or even the method as something possibly more 
important: the mood. Heidegger early on borrowed from Phenomenology 
the sense of science, here a science of Being though he never 
attributed to his work the foundational role claimed by Husserl. This 
attempt at rigour, however, was at odds with its intended object - we 
saw some of the reasons for this in chapter 2.1. The mood, mind-set or 
attitude which thinking must take is prescribed by (none of these words 
Heidegger would approve of) the discovery (or rather emphasising) of 
the relation between language and Being. This problem just simply 
never worried Heidegger for prolonged periods prior to the 1930s. 
Recognising this continuity should help us recover Heidegger' s more 
difficult moments. But recover for what, at whose will and in what 
form? There are essential reasons why such a recovery, in order to be 
a recovery, must also be a betrayal, and more essentially than ever a 
recovery. Perhaps there is a way out of this bind, but we are not 
clever enough to find it. Or perhaps within the betrayal, there is 
couched an illumination (however ghastly and dim). It is enough of a 
chance, and a risk entirely without risks, since what consequences 
would pertain? We might also expect that this recovery/betrayal will 
allow us to carry our problem about spacing directly into the later 
work. 
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2.3.1. Earth and Nothing. 
One feature we neglected to discuss in the previous chapter 1S 
Heidegger's apparent assertion that Nothing belongs. Such a phrase 
seems patently oxymoronic - what could it possibly mean? 
Heidegger writes in 'The Origin of the Work of Art' that poetic 
projection 'never comes from Nothing in that what is projected by it is 
only the withheld vocation of the historical being of man itself' (OWA, 
76). Similarly, in 'Introduction to Metaphysics' written a few months 
earlier, Heidegger writes, 'For that nothing is not an entity does not 
prevent it from belonging to being in its own way' (TT, 111). The 
nothing must have a kind of articulation all its own: this can only 
mean that the nothing is nothing with respect to a world, and as such 
belongs to that world and the world to it. Four points need to be made 
which recall our discussion in the previous chapter: first, with 
respect to that world, the nothing is the possibility of delimitation, 
and thus of the rising up of particular beings as worldly; but second, 
the nothing is also the concealment to which the pre-ontological 
understanding of Being and world returns in the coming-back to beings; 
third, the nothing is the lostness of insignificant or unactual beings 
to always particular comportment; finally, the nothing is the distance 
to which equipmental beings are sent in everyday activity. All of 
these are essentially linked in the happening that is the clearing of 
the space for beings to present themselves. Being is nothing in a 
fifth and broader sense: no-thing, Being is no thing in any mode of 
extantness, possible, actual, past or future. This much more radically 
empty sense of nothing has to be distinguished from the above four -
for the above are rather belonging modes of not being a thing. Only if 
nothing belongs in some way does it make sense to speak of four (or 
five) different modes of nothing. Being, we said above, lies 1n the 
dynamic and eventful relationship between world and nothing. 
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What we wish to arrive at is some way of correlating Heidegger' s 
language in the Being and Time period with the language of The Origin 
of the Work of Art. Accordingly, we assert: Nothing as the moment of 
untruth which belongs to and indeed makes possible the essence of 
truth, is what Heidegger means by earth in its opposition to world. To 
repeat our 'four points': 1) Earth is the source of the 'that it is' of 
particular beings. 2) Earth is the self-concealing shelter and ground 
of beings in their significance, that is, in the understanding's coming 
back to beings. 3) Earth is the 'Sich-ver-schliessende' (OWA, 47), the 
self closing-off from itself; and earth enters the work 'because truth 
occurs only by installing itself within a particular being' (OWA 69) .1 
4) Earth is (thought here roughly as material) the closing-off from 
equipmental comportment, i.e. the move from use to what grounds use. 
The belonging of earth and nothing is indicated, for example, when 
Heidegger writes that, with respect to a particular historical 
community, the earth is not the earth but 'its earth' (OWA, 75). But 
in the work, Heidegger claims, both the earth and the world of a 
historical people are opened for the first time. Therefore, the 
belonging of nothing and earth must be particularly and perhaps 
originally present in the work of art. 
This interpretation will be contested. Earth is not nothing; but then, 
Heidegger insists, nothing is not (absolutely) nothing too. There is 
a more serious objection: Heidegger develops the wor Id/ earth 
distinction by taking the matter/form distinction back to its roots. 
And he continues to discuss earth via examples of base matter (for 
example, and especially, stone). No one would want to equate earth and 
matter - but it does seem possible to equate earth with thingliness as 
such, as Heidegger seems to do on OWA, 69. As far as it goes, this we 
do not deny: for the thingliness of a thing is not itself a thing, it 
is nothing, but of a particular mode. To borrow a concept: thingliness 
has not been formed, which means brought to a world. 
interpretation is too easy. Heidegger also writes: 
But this 
All things of earth, and the earth itself as a whole, flow 
[verstromen] together into a reciprocal accord 
[wechselweisen Einklang]. But this flowing-together is not 
a blurring of their outlines [Verwischen]. Here there 
flows the stream, restful within itself, of the setting of 
bounds [Ausgrenzens], which delimits [begrenzt] everything 
present within its presence. (OWA 47) . 
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The earth is not thingliness, here, but things, with their own quiet, 
self-subsisting articulation. But earth, Heidegger elsewhere asserts, 
is also 'ground'. Thus he writes, I [Phusis] clears and illuminates, 
also, that on which and in which man bases his dwelling. We call this 
ground the earth . ... In the things that arise, earth is present as the 
sheltering agent' (OWA 42). Further, earth is that which has 'its own 
law' (OWA 63) . 
Thus the issues complicate themselves. Earth is not earth because of 
particular things, or thingliness in general; rather the reverse, only 
because of earth as the essentially self-concealing nothing (law and 
ground) and thus as a moment of truth itself, can individual things 
arise and appear, and can any interpretation of thingliness assert 
itself. In equating earth with thingliness as stuff or matter, we made 
the ludicrous error of ignoring the whole movement of Heidegger's essay 
away from traditional theories of thingliness. In equating earth with 
things, or things as a whole, we ignore the concepts of the sheltering 
of things, the ground for things, etc. This latter equation, indeed, 
wants to bring earth/world into alignment with the ontological 
difference. But if there lS one thing we hoped to point out by the end 
of our previous chapter, it is that this difference cannot be thought 
as a conceptual distinction, but is itself an event, a happening. 
Thus, what Heidegger is doing with earth and world is not to clarify 
conceptually (by analysis) what Being is with respect to beings, but 
rather to indicate how Being (as self-appearing appearance) comes to 
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beings, as the very possibility of their extant appearance, and al .... 'a:/s 
in the form of history. 
Earth or nothing (and world as well of course) are moments within the 
more fundamental and eventful nothing of the spacing of the rift or 
strife (which spacing is the happening of Being itself) which brings 
earth to world and world to earth, and always in a decisive and 
historical manner. We call both the moment (defined by its opposition) 
and the event (in its originality) 'nothing' because they correlate 
with how Heidegger uses the term 'nothing', as explained in the last 
chapter and immediately above. 
The space between world and earth, what Heidegger calls the 'Riss' or 
rift, which is also a kind of strife or conflict, is an originating 
space. Only by drawing attention to the belonging itself - that is, 
beginning with the rift-space -can we say that world and earth as 
separate moments both belong one to the other, that 'the opponents 
raise [heben] each other into the self-assertion of their natures' (OWA 
49) • To think in the reverse direction - to claim that world and 
earth, by their orientation one to the other from within the one, first 
create a rift - we are in danger of thinking of nothing as some kind of 
absolute possibility-space, of some kind of thing or substance. Of 
course, this could not be further from Heidegger's intent. Rather, 
earth and nothing must be thought in their event-character, as aspects 
of the happening of truth. To speak of earth and world separately, as 
components of the phenomenon of thingliness, is to ask for ingredients. 
What does event or happening mean here? Must we understand it in 
opposition to thing or substance in the permanence implied therein? 
That is, oppose the two sets as moment is opposed to duration? Or lS 
this to make the same mistakes outlined above in our discussion of 
alternate interpretations of 'earth'? In particular, should we 
understand the happening of truth in the work of art as something 
correlating to an aesthetic experience? We know in advance that this 
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is certainly not what Heidegger means, but he still remains stubbornly 
unhelpful, and certain passages are particularly so: 'To submit to this 
displacement means: to transform [verwandeln] our accustomed ties to 
world and to earth ... ' [OWA, 66].2 This is unequivocally the language 
of momentary event, of a singular or collective experience and, in and 
from out of that experience, an inauguration. The problem seems to be 
that Heidegger is no longer explicitly dealing with time in these later 
works thus we no longer know quite how to take a concept like 
'happening', though we can guess. 
One obvious place to begin is with the event-like temporal phenomena 
discussed in Being and Time: the 'Augen-blick' or the 'repetition', 
perhaps. We have treated these themes above. The important thing to 
remember is that such 'moments' take place as articulations of 
anticipatory resoluteness; i.e., against the background of a temporal 
phenomenon that 1S rigorously non - 'momen tary' . Anticipatory 
resoluteness was rather a kind of closure towards openness (that is, a 
'determination' to exist as possibilities - and indeed as one's ownmost 
possibilities and not 1n or alongside actualities, opinions or 
ahistorical legislations). Anticipatory resoluteness, as such an open 
closure, endures (in a peculiar way, of course) through the 
indeterminate stretch of a Dasein's existence, which stretch 1S 
characterised by thrownness and death. More exactly, the indeterminate 
stretch just is anticipatory resoluteness in its authenticity. Thus, 
if the Augenblick or the repetition are momentary, they are not. But 
equally, to say that such phenomena endure in a way even analogous to 
the way material substances endure is equally mistaken. What is 
important is the openness, or in other words, the being-constantly-at-
issue of existence itself, or in still other words, Being-in-a-world. 
Things (and here Heidegger obviously includes animals) do not have a 
world, which is to say that whatever ontic freedom or determination 
might in fact pertain, ontologically such things do not exist as 
possibilities of themselves. Their existence is closed off in a 
certain way: either closed off into and for the duration of 
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reliability, or into an ahistorical and unprojective will, or closed 
off as self-closing to self and world itself. 
On this model, the happening of truth does not correlate with anything 
like an aesthetic experience. The 'transformation' in the passage 
quoted above is not an event like the dying or bleaching of cloth a 
different colour - nor does the 'submit to' mean a temporary abberation 
in one's weakness or strength. The concept of 'preservation' is 
Heidegger's most explicit attempt (in 'The Origin of the Work of Art') 
to detail the temporality at issue. The work is essentially that which 
1S preserved, even if it is not in fact preserved at all in some moment 
or stretch of time. And, we might expect, the work is essentially that 
which 1S preserved even when it, 1n its familiarity, has become an 
object of everyday banter - and is thus in some way overpreserved. 
Preservation of the work, as the word (at last) suggests, is a way of 
existing with the work as work, and not as a series of possible or 
actual experiences, nor even necessarily beginning with some one 
experience as epiphany. The peculiar constancy of preservation is 
alien to the notion of mere experience, and in precisely the ways we 
suggested above. But this constancy is also other than any enduring 
being-alongside a thing: for preservation constantly comes back to the 
work, 'feeds' on it Heidegger tells us (OWA 67) - preservation 1S how 
one lets the work be in every instance at the origin of the opening and 
holding open of one's world. Not surprisingly, it is immediately after 
introducing preservation that Heidegger makes a brief mention of 
'resoluteness' from Being and Time. 
Moreover, the temporality of this preservation carries an index to the 
belonging of earth and nothing. Only a phenomenon with such a 
fundamental temporal characterisation can be a constant relation not 
only to an individual work as a present thing, but to the sustained 
. f that work (out of the earth), and of event of the com1ng-to-appear 0 
its setting back into hiddenness (within the earth). In other ·.·.'Ords, 
the temporality of the preservation-relation allows the belonging of 
252 
the nothing of earth to its world and world-opening work such that the 
belonging is eventful without being momentary, and yet sustained 
without being substantial. What does this mean? It means that the 
earth, belonging to the world it supports, makes possible in the case 
of the work a peculiar extantness, or 'that-it-is.' 
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2.3.2. That-it-is. 
According to Heidegger's phenomenological analyses, and from the early 
days of his career, the that-it-is of things - which is just the 
becoming-explicit of the fact of their existence is ordinarily 
hidden. We just deal with things, do things, ignore or pay attention 
to things, and so forth. Implicitly, of course, there is some 
recognition of existence in its various modes - but the mere that-it-is 
does not draw attention to itself. In Being and Time, Heidegger allows 
that the that-it-is announces itself in the privative of ordinary 
experiences. For example, in the break-down of equipment, or in its 
simply being out of place or altogether missing. In each of these 
cases, the mere presence-at-hand of the thing shows itself, and indeed 
shows itself as precisely that which refuses itself as such (in its 
proper worldliness) - but always from out of the horizon of the ready-
to-hand. 
But in the work of art, Heidegger now tells us, the that-it-is of the 
work is foremost, and yet not in the mode of the privative with respect 
to any object ready-to-hand. How is this possible, and what are its 
implications? 
Heidegger writes, 
In fabricating equipment - e. g. a stone axe - stone is 
used, and used up. It disappears [verschwinden] into 
usefulness. The material is all the better and more 
suitable [geeigneter] the less it resists perishing in the 
equipmental being of the equipment. By contrast, the 
temple-work, in setting up a world, does not cause the 
material to disappear, but rather causes it to come forth 
for the very first time and to come into the Open of the 
work's world. (OWA, 46) 
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Later, this 
'material' aspect is equated wl'th the " lS and as it is' 
(earth and nothing) . The same theme is expanded l'n th' lS passage, 
But in contrast to all other modes of production, the work 
is distinguished by being created so that its createdness 
is part of the created work . 
... createdness is expressly 
created into the created being, so that it stands out from 
it, from the being thus brought forth, in an expressly 
particular way .... the simple 'factum est' is to be held 
forth into the Open by the work: namely this, that 
unconcealedness of what is has happened here, and that as 
this happening it happens here for the first time; or, that 
such a work is at all rather than is not. (OWA 64-5) 
It should be asked how Heidegger moves from createdness - which, we 
like to think of as one species of 'having come into being', and in 
particular we might wish to talk about concepts like will - to the mere 
, t ha tit is'. Heidegger speaks of the creation of a thing always 
having an eye to the release of the produced thing into its own self-
sufficiency. Thus, the aloneness of the 'that-it-is' must not be seen 
as contradicting the producedness of a thing, for the thing is produced 
precisely in order that it might then stand alone without its producer. 
In fact, Heidegger claims, the self-sufficiency of the work is of a 
more radical nature than that of equipment, and resembles rather the 
un-producedness of the mere thing - though still marked as a created 
thing, as requiring creators. 3 For the piece of equipment is only 
self-sufficient by being created into a certain task-environment 
(usefulness); only the task-environment allows it to appear in itself 
as something. 
But above, we asserted that what was distinctive about the work was 
that it did not happen within the context of equipmental being. Are we 
not contradicting that statement here in speaking of createdness and 
preservedness? On the contrary, if there is some hierarchy to be 
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found, it will place equipment as arl'sl'ng l' 'tl 1 exp lCl y on y within the 
horizon of the world opened by the work. 'I h n t e work of art the truth 
of an entity has set itself to work' (OWA 36). Th e createdness of the 
work has this unique property: the that-l't-l'S 1 proper y removes itself 
from all extant relatl'ons l'n ord t d ' er 0 open an lllurninate a 'i!orld 
specifically its own. Here there is no task-environment , nor any 
implicit or explicit conceptual grasp of the extantness of the extant. 
The self-sufficiency of the work is, ideally, absolute. 
Thus Heidegger writes, 'the artist remains inconsequential as compared 
with the work, almost like a passageway that destroys itself 
[vernichtender Durchgang] in the creative process for the work to 
emerge' (OWA 40). Does this mean that the artist and the world of the 
artist can be safely ignored in the encounter with the work? Not at 
all, for the great artist only negates him or herself in the always 
historical (and always incomplete) transformation of the world - the 
artist is not removed from historical world-disclosure but rather 
overrun by it. We say' always incomplete' because, again, preservation 
always remains to be accomplished. The earth and the nothing jutting 
through the new world in this case means: the entities, significations, 
values and above all decisions that were not but could have been. 
These necessarily belong to the world of the work as precisely that 
which gives it its definition. The essential point is not that the 
work at any time exists outside all prior or subsequent relations 
(which is just silly) but rather that the work, precisely as the strife 
which it is, is constantly lifting itself into a new originality. 
Thus the that-it-is of the work is other than the mere extantness of a 
thing. Or rather it can be, since the work is also a mere thing (as 
the object of conservation, for example), and also a piece of equipment 
(in the art market, and indeed in any market where art is valued in 
general) and it is important to recognise these possibilities. 
However, not only does the mere thing not draw attention to its that-
it-is, but its event-character is limited by its particular mode of 
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being-present. The proper that-1' t-1' s of th k' e wor 1S not to be 
distinguished from the happening of truth in the work. But can we 
describe this happening from the point of view of the that-it-is? 
Such a happening is the emergence of world-destroying and opening truth 
and untruth which Heidegger describes as, again, the rift between world 
and earth on the basis of their belonging to each other. This rift is 
Grund- and Auf-riss, into which the particular being is brought. But, 
Heidegger tells us, the rift comes to the thing, meaning the thing 
created only becomes a work as the happening of truth, when the rift 
sets itself back into - entrusts [anvertrauen (OWA 63)] itself to -
earth. What does this mean? To trust the self- and essentially-
concealing earth means to lay the happening of truth in those hands. 
That is, to allow openness to be given from within closure, but this 
means also that closure comes into the open precisely as the place and 
outline of truth. Only in this way, Heidegger asserts, does the rift 
appear (in stone, paint, words) as the figure of the work, the figure 
being the site where the materiality or thingliness of the work 
considered as an object meets the happening of truth. Again: what does 
this mean? 
The earth is the moment of self-closedness, closedness off from itself 
and from world. This closedness only 'appears to be' [aussieht] (OWA 
64 and again at 69) like materiality, for materiality is interpreted 
(according to the tradition) as the necessarily undisclosed no-thing of 
formlessness - but since in our essential falling we must also and 
without exception also treat the work as a thing, this appearing to be 
materiality must belong to the earth-moment of the work as a possible 
everyday encountering of it. 4 To continue: if the open disclosure of 
the truth of what is is set back into earth, this means that the 
openness must be closed off in some way. But there can be no closing 
off from appearance altogether (that is, from historical Dasein), or 
from the happening of truth (since the work remains a work), but rather 
from all 'our accustomed ties to world and to earth' (ONA). Sut this 
257 
is just the meaning of the work's that-it-is: namely the cutting off 
from prior world, in order to make possible a release for a self-
opening world. For, in addition to the closing of openness there is a 
certain opening of closure: The self-concealing nothing of earth is set 
out and forward as that which supports shape and figure, which 
Heidegger calls the fixing into work of the truth of a newly opening 
world. In this way the work achieves its purpose of being-an-origin. 
Similarly in Introduction to Metaphysics: 'the overpowering as such, in 
order to appear in its power, requires a place, a scene of disclosure' 
(IM, 163). This 'place' is Dasein, as the entity which has world, i.e. 
as the entity to whom things appear. The violence of the bringing-
being-to-appearance can only be partially successful; the site of this 
partial success is the thing, opening up always before man and always 
in his world. The thing is both thingly and historical precisely 
because of this partial success. If in turn the thing took this 
'partial' and held it out before itself, then it would be world opening 
work. 
These lines of thought have important consequences. In the 
introduction to this chapter, we alluded without explanation to the 
dangers involved in attempting to 'recover' or 'translate' Heidegger's 
later work back into the concepts of the earlier period - or vice 
versa, of course. One reason why this should be risky has now been 
discovered. Because the particular manner in which the nothing, in its 
transcendental role, belongs to the appearing things it brings about, 
then any language capable of calling forth this nothing (as the world 
or Being of the thing) must be tied in particularity to the appearing 
thing. Thus Heidegger' s language in the later work is just the 
opposite of systematic. At the end of the 'Addendum' to 'The Origin of 
the Work of Art' Heidegger writes, as if in afterthought: 
There is an unavoidable necessity that the reader, who 
naturally comes to the essay from without, neither at first 
nor for a long time perceive and interpret the state of 
affairs [Sachverhalten] from out of the reticent domain of 
the source of what is to be thought. For the author 
himself, however, there remains the necessity of speaking 
each time in the language most opportune [gunstigen] for 
each of the various stations on his way' [OWA 87, 
translation modified] .5 
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Similar disclaimers can be found, for example, at the beginning of 'The 
Question Concerning Technology', or in throughout Heidegger's lectures 
on language from the late 1950s. Similarly, this passage from 
'Introduction to Metaphysics': 
... Most people [hearing this lecture] listen in the wrong 
direction and become entangled in details. True, even in 
lectures on the special sciences, it is the context that 
counts. But for the sciences the context is determined 
directly by the object, which for the sciences is always in 
some way present. For philosophy on the other hand, the 
obj ect is not present; what is more, philosophy has no 
object to begin with [1M, 85]. 
The object is Being, which is not present but must be made present by 
way of beings (texts, meanings, descriptive passages, examples, 
whatever) . For Being is always the being of beings. We must J look 
completely through' - to borrow a concept from Being and Time - the 
things in order to make Being manifest, to even make the question of 
Being as an object intelligible. But what is looked through cannot be 
simply transparent - if it were, then it would not matter what was 
looked at in order to look through it, and Being as the Being of beings 
would be a generic concept. Thus what is made manifest must belong to 
what was first looked through. 
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In the first quotation, the odd word is 'gunstig' mean1°ng 
opportune or 
favourable, which has unfortunate overtones. As if Heidegger would 
admit that his language were in some way utterly contingent. The ''-o'crd 
comes from 'Gunst' meaning goodwill or even patronage. This seems 
closer to what Heidegger must be after: from each station and each 
state of affairs, a certain language only will as it were receive a 
blessing. The language in fact is something like an endowment of or 
from an authentic comportment to the phenomenon. Now of course there 
is no guarantee that these languages will not in fact coincide - but 
also no guarantee that they will do so. 
This puts the present commentary on difficult ground. But in fact what 
we are trying to do is explain just how and why it 1S difficult - this 
may be paradoxical but is at least honest. And in fact, there must be 
a certain ground, though not exhibitable as such: namely, the pre-
ontological understanding of Being, which Kant would have called a 
priori. This opens up the Hermeneutic circle (and what else has been 
under discussion here?) without also flattening it out. To continue: 
The work of art is not just a disclosure of entities in their truth -
for the truth of the shoes is known, and most properly indeed, by the 
woman who wears them. She needs no painting to go about her tasks in 
the fields, to use the shoes as they are. If the painting is this and 
nothing more, it has no work to do. For 'If anything is questionable 
here, it is rather that we experienced [erfahren] too little in the 
neighbourhood of the work and that we expressed the experience to 
crudely [grob] and too literally [unmittelbar - perhaps 'too directly' 
or even 'too soon']' (OWA, 36). Heidegger says the work does not tell 
us what a piece of equipment is or does, but rather brings 
equipmentality itself to appearance (OWA, 36). 
But similarly, if the work is just the disclosure of world-historical 
existence, Heidegger lists several other types of events which do the 
same (OWA, 62). The essence of art must be something mere or 
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different. And indeed, Heidegger immediately after writes, 
I ~';here 
[the] bringing forth expressly brings the openness of beings, or truth, 
that which is brought forth is a work' (OWA, 62). Th k e wor , then, is 
the explicit disclosure of entities as disclosed. But in what way 
'explicit'? For it is contrary to the being of equipment that they 
should become explicitly (i.e. thematically) disclosed ~s/still be as ~. 
equipment. And it is contrary to the being of mere things that they 
should ever be explicitly disclosed, except as precisely that which 
keeps itself undisclosed. Certainly, according to Heidegger, the 
painting helps us to understand what the shoes are, but not merely as 
pieces of equipment themselves - for that we would need to wear them 
and experience, or rather not experience, their particular reliability. 
Nor did the painting bring them to us as mere things, under any 
interpretation of thingliness. Rather, the work disclosed the world 
within which the shoes were equipment - it disclosed the fundamental 
meaning of equipmentality for the world of the peasant woman. 
We thus interpret this ' explicit disclosure' as the disclosure of 
disclosure itself. This means, the disclosure of not the stri fe 
(which is the opening world, which can be experienced as nothing but 
the appearing in significance of things) but the striving (which is the 
world-opening, the originating and which can be experienced as 
originating) . It is the work of art, Heidegger tells us, which first 
brings us into contact with what truth and world and Being are, and 
thus first brings them to thought. More then than the site of world-
opening, it is the citing of that site, rousing preservers towards a 
comportment to a new world of significance and towards a thinking 
comportment to the phenomenon of newness itself - not then just towards 
the origin but towards origination. The work is the site and the cite 
of situation. 
Art then phenomena since it is the most privileged of world-opening 
also opens opening. t d all art Heidegger For this reason, ar - an , 
claims, is essentially poetry - is neighbour to thought. The work 
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accomplished by the work is the setting of the question for thought; 
the work accomplished by thought is the preserving of the work as 
question, i.e. the preserving of art in its essence. 
The question now is how are we to understand or at least think through 
the 'intimacy' of the 'rift'. 
262 
2.3.3. The Form of the Fourfold. 
Consider the following passage from Heidegger's 1951 lecture, 
Wohnen, Denken': 
'Bauen, 
The producing [hervorbringen] of ... things is building. 
Its nature consists in this, that 1S corresponds 
[entspricht] to the character of these things. They are 
places [Orte] that allow [verstatten] spaces. This is why 
building, by virtue of erecting places, is an endowing 
[Stiften] and joining [Fugen] of spaces. Because building 
produces places, the joining of the spaces of these places 
1S necessarily also accompanied [kommt mit in] by 
space, as 'spatium' and 'extensio', into the thingly 
structure [gefuge] of buildings. But building never shapes 
[gestaltet] 'the' space. Neither immediately nor 
mediately. Nevertheless, because it produces things as 
places, building is closer [naher] to the nature of spaces 
and to the origin of the nature [Wesensherkunft] of 'the' 
space than any geometry and mathematics. Building erects 
places that space out a site for the fourfold. From the 
simple oneness [Einfach] in which earth and sky, divinities 
and mortals belong to each other, building receives 
[empfangt] the direction [Weise] for its erecting of 
places. From the fourfold, building takes on [ubernehmen] 
the standard [Mass] for all traversing [durchmessen] and 
each measuring [ausmessen] of the spaces that in each case 
are spaced out by the endowed places. 6 
Let us begin by noting some peculiarities. First among these must be 
the absolute saturation of the above passage with a spacial vocabulary 
- and why not, since Heidegger is talking of space. 
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'The producing ... of things is building': 'to produce' here translates 
'hervorbringen' which might also be rendered 't b' o ring out in front', 
Two paragraphs later Heidegger will make thi'S l' iteral meaning 
explicit. 7 Again, 'Things are places that allow spaces': 'to allow' 
translates 'verstatten' which is related to the noun 'statte' used by 
Heidegger a few lines below, and translated 'site'i were it not 
overelaborate, we could thus translate this sentence as 'things are 
places which allow spaces to be situated'. 
'Immediately' and 
'mediately' are involved in roots that mean not merely the means, as in 
means to an end, but also the middle or between of a spacial stretch, 
Then, the suggestion of spacial movement in 'corne with' [kommen mit] 
(here: 'accompany') should be heard. And so on and so forth. 
And what is the space discussed here with almost every word? Is this 
space Newtonian space, the container of objects? Certainly not: that 
would be 'the' space. Is it Leibniz' relational space, such that 
essentially non-spacial intelligible entities exhibit certain relations 
between them as space? For building never shapes 'the' space, and 
produces space in producing things. And yet, again, not: for how could 
such spaces be joined, situated, endowed? Is it then Kantian space, on 
the ordinary understanding of Kantian space, such that space is indeed 
a priori, but not in the transcendental thing, but rather as a form of 
relations for all outer intuition? But Heidegger does not mention the 
subj ecti vi ty of the subj ect, or the distinction between things in 
themselves and phenomena. We are left with a space - or let us say a 
spaciality - that is not to be distinguished from things, but is to be 
distinguished from 'the' space. Things are spacial in that things are 
places, but things (in being erected) allow spaces to be situated, 
endowed, joined. What does this mean? 
A thing is a thing neither primarily because of its intelligibility, 
nor because of its extension. Rather, a thing is a place [Ort]. Ort 
is very often used like 'locale', to refer particularly to villages or 
towns. We might say similarly that 'Kenilworth is a quiet place' or 
264 
'In this town there are pubs allover the place.' Place as Ort is 
linked to dwelling in a very ordinary sense. In erecting locations, 
Heidegger says, spaces are endowed and joined. The word translated as 
'endow' is 'Stiften', which can mean two very different things', . pln, 
tack, pen, etc.; but also 'endow', 'charter', 'found', 'grant'. Many 
associations come to mind: the pen which signs the charter; the nail 
which attaches a decree to the door, and also the nails which hold 
together the public door or building itself, etc. The sense of Stiften 
is of an act which founds an important entity. Not surprisingly, the 
word behind 'joining' has similar associations. Fugen can mean either 
to join, to fix or put in place; or also to decree, to ordain. Even 
the word 'errichten' to erect, has etymological associations with 
'recht', meaning law or right; through these, errichten also carries 
figuratively the meaning 'to establish.' For Heidegger, spaces and 
places are always si~nificant, and thus always at the origin of the 
identity of a community; if not, it 1S not merely that they would not 
be noticed or perceived, but they would not be places or spaces at all. 
We must clarify a four-way distinction: between Ort, place; Raum, a 
space; Raum, 'the' space; and Statte, site. It would be nice if we 
could effect a sort of transcendental management buy-out and say: 
places allow sites which endow spaces which necessarily let in 'the' 
space. Unfortunately, this would not be appropriate. The management 
just doesn't have that kind of clout. We can, however, at least say 
this: spaces are endowed and joined within the same gesture as the 
erection of a place. The erection of place means (perhaps among other 
things) the endowing of spaces. Further, 'the' space must be 
considered either a secondary phenomenon, or a completely other 
phenomenon. Finally, the site, has a meaning complicated by the 
But site, appearance of the word 'verstatten' as we observed above. 
wheresoever it fits in, 1S always used in conjunction with the Geviert: 
site of, site for, etc. To anticipate: site is place and space 
considered ontologically as where the happening of truth 'takes place'. 
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We are now confronted by the concept of the Gevl'ert. Th' , lS lS an old 
word in German which has three main meanings·. fl'rst, l't simply means 
rectangle or square , for example, buildings standl'ng l'n or forming a 
square; second, it means a crib or cribbage in ml'nl'ng, a square wooden 
or metal structure for reinforcing the stone of a mine shaft _ an 
interesting partial reversal of Plato's cave; third, it means a quad or 
quadrat, a piece of metal used in typesetting to form the blank spaces 
between words. All of these usages have two things in common: first, 
trivially, that they are four-sided, rectilinear objects; second, most 
importantly, they are things which support or hold open empty but 
protected spaces. For these reasons and others, I do not like the word 
'fourfold'. The form of the word Geviert seems to suggest a noun made 
from a verb, a verb such as the non-existent 'vieren', to four. The 
four, earth, sky, divinities and mortals - the four four, in the same 
way that Heidegger elsewhere says that space spaces, time times, or 
world worlds. We might translate 'Geviert' as 'the enclosing four', or 
as 'the opening square'. The link between Geviert and Lichtung is 
certainly clear. 
How does the concept of the Geviert function in the passage we have 
quoted? If the four are four, we ask, how can they be one? Because, 
Heidegger tells us, they belong to each other: zueinander geh6ren. 8 
The relation of gehoren to horen, to listen, is evident. The four 
listen to each other essentially and from the first. 'On the earth' 
Heidegger writes a few pages previously, already means 'under the sky', 
before the divinities, and with men. 9 Provisionally, we are not here 
interested in the content of these four 'categories', which are at once 
I ' I (as l' f that difference could be mythological and phenomeno oglca 
I ' I In partl'cular, we do not maintained) and in some sense cosmo oglca . 
want to be too hasty in identifying the two 'earths'. Rather, we are 
interested in the structure or form of fouring. No doubt the two 
, t d l'n such a fashion, as if the four were lnterests cannot be separa e 
just any four; thus, we must speak provisionally. In any case, the 
whole context of Heidegger' s text forces us to identify the ',oIorld-
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opening event of the intimate striving between world d h' 
an eart w1th the 
fouring of the four. 
For Heidegger, the task of dwelling 1S to preserve the Geviert .10 
Preserve translates 'schonen': to care for, spare, look after. This is 
a different word than bewahren, also translated 'preserve', in 'The 
Origin of the Work of Art'. There, the semantic incentive was the 
'wahr' (true) in bewahren. The etymological link of schonen with schon 
(fine or beautiful) should be noted, and helps us to make the 
transition between the earlier and later texts. Heidegger writes at 
length on the meaning of preservation, concluding that it means to free 
a thing to be what it is. To preserve the Geviert would be to let the 
earth be earth, the sky sky, etc. We preserve the four by cultivating 
and building in accordance with the four. Building, Heidegger says, 
takes on the standard from the four in the expanded sense of assuming 
responsibility for the four. Not quite, though: Heidegger says 
building receives the direction for its erecting not from the four but 
precisely from the oneness of the four. Authentic building, then, must 
take responsibility for the one-in-four. What does this mean? 
Is the building-preserving a kind of event, the unity of which 
collocates the four as vectors into one (one here being a different 
kind of counting from the four)? Surely, though, this would make of 
the Geviert something more contingent than Heidegger would like. It 
hardly needs to be said, however, that what would certainly be a 
mistake would be to think of the four as individual or self-identical, 
the interrelationships among which are either contingent or 
internalized properties of their identity. One does not preserve the 
four as one in the same way four are one in mixed fruit preserves of 
such and such a recipe. And further, is it not precisely the oneness 
which grants to such a building-event its signification as a (temporal) 
eVent? An event would not be an event if it did not signify from out 
of the one; it would be a heap of incidents in the mathematical and 
disjointed understanding of time. The building 'instantiates' the one 
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in four in the sense of housing or sheltering the one in four within a 
particular entity. But this also means to bring about the presencing 
of the oneness of the four as such, i t f 
.e. 0 ree them to be, which 
means to come to appearance. We should remember that Heidegger only 
comes to the fourfold by way of an analysl's f b 'ld' o Ul lng as dwelling. 
This housing forms the eventhood of building, which is the preparing of 
a site for the fouring of the four. 
since it is of the essence of the four to belong or listen to one 
another, preservation of the four must be preservation of the one-in-
four. If preservation means to let be in its being, then it is the 
being of the four not to be four but to be one. The four are one 
before they are four - and yet their fourness is not a disintegration 
of the one, nor an analysis or dismemberment or abstraction or 
contextualisation. Similarly, in the erecting of a building, spaces 
are joined and yet are not spaces prior to the joining. The direction 
by the Geviert means that the places and spaces are directed outside 
themselves - are important and noticed: listened to. Heidegger writes 
a few lines below our quotation that 'genuine buildings give form 
[pragen] to dwelling in its presencing [Wesen] and house [behausen] 
this presence.' 11 Places and spaces are directed outside but before 
there is such a thing as an inside or an outside. Thus ins ide and 
outside cannot here be imaged in terms of purity. To put it another 
way: the very issue of a pure inside cannot be raised or recognised 
except on the condition of a dis-purity. 
What is this, such that the one is prior to the four, and yet the four 
are, have being, are not 'quarters of'? Shall we put this question 
into a slightly different language: What is this, we now ask, such that 
the whole is prior to the parts, and yet the parts are not merely 
portions of a whole? We immediately recognise such a quest ion as 
essentially the same as we encountered in our passage through l<:ant, but 
here given explicitly and indeed celebrated. 12 
268 
2.3.4. Mirror-play and the Form of the World. 
One of Heidegger's most elaborate discussions of this event of fouring 
occurs in the essay 'The Thing' - which usefully for our purposes 
concerns itself both with the being of things and of nearness. We will 
find innumerable new ways to express and finesse the basic concepts 
given above. 
It should be noted that the notion of the fourfold seems to have been 
a brief fling of Heidegger's - but to say Heidegger 'moved on' would be 
hard to maintain. Therefore we remain with the fourfold, even to the 
detriment of a sustained and explicit discussion of what many consider 
Heidegger's chief 'concept' of the later work: Ereignis. Nevertheless, 
Ereignis is what we have been thinking through all along. 
At least four relatively new vocabulary items appear here: 'nearness', 
'mirroring', 'ring'. Many formulas, each as meaningless as the next, 
can be used to interrelate them provisionally. One such might be: 
nearness means the ring which joins the four together in that each 
mirrors and plays to the other, and in so doing first brings itself 
into its own. Not very helpful - the question is, can we use the new 
words, put together with such obvious care, to arrive at an enhanced 
understanding of the worlding of the world? The appropriate way to ask 
this question is by going through a different question, namely: in what 
way these new words call the phenomena? 
The word 'spiegel', right back to its latin word 'speculum' refers to 
sight, just as 'horen' and its family referred to hearing. But the odd 
reversal characteristic of mirror images pertains: one looks at 
something, to see one's self. In the mirror, one's self becomes at 
once both more familiar and more alien by joining a public image-space. 
Indeed, imagine (if one can at all) the cribbage or fourfold with four 
walls as four mirrors. Are there four mirrors now, or only one? There 
is only the light, endlessly travelling, without ever forming an image. 
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But if the mirror or mirrors do not form an l'mage, h t en there is no 
sight, no looking at. And the reverse: if there l'S sl'ght d 1 an ooking 
at - 1.e. if something appears there - then the l' , d mage lS a pro uct only 
of all four mirrors, at once, corning together in a particular manner. 
Of course, we are only speculating about some possible factors lying in 
this word. 
'Spiel' comes from an old word meaning dance, which no doubt suggests 
'Reigen' (Round-dance) a page later. One is also reminded of phrases 
like 'spielraum', which referred to the open space which Dasein' s 
understanding of Being opened and held open so that beings and their 
ontic relationships might appear. What seems pertinent in the ordinary 
concept of play, whether in theatre or in the sense of a game, is that 
which parallels our treatment of 'mirror'. In play, there is a certain 
free forfeit or risk of identity in favour of an identity constituted 
from out of a mutual play-environrnent. 13 In play, one is a player in 
a game made possible by the other players - even in solo play, since 
there is always an implicit protagonist and antagonist (the dice, the 
cards, the rules) with which and against which I identify myself as 
player. ' ... Each of the four plays to each of the others' (TT, 179). 
Playing forms, and does so explicitly, its own miniature world. 
Similarly with dance: dance, as Yeats might say, is always a dancing in 
a unity with others and especially with the music. 
This is even more emphasised when we notice that, in its first use in 
the essay, play is not just 'Spiel' but 'zuspielen' - to play to, as to 
pass the ball to another player. And again, not just 'zuspielen' but 
'sich zuspielen', to pass one's self to another. The four become the 
four within the game through passing themselves each to the other. 
Just like the mirrors, the game becomes everything, and its world the 
only world. But just as with four as mirrors there could be, from 
themselves, no image so here, in the endless passing around and 
through the players or the dancers, there may be world, but there 1S no 
game as such. , l't must be entered in a For the game to begln, 
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determinate manner, the endless pas . h slng gat ered together into a 
certain configuration and made tranquil and sustained. In old German, 
tranquillity was 'hwila', the root for Heidegger's 'weilen' or 
'verweilen' (to stay, but here in the sense of: to bring something to 
a stand so that it stays) Thus 'the gift of the outpouring [of the 
jug] is a gift because it stays [verweilen] earth and sky, divinities 
and mortals .... Staying appropriates [ereignet]. It brings the four 
into the light of their mutual belonging [Eigenen] From out of 
staying's simple onefoldness they are betrothed, entrusted [zugetraut] 
to one another' [TT, 173]. The eventful essence of the jug, the 
ability to keep the water or wine and pour it out in gift, is also the 
event of the appropriative presencing of the fourfold. In a similar 
fashion, we saw above how the building made possible the as suchness of 
the fourfold their coming to appearance. Even more than in 
'Building, Dwelling, Thinking', we notice here how the whole issue of 
the fourfold is introduced from out of the question of the jug. Thus 
to 'stay' the four in the thing means to realise the oneness of the 
fourfold for possible appearance as the very worlding of world. 
'Ring' shows up ln many different words throughout the passage. It 
first shows up unannounced, as it were, on the first page. Heidegger 
is talking about the levelling off of all distance by modern technology 
and attitudes towards things. Heidegger writes, 'Nearness does not 
consist in small measures of distance. What stands in the smallest 
distance from us, with respect to the measurement that distance 
through the image on film, or the sound on the radio can remaln 
distant from us' (TT, 165, translation modified). What I have 
translated as 'small' lS the word 'gering'i Heidegger also uses 
'Verringerung' meaning reduction. The root word here and the ring 
(meaning circular form or obj ect) used later have no etymological 
connection. h ld . of 'ring' that The gesture towards teo meanlngs 
Heidegger makes are in fact a gesture towards the first root, not the 
second. It does not matter if Heidegger was careless or misinformed. 
For the important connection lies only in Heidegger's project of 
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reappropriating language to an authent1' c ' f exper1ence 0 Being. 
Therefore, in line with the explicit attempt to recover a meaning for 
nearness outside the concept of measurement, his point would be that 
the real meaning of 'small', 'modest', 'slight' or 'close' is the ring 
of the fourfold in the worlding of the world. 
Indeed, having prepared the ground fifteen pages earlier, in the 
context of the latter meaning Heidegger even goes so far as to make up 
three new words. The first is the transitive verb 'ringen' - such a 
verb exists but means to wring (one's hands) or wrest (something away 
from someone) . Here it presumably means 'to join into a ring'. The 
second is the deliberately ambiguous noun 'Gering'. He writes, 'The 
gathered presence of the mirror-play of the world, becoming joined in 
a ring, is the Gering' (TT 180). How are we to understand this, as 
linked to the meanings small or slight, or to the meaning circle? 
Clearly both. Only on this condition does Heidegger feel authorised to 
return back (on the next page) to the question of nearness. Finally, 
Heidegger uses the word 'das Ringe' clearly equating it on the basis of 
his brief etymology with 'Fugsam', translated 'compliant'. 
An additional but illuminating complexity is found in Heidegger's use 
of the verb entringen (to wrest something away from something). Here, 
however, there is no 'from'. The mirror-play wrests not from but to: 
to the ownmost compliancy of the one-in-four (TT 180). There is no 
essence before the wresting, no 'from' where the four lay beforehand, 
the wresting to or for (the becoming joined in a ring through 
mirroring) is all. 
There 1S no need to analyze the word nearness [Nahe]; we have our 
answer already. Nearness means allowing things to arrive from out of 
the worlding of world. 
However, one element 1S , b 'ts relat1've absence consp1cuoUS Y 1 in 
Heidegger's late descriptions of the fouring of the four. As we have 
seen, the four are explicitly identified with the 
concept of ~orld. 
Where, then, has (in the language of 'The Origin of the Work of Art') 
the earth gone? Earth is the concealment - indeed, self-concealment _ 
necessary for spacing out the space of unco 1 
ncea ment as the essence of 
In the language of the essay 'The Thing', we might construe 
this as the farness or remoteness [Ferne] f rom out of which nearness, 
truth. 
as event, brings near - and which, of course, makes possible any kind 
of bringing near. In fact, only half a paragraph is devoted to this 
notion - a notion which, as we argued above, was absolutely central for 
Heidegger in the twenties and thirties. This is the passage: 
Nearness brings near [nahert] the far [Ferne] and indeed as 
the far. Nearness preserves [wahrt] farness. Preserving 
farness, nearness presences in its bringing-near [Nahern]. 
Bringing near in this way, nearness conceals its own self 
and remains, in its own way, nearest of all (TT 177-8, 
translation modified) 14 
Notice here that Heidegger has used 'wahren' for preserve, as in 'The 
Origin of the Work of Art' - and we realise the inner connection which 
makes that not at all surprising. What Heidegger fails to do in this 
essay is to remain with this theme and show it at work within the 
complex structure of the fourfold. Only one sentence hints as this. 
A few lines above Heidegger had written: 'Staying, the thing brings the 
four, in their remoteness, near to one another' (TT, 177). But above 
we said the wresting, the bringing to the joining ring, was all. ;·Jhat, 
then, are the four 'in their remoteness'? This apparent self-
contradiction is one unfortunate consequence of Heidegger's distancing 
himself from the theme of concealment. 
But if nearness is not a measure of distance, then farness too is no 
measure, and is consequently no place. Farness is the no plac~ and 
nowhere discussed in Being and Time. Remoteness, then, is ncthing in 
th f b . t from the realm of possible s::.?~,ting, e sense 0 elng remo e 
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thinking, knowing. The remoteness of the f . our 1S not, then, some 
sovereign and absolute state wherein the four rest beyond all pla::'ing 
and mirroring. Rather, remoteness belongs to the possible appearance 
of the authentic thing as its possibility. And the play bet't.'een near 
and far is, literally for once, spacing. 
Now we read that nearness brings near as the far. Even in arriving at 
the particular thing, even in being , housed', , gathered' or ' stayed' 
there, the four maintain themselves in their remoteness. This means 
they maintain their transcendental aspect, and make possible the 
appearance not merely of this entity, but of this entity in a world. 
Only if there is a difference between thing and world - and the most 
radical difference: between appearing and concealing - can the thing 
appear as it is. World must here be understood differently from in 
'Origin of the Work of Art'. Here, the worlding of the world names 
nothing else than the Being of entities, which in the earlier work 
corresponds to the struggle for appearance as the struggle between 
'world' and earth. World, considered with respect to the full 
phenomenon of truth, as the essential and historical directions of 
decision and thus of all possible actions, significances and 
appearances, is that nothing to which any individual appearance 
necessarily gestures by virtue of its appearance. 
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2.3.5. World and Art. 
We have apparently moved far from the realm of art. First to building, 
where there is little suggestion that by building Heidegger means great 
architecture. Then just to things like jugs - and again not just fine 
ceramics. 
In one sense, all we are doing is recognising the relative emptiness 
and uselessness of a concept of 'art'. Not for the reason, however, 
that modern art has so expanded the concept as to nullify it. And also 
not for the reason that analysis has demonstrated that art is 
historically and ideologically imbedded and thus anything but 
distinctively liberating (in the ordinary sense of that word). 
Heidegger suggests another reason: as phenomena of the worlding of 
world, art objects are (almost by definition) of secondary importance. 
In the very act of preservation, the world-opening work of art 
necessarily withdraws in the face of things. Indeed, it opens world 
for things, so that things might be able to take a stand in and create 
a site for the fourfold. If works of art are origins, they are 
preserved and celebrated not in contemplating the spring but 1n 
drinking the water. 
But in another and simultaneous sense, art remains in force. It might 
be useful here to interpret in some depth Heidegger's late lectures on 
language - but there is no real need to proliferate interpretations. 
A single passage will suffice: 
If we must, therefore, seek the speaking of language in 
what is spoken, we shall do well to find something that is 
spoken purely rather than to pick just any spoken material 
at random. What 1S spoken purely is that in which the 
completion of the speaking that is proper to what is spoken 
is, in its turn, an original [anfangende]. What is spoken 
purely is the poem. ('Language', 194). 
This seems clear enough. It thus tur h 
ns out t at, if art is understood 
as essentially poetry (as l't alread ' " y was In 'Orlgln of the Work of 
Art') , the movement between 1935 and 1950 ' lS not an emptying of the 
concept of art, but a heightened enthusiasm for the possibilities of 
mere things and thus of the language of things. Though less obvious , 
this enthusiasm was already present: for example, in the assertion in 
Introduction to Metaphysics that 'Language is the primordial poetry In 
which a people speaks being' (IM, 171). Again, what has happened is 
not so much a broadening and emptying of the concept of art or poetry, 
as a recognition of the intimate mutual relationships between Art, 
world, things and nothing. Of course, it will always remain difficult 
to think of nothingness as 'intimate'. We have attempted to explain 
what this means above. 
Heidegger continues the passage from 'Language': if what is at issue is 
the very speaking of language, then we require not merely a pure 
speaking but a pure speaking which addresses itself to this issue. 
This opens Heidegger to one of two oft-repeated charges: 1) Heidegger 
construes all poetry as itself about poetry; 2) Heidegger ignores 
poetry that is not itself 'about poetry. These accusations begin at the 
place Heidegger abandons, namely with the thesis that language in its 
essence (rather than contingently and when misunderstood) represents 
things, and thus can be considered in complete separation from things. 
Thus, it would be better to say that, for Heidegger, all (great) poetry 
is indeed itself about poetry not because it implicitly or explicitly 
addresses itself to its own language and art; but rather, insofar as it 
not only opens up an encounter with what-is in its world-site, but 
opens 'anfanglich'. That is, brings the origin out into the open as 
origin: opens the world-site and cites it. In this way Heidegger 
indicates the role of art. As a phenomenon of significance, it is one 
Worldly thing among others. However, as a phenomenon of the citing of 
originating site, art (as poetry) is both neighbour to though,= and 
vital for the happening of the history of Dasein. 
Further, as we have seen, what the earlier, middle and later '::crk a ~ ~ 
make clear is the elaborate and mysteriously structured spacing 
(between the near and the far, the present and the absent, the open and 
the closed, beings and nothing) which makes this siting and citing 
possible. The appearance of worldly things is the happening of this 
spacing. 
The same notions of spacing are given here as were present in Kant's 
thinking about the forms of intuition, and in Heidegger's early thought 
concerning what we have called 'neighbourhood space': the primacy of 
difference and span over position, of wholeness over parts and 
collections of parts, of exteriority over interiority, of possibility 
over actuality, of surface and field over representation, and so forth. 
As if such lists ever accomplished much, or as if such a list were a 
list of all that was 'good' over all that was 'bad'. One could just as 
easily turn the list upside down and talk about the primacy of position 
over difference, etc. Indeed, no doubt one could deconstruct the poles 
of this list, showing elaborate structures of cross-pollination. But 
this would accomplish nothing more that what Kant had already done in 
the first Critique. Nobody here ever claimed that difference was not 
a concept, or that it later became one - or that position was not an 
intuition in the sense of a way of seeing. At issue are Being-
characteristics, nothing more. If such lists help prop up for the 
duration our (initially arbitrary) historical inquiry - or if they put 
a practicable edge on the tools of Kantian and Heideggerian Critique -
then so much the better. 
Initially, we would have liked to take up these tools and questions, 
and take them to contemporary European philosophy. Certainly, we 
intended it to be obvious all along that this was the direction the 
work was moving. However, the limitations of space and time prevented 
this. This is work for the future. Now, the task is to briefly access 
the region we have crossed. 
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Notes 
1. We should hurriedly note that closure and 
something different (almost in fact the opposite) t opehnness r.ere me~n 
Kant. 0 w at they meant In 
2. The more Heidegger here sounds like Gadamer the m t. 
1 d Wh' h' h' , ore as ra I ' .. .re 
,ea. lC lS no~ lng against Gada.mer, of course, merely that 
lnterests carry a dlfferent emphasis and language. 
are 
h i -~'=' 
3. It is valuable to note just how Kantian this is. 
4. cf. Heidegger's discussl'on of the essent' 1 b' , la am 19U1ty In 
'appearance' in 1M 182ff. 
5. 
6. Heidegger, M. 
Language, Thought. 
'Building, Dwelling, Thinking'. In, Poetry, 
7. Heidegger, 159. 
8. Heidegger, p. 149. 
9. Heidegger, 149. 
10. Heidegger, p. 159. 
11. Heidegger, p. 159. 
as in Being and Time. 
The notion of 'genuine' lS as troubling here 
12. This is perhaps what it means to evaluate Heidegger. From a 
completely argumentative philosophy in Kant, wherein certain shadows 
were cast across the arguments and their form, in Heidegger we find 
these same shadows brought to a certain kind of light. To the extent 
that such a ' finding' is possible in Heidegger, we can properly 
conclude that he is engaging productively in the history of philosophy. 
13. Cf. Heidegger 'The Principle of Identity'. The leap out of 
representational thinking risks the abyss, unless it rediscovers the 
'ground' of identity in Ereignis. The risk is never merely apparent. 
14. This is of course the flip-side of Heidegger's opening question 
from within the modern: 'What is nearness if, along with its own 
failure to appear, remoteness also remains absent?' (TT 166). 
2.4 
Inconclusions. 
2.4.0. 
In part at least, this work has been its own conclusion. As an 
investigation attempting an historical reconstruction of a problem and 
the implications of that problem, the reconstruction should suffice to 
itself. 
Yet of course this essay has been not one but two reconstructions. We 
have forged links along the way, attempting to make the two sounding 
boards for each other - which in the author's development of these 
ideas they certainly have been, although it is entirely possible that 
this may not be apparent. We suspect the above work still looks like 
two shorter essays run arbitrarily together, each perhaps with 'its own 
conclusion.' To make the two one would have meant either a) violating 
the code with which we began - i.e. the code requiring of us a certain 
fidelity to the inner movements and language of the author discussed; 
or b) writing a thesis called 'Kant and Heidegger', which has been 
done, several times, and well. 
This text has been named 'Kant, Heidegger and Spacing'. It is both 
thematic and doubly historical, and must bow to both genres. The 
former demands that the subject be unified and the inquiry completed. 
The latter demands respect for difference - though of course history 
can be made a theme. At the end of such a hybrid, what does one do 
when coming into conclusion? The only option is to write about 
spacing. 
2.4.1. Worlds. 
Let us broaden our discussion but stay with th f 11 . 
, e u notlon of world 
with which we ended the previous chapter. 
Kant sometimes uses the word 'Welt', in contrast to 'cosmos', to mean 
not just the whole collection of existent things, but the laws 
governing their existence (that is to say, governing their appearance) . 
Heidegger would describe such a world as the realm of everyday 
comportment and ontic science. What he means by world is something 
and yet, as we have seen over and over, that different to Kant 
difference is none the less inscribed in Kant. Heidegger means that 
different form of wholeness (entities as a whole, which essentially 
means the possibility of entities being as a whole - rather than the 
mere totality of entities) which makes possible the appearing In 
significance of the thing, but is not itself thingly, and precisely 
because of this cannot appear with the thing. 
In Kant, this other 'world' would precisely describe those a priori and 
transcendental forms which we have discussed in part 1. These include: 
Space and time as forms of intuition, the propriety of which we have 
discussed at length, but which necessarily appear to the understanding 
as extant, empty, measurable containers. We have also seen that it 
matters even for discusive knowledge that intuition should be so 
formed: this form describes both the possibility (in our analysis of 
the Principles) and the limits (in the notion of schemata as models) of 
such knowledge. Further, such a 'world' would include apperception as 
the form of consciousness, which has many formal features in common 
with the forms of intuition, both in its presentation function and in 
the way it makes possible the 'I think here/now' of full self-
consciousness, and which is necessarily encountered as the s~'nthetic, 
And continuous and 'stretched' production of the global 'I think'. 
finally the Ideas of Reason, considered as the carrying back of 
syllogisms not just to their totality of conditions but to what makes 
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possible that totality in its wholeness. Such ideas are encountered as 
illegitimate application and potential metaphysical illusion, but ':.'hich 
precisely because of this distinctive 'carrying-back', nevertheless 
regulate and guide the understanding to its proper end. 
All of these moments in Kant, then, appear or are encountered as part 
of the world in Kant's sense, but for which it is at least possible, 
from within that everyday world, to point out the paradoxes (starting 
with incongruent counterparts, and ending with the peculiar law-
likeness of the beautiful) which suggest a different realm and laws. 
We explored in what way such a world was revealed by the phenomenon of 
art on Kant's interpretation - i.e. in what way art made possible an 
encounter, and thus a peculiar understanding of, the supersensible. 
Indeed, it is only on the basis of phenomena like art that the 
'supersensible' ever shows itself to be transcendental for experience, 
rather than just empty hypotheses of pure reason. Thus, for example, 
the odd status of Kant's teleological proof for the existence of God. 
These limit-transcendental elements thus form, in Heidegger's sense, 
the world. 
But the first characteristic of such a world, for each philosopher and 
in every instance and element therein, is spacing. 
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2.4.2. Spacing. 
startling is the prevalence of the language and concepts of space in 
describing (or rather intimating) th ' e proprlety of this ' other' to 
things. From the moment that Kant, onl ' y pages lnto the Critique of 
Pure Reason (B7-8), starts talking about the foundations of building, 
about the circle of experience, or about d tt ' oves a emptlng to fly in a 
vacuum, the spacial analogies take over. Of course all ordinary things 
are spacial. But what is important in the metaphors of building, dove 
and circle are not bUl'ldl'ngs, doves d '1 h' an Clrc es as t lngs, but 
precisely the way they relate to space. Thus, they are not just any 
metaphors which happen to use objects in space, but rather are 
explicitly spacial metaphors. 
It does not, however, take much effort to show that these analogies are 
inconsistent even with each other. In the analogy of building, the 
value is support to remain motionless; in the analogy of the dove, the 
value is support to make advance and progress; in the analogy of the 
circle, the value is of safety against outside threat. These are not 
all the same value, although they are all important to Kant. Of 
course, this itself proves nothing except that Kant was not a 
tremendously talented or careful writer. It at least suggests, 
however, that from beginning to end Kant envisaged all philosophical 
problems in terms of space - even against the strict logic of the 
analogies themselves. Numerous are those who would tell us how much an 
unfortunate and rather sloppy mistake all this was for Kant - but what 
if it was not a mistake, what if in fact it was an implicit recognition 
that the phenomenon we have called spacing is an important factor in 
all processes and components which are transcendental for experience? 
Take the most famous analogy, that of building. 1 Let us think it 
through as Heidegger might have done. contrasted with the image of 
building one's building on a firm and in advanced secured foundation is 
the image of building without foundation at all, which is presumably 
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impossible. But Kant's analogy then forces him to say 1) not that such 
building is impossible, but that such building is a sham; 2) 
the building but the inspection into building itself 
it is not 
which is 
dangerous. The analogy thus seems to be very imprecise. But we have 
not yet been generous enough. Suppose Kant meant to imply not that 
building is only possible on a foundation (which results in the analogy 
being strained'to bursting) but that building a place to live securely 
is only possible on a firm foundation. Then, 1) sham building means to 
build a house not fit to live in and 2) inspection is dangerous because 
not because it reveals the ' house' for what it is, but because it 
brings the house down. 
But this interpretation depends upon several other factors: 1) that 
, living securely' means to live within the house: such that the 
structure of the house is part of one's life; 2) 'living securely' also 
means living freely: there is no part of the house which cannot be 
inspected; 3) 'living securely' however also means living freed: one 
can inspect any part of the house, but there is no need to, one can 
move on to other things - or rather, the moving always 'within the 
house' on to other things (continuing to build) just is the free 
inspection of foundation. To build securely then means, in Heidegger's 
language, to dwell. 
This somewhat bizarre interpretation would have no credibility if it 
did not in fact point to some essential elements in Kant's thought. 
There is an illusion, fostered by Kant himself at times, that Critique 
as transcendental science is something Kant did, or could have done, 
once, and which could be left behind precisely as the secure 
foundation. But at B25 Kant tells us that searching for such an 
, organon of pure reason' would be ' demanding a great deal'. Thus 
rather than organon, we have Critique, which presents merely the idea 
of a science - an idea among, it must be noted, other regulati \-e ideas. 
Kant, despite his basic optimism, does not underestimate the lngenuity 
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of pure reason. Further, the continuation of Kant's work 
, the filling 
in of the architectonic, has certain limits of its own: 
No one attempts to establish a science unless he has an 
idea upon which to base it. But in the working out of the 
science, the schema, nay even the definition which, at the 
start, he first gave the science, is very seldom adequate 
to the idea. For this idea lies in reason like an embryo 
[Keim], in which lie hidden all the parts, still undivided 
[einwickeln] and barely recognisable even under microscopic 
observation. [A834=B862] 
Thus, not merely at first but perpetually must the reference of the 
working-out of the science refer itself back and adjust itself to 
reason. Naturally, this requires also a certain critical vigilance 
such that these references back do not force an adjustment to an 
improperly understood whole. The work of critique is thus never 
finished, and must in fact be nothing other than the authentic and 
secure work of the individual sciences. Our interpretation of Kant's 
analogy of building has thus indeed indicated essential lines of Kant's 
thought. And even here the spacial analogies - and analogies of 
developing life which, as we have seen, Kant thinks through in terms of 
space. 2 The phenomenon we have called spacing - always couched in 
spacial language - appears here as the ultimate rational condition of 
the possibility of critical science, but also of the limits it 
necessarily places upon itself. 
At this point it is worth pursuing further the link we have forged 
between the aesthetics of Kant and Heidegger. Despite the very 
different conceptual languages and approaches at work, nevertheless 
there are some striking parallels. Two of these we mentioned above in 
the introduction to chapter 2.3. These are first the manner in which 
the phenomenon of art helps to indicate the proprieties of thought, and 
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second the manner in which this propriety k rna es a necessary reference 
to an historical and alterable community. 
A third parallel consolidates the connection. In Kant, the beautiful 
representation-in-me draws attention to itself, the mind is drawn to it 
by pleasure, even against its will, Kant says. The disclosure of the 
beautiful is a disclosure which cannot be ignored, but only interpreted 
away by the understanding. But precisely that which draws the 
attention (the pleasure itself) lS the form of the representation which 
functions, as we said above, like a will, and which at the same time 
resists the understanding's proper synthetic functions, but without 
becoming nothing. The beautiful, in Kant, is that which pleases (draws 
attention) in and through resisting in a certain manner. Thus, we 
might say that the beautiful representation lS that which is 
distinctive and draws attention by closing itself off (residing within 
itself) in such a way that the drawing attention (cognitive harmony) is 
an opening for other realms of meaning (i.e. aesthetic ideas of the 
supersensible) . 
But as we saw above, for Heidegger too the self-sufficiency of the 
work, which lS so striking and prominent, is other than the self-
closure of a mere thing. The self-closure of the mere thing is never 
obdurate, except privatively. Rather, the self-sufficiency of the work 
must be carried forward to the ability of the 'solitary' work to 
'transport us out of the realm of the ordinary' (OWA 66). Thus, the 
beautiful in Kant lies in strict parallel to the distinctive and world-
opening that-it-is of the work of art in Heidegger. We should hear in 
h 'd d 'b l' 'The Prl'nciple of t e 'unbridged entry' Hel egger escrl es n 
Identity' (33) an echo of the possible/impossible bridge Kant 
explicates in the introduction to the Third Critique. Heidegger's 
occasional polemic against aesthetics as a theory of institutionalised 
subjective experience among paintings hung with value-added tacks on 
museum walls - this is a polemic not against Kant but against a certain 
Kant, that is, a whole interpretative tradition. 
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But this 'strict parallel' is in fact a moment of the d d 
epen ency upon 
the idea of spacing which is to be found in the aesthetic writings of 
both Kant and Heidegger. It is spacing which conditions the 
distinctive mode and efficacy of the work of art. In Kant, we found 
that the form of the organism is described in the same terms as the 
intuition of space. The former is then used to describe what Kant 
means by self-subsisting cognitive harmony, and can be used to explore 
the relation Kant may have intended between symbols, aesthetic 
attributes and ideas - and also to explore the excess to thought of 
this relation. Both the language and the idea of space are preserved 
in this chain. In Heidegger, the analysis of neighbourhood space found 
in Being and Time not only becomes the model for the analysis of time 
and nothingness, but also of the coming to appearance of both thing and 
work. Earth and World, and the Geviert are both sets of moments within 
a primordial spacing which borrows from Heidegger's phenomenology of 
space all its essential content. In both cases, spacing is the clue to 
both the possibility and the necessary self-effecting withdrawal of the 
experience of art. 
Spacing comes to languag~ and thought as space. This lS not because 
ordinary space has some kind of transcendental priority, but perhaps 
because of exactly the reverse: ordinary empirical space is that last 
'empirical' element which cannot be eliminated. For both Kant and 
Heidegger, the most fundamental law of philosophical inquiry is that 
one always inspects, destroys and builds from within the house. Kant 
calls this 'Critique', Heidegger calls it 'the struggle against 
appearance' (Introduction to Metaphysics). And, as we have seen, even 
this law must become a law of spacing. 
Since the everyday conceptions of time, as we said before, exhaust 
themselves in their objects, they only relate to essential time through 
spacial models and metaphors. Thus, in the Sisyphean climb 'out of' 
the empirical, even primordial temporality has to take space on its 
back. It is not necessarily the case the time is thereby compromised 
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in its primordiality but rather that, since time temporalises only for 
Dasein, it can have no proper voice of its own. As we are falling back 
from the highest point, space is the only language to express what has 
been glimpsed. 
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Chapter Notes 
1. This analogy, and some of the others, is dealt with much more 
adequately in John Sallis, Spacing. 
2. And which are continued and expanded a page later. 
BT 
CAJ 
CPR 
CTJ 
1M 
OWA 
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